




In the historic center of Prague lies the Square of Franz Kafka, where visitors 
meet a larger-than-life bust of Kafka’s brooding features staring down unblinkingly from 
a wall of Maisel Street.  Another bust is found in the Quadrio Business Centre, where 
Kafka’s eleven-meter-tall face, comprised of forty-two independently rotating tiers that 
alternately distort and restore his stern features, turns from side to side as though 
scrutinizing its visitors.  Kafka, perhaps the quintessential modernist author and 
scrutinizer of bureaucracy and the world at large, has thus been immortalized as an ever-
watchful guardian.  As Western society veered from its traditions, modernists reexamined 
existence; Kafka deemed the world absurd and struggled against its “unjust Judges” 
(Diaries 342).  As he scrutinized the world, Kafka scrutinized himself and his writing, 
down to the individual letter of every word: “Almost every word I write jars against the 
next, I hear the consonants rub leadenly against each other and the vowels sing an 
accompaniment like Negroes in a minstrel show” (Diaries 29).  Intensely doubtful about 
his own writing, Kafka destroyed an estimated ninety percent of his work and before his 
death in 1924 asked his friend Max Brod to burn the rest.  Cementing his reputation as 
anonymous and enigmatic, Kafka published only a few short stories during his lifetime, 
including “The Judgment” in 1913 and Metamorphosis in 1915.  Otherwise, his writing 
survives only in scattered fragments—letters and diaries, aphorisms, manuscripts of 
unfinished novels—all rescued by Brod, who disobeyed Kafka’s final request and, 
carrying a suitcase filled with Kafka’s writing, left for Palestine minutes before the Nazis 
isolated Prague.  Due to Brod’s efforts, The Trial was published in 1925, followed by The 
2 
	  
Castle in 1926 and Amerika in 1927, and Kafka’s slim corpus attained the recognition it 
had not during his lifetime.    
Kafka has since been credited with his own informal literary genre, the 
Kafkaesque, which is characterized by an illogical, senseless, often nightmarish 
complexity and a mood of despondence and hopelessness.  He was a troubled man beset 
by anxiety and depression; John Updike supposes that Kafka’s nervous system “flayed of 
its old hide of social usage and religious belief, must record every touch as pain” (The 
Complete Stories ix).  The Kafkaesque connotes the horrific and bizarre, but this skewing 
of Kafka’s reputation towards cynicism is surprising and perhaps unwarranted.  In The 
Myth of Sisyphus, Albert Camus discusses the philosophy of absurdism, which claims 
that the efforts of humanity to find value and meaning in life are doomed and therefore 
absurd; Camus compares this absurdity to the “futile and hopeless labor” of Sisyphus, 
condemned to “ceaselessly rolling a rock to the top of a mountain, whence the stone 
would fall back of its own weight” (119).  Camus praises Kafka for his depiction of the 
absurd, but he qualifies his praise by claiming that Kafka introduces “hope in a strange 
form” (130).  Hope is not typically associated with the Kafkaesque, but contrarily, Camus 
interprets Kafka as purposeful and deliberate.  Camus and Kafka agree that the world is 
absurd and that rationalism—the belief that reason is the basis of all truth, that logic 
explains all the workings of the world—is insufficient.  But Kafka’s writing is not purely 
a venting of frustrations, not startling and bizarre merely for the sake of being startling 
and bizarre.  Kafka should be read not as a cynic, but as a skeptic.  Cynicism implies 
passivity: acknowledging a problem without attempting to remedy it and finally 
succumbing to apathy.  If he had been a cynic, Kafka would have written truly hopeless 
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stories.  As a skeptic, Kafka recognized the absurdity of the world and surmised that there 
must be a means of rectification.  The question becomes: What is the absurdity that Kafka 
depicts, and what is his hope?  
Before further discussion, I must acknowledge the inherent problem of 
interpreting Kafka.  As an author whose corpus was primarily posthumous, Kafka 
deflects direct analysis.  Aside from the few stories published during his lifetime, Kafka’s 
fiction cannot be said to be purely his own.  Amerika, The Trial, and The Castle are truly 
collaborative works between Kafka and Max Brod, who organized scattered chapters into 
their current, incomplete forms.  Though the words belong to Kafka, the narrative 
structure was partially constructed by Brod.  To Brod’s credit, the narratives are logical 
and may well reflect Kafka’s original intention, but the fact remains that Kafka did not 
construct the current forms of his stories.  Furthermore, I must rely on translations rather 
than the original German, and I acknowledge that translation may stray from the original 
spirit of the text.  However, I believe that a broad thematic discussion is largely immune 
to misrepresentation.  My discussion is based on the Willa and Edwin Muir translations, 
which were the first translations, published as early as 1930.  Secondary literature 
typically relies on these translations, thus allowing me to engage in conversation with 
other analyses.  Relying on translations, I avoid analysis of diction and syntax, which are 
partially the work of translators.  Instead, I focus on plot, detail, characterization, and 
symbolism, which—and here I must rely on the integrity of the translators—are abstract 
ideas that transcend diction and truly belong to Kafka.  Because Brod partially 
constructed the narrative structure of the novels, character development is ambiguous, but 
any character development is at least indicative of a change in character, because the 
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writing compiled by Brod ultimately belongs to Kafka.  With these considerations in 
mind, I return to my discussion. 
In Kafka’s fiction, the absurd is largely social—that people are, by some unseen 
force, bound to a bourgeois society that mandates an incomprehensible code of behavior 
and normalcy.  Hermann Hesse’s Steppenwolf provides a fitting definition of the 
bourgeois world:  
Now the bourgeois treasures nothing more highly than the self, rudimentary as his 
may be.  And so at the cost of intensity he achieves his own preservation and 
security.  His harvest is a quiet mind which he prefers to being possessed by God, 
as he does comfort to pleasure, convenience to liberty…the bourgeois is 
consequently by nature a creature of weak impulses, anxious, fearful of giving 
himself away and easy to rule. (52)   
Kafka criticizes both the bourgeois world for its forced assimilation of humanity and 
humanity for its submission to the bourgeoisie.  If a social contract exists between 
humanity and society, it was not written and signed in the truest sense of a contract.  
Kafka depicts the contract not as an explicit agreement with the full understanding of all 
parties, but one forced on its participants and whose terms are never specified, so that 
people live in “complete ignorance of all things concerning [it]” (The Trial 153).  It is 
more accurate to characterize this relationship between citizen and society as subjugation 
under an arbitrary social mandate, in which the directive, the what is known—
conforming to normalcy—but the why and how is not.  There is no understanding of what 
normalcy means, perhaps no achievable state of normalcy at all, and therefore it is 
impossible to fulfill this mandate.  Kafka’s characters are trapped in two conflicting 
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situations: the necessity of understanding others to find a place among them and the 
fundamental human condition of being unable to understand others.  Privately, Kafka 
describes his loneliness thus: “Insignificant as I may be, nevertheless there is no one here 
who understands me in my entirety.  To have someone possessed of such 
understanding…would mean…to have God” (Diaries 339).  Lacking the omniscience of 
God, humans can never understand each other, and thus the efforts of Kafka’s characters 
can never succeed.  Their expectations of others are continuously subverted, they 
disappoint the expectations of others, and all their attempts end in frustration.  For 
example, in the short story “Description of a Struggle,” the narrator initially expects his 
companion to be lively, but instead meets silence and realizes he “no longer understood 
his mood” (The Complete Stories 11).  When he acclimatizes to silence and resolves to 
leave, the companion speaks and compels him to stay, as though “suggesting some 
agreement which [the man] had apparently forgotten” (12).  When he continues their 
conversation, he realizes that his companion believes him to be something he is not, 
causing the man to undeservedly “rise in his estimation” (13).  There is a perpetual sense 
of instability, and this vertigo of inevitable failure characterizes Kafka’s depiction of 
social relationships.   
Human inadequacy would not be absurd unless it were also inescapable, and 
Kafka makes clear that humanity cannot be freed.  Social subjugation is absolute because 
the mandate comes from an unknown yet inexorable authority.  As The Trial states, 
“Everything belongs to the Court” (140).  Kafka equates authority with an omniscient, 
omnipresent, omnipotent force that transcends humanity and demands absolute obedience.  
Authority is not necessarily divine, though theology features prominently in Kafka’s 
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work.  Instead, authority refers to the higher order of the world, the system of morality 
and law that exists independently of humanity.  In The Trial, this is the High Court.  In 
The Castle, this is the titular Castle.  Its mandate takes on elements of compulsion, 
forcing Kafka’s characters continuously to try to conform despite their continuous failure.  
They are aware of their own lack of understanding and question their role in society, but 
when they question the system, they discover ambiguity—and almost invariably wind up 
subjugated.  Authority forces them to comply, but this authority seemingly has no 
justification other than its nature as authority.  It has no concrete form, cannot be traced 
to an origin, and exists as an unchallengeable norm.  It deeply pervades the culture of 
Kafka’s works, forming an unconquerable barrier to freedom.  His characters can only 
doubt themselves and their perceived inability to conform to an impossible system.  No 
one has chosen this subjugation, and they have no option to choose otherwise.   
It is important to recognize that the Kafkaesque traits of subjugation and 
compulsion are not merely fictitious but the depiction of an observable real-world 
phenomenon; Kafka’s stories serve to expose the absurdity of the real world.  Kafka’s 
commentary on the social sphere incorporates the political and theological spheres and 
synthesizes them into a single, overarching dynamic—a struggle between humanity and 
authority.  People have an obligation to society, citizens have an obligation to 
government, and humanity has an obligation to a higher spiritual order.  These 
relationships all derive from the same concept of human subjugation to a supreme 
authority whose hold is unexplained yet absolute.  In The Trial, Joseph K. is pinned under 
the rule of a nonsensical governmental authority, the Court, and stands accused of a crime 
unknown to him.  His predicament is the same as the average, real-world citizen whose 
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nationality is determined not by explicit agreement but because he happened, by chance, 
be born in a particular area under the jurisdiction of a particular government.  Nor does 
the average citizen have a complete understanding of the laws to which he is bound, and 
yet he must comply with those rules or suffer the consequences.  Theology enters the 
story when K. enters the Cathedral and learns that the priest also belongs to the Court.  
Religion is thus depicted not as an escape from earthly constraint but as another form of 
subjugation, an extension of the same imposition of supreme, inscrutable authority that 
pervades the social and political domains.  It mirrors Kafka’s personal struggle with his 
religious identity, an experience certainly not unique to any person.   
But Kafka did not reject authority outright.  His characters are not noble 
revolutionaries railing against an evil oppressor.  Kafka’s protagonists are average people 
mired in a conformist, bourgeois society.  They, like Kafka and so many others in the real 
world, are inflexible, unable to break from worldly constraints and unable to adapt to the 
inexplicability of the larger universe.  Their quest is to understand the nature of the 
authority that governs them—though, per the principles of absurdism, they invariably fail.  
Secure in bourgeois society, they cannot comprehend the nature of authority and the 
world, but their efforts are not meaningless.  Kafka satirized the bourgeois and the 
defeatism of mindless conformity, but not the inability to break free.  Robin West writes 
that “choice” and “autonomy” have become synonyms for “right” and “good,” while 
“authority” and “obedience” connote “the good German, the Nazi soldier, the Stalinist” 
(385).  But West and Kafka agree that humanity consents to obedience.  West writes: “It 
is psychologically satisfying, or perhaps necessary, to believe in the divine authority or 
the natural superiority of those with power” (419).  Kafka questioned authority, but even 
8 
	  
as he protested its irrationality and absurdity, he embraced its premise.  As he himself 
claimed, Kafka was not a critic, “only a man under judgment and a spectator” (Janouch 
13).  Kafka rejected rationalism and intellectualism, which place humanity and logic 
above spirituality—though Kafka did not believe in the inherent goodness of authority.  
Kafka believed in a higher existence, an authority than transcends humanity and is 
therefore owed obedience, but that authority simply exists, neither good nor evil, remote 
but omnipresent, negligent but omniscient, distant but omnipotent.  Its neutral nature is 
best described in The Trial: “The Court makes no claims upon you.  It receives you when 
you come and it relinquishes you when you go” (205).  Kafka refused to attribute 
morality, nobility, virtue, or logic to his authority, his God, but for that very reason, 
Kafka recognized and accepted the transcendental power of authority.  Authority may be 
considered transcendent from here on, which describes its existence beyond humanity but 
does not judge its nature.  Similarly, the transcendentalism in which Kafka and his 
characters believe refers to transcendence of the bourgeois world in pursuit of a holier 
world.  Kafka’s diary entry of October 18, 1921, offers his interpretation of 
transcendentalism: “It is entirely conceivable that life’s splendor forever lies in wait 
about each one of us in all its fullness, but veiled from view, deep down, invisible, far off.  
It is there, though, not hostile, not reluctant, not deaf” (Diaries 393).  Kafka recognizes 
that authority exists and does not forbid happiness, may perhaps deserve obedience and 
be understood, and that is his hope. 
Kafka observed and questioned the absurdity of obligation in the general social 
mandate.  This conflict, which lies at the heart of his work, can be traced to Kafka’s 
longstanding conflict with his father, Hermann.  The “shining example for [Kafka’s] 
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imagination and creative genius” (Brod 5), Hermann epitomized everything that Kafka 
attributes to the social mandate.  While Kafka’s fiction suggests an elusive authority, 
Hermann was the concrete source of conflict in Kafka’s personal life.  In the nearly fifty-
page Letter to His Father, Kafka explores his relationship with Hermann, who was, from 
his son’s perspective, abusive and tyrannical.  Hermann was such an authoritative figure, 
such an insurmountable obstacle, that he seemed to Kafka not just a man but a world, a 
god whose every whim was a “heavenly commandment” (Letter 23).  Worse, Hermann 
was a god who had proscribed free will.  Kafka believed himself subject to predestination 
mandated by his God, Hermann, a god whose judgment was inconstant and arbitrary, a 
God who “did not keep the commandments [he] imposed on [Kafka]” (Letter 25).  Just as 
Kafka’s characters are involuntarily subjected to a social mandate, Kafka was forced into 
bondage to his father, born by chance and without choice of circumstances, and like any 
child, subject to the non-negotiable authority of his parents.  As Kafka explores his 
inability to balance personal freedom and social obligation, the concept of conflicting 
worlds emerges: 
Hence the world was for me divided into three parts: one in which I, the slave, 
lived under laws that had been invented only for me and which I could, I did not 
know why, never completely comply with; then a second world, which was 
infinitely remote from mine, in which you lived, concerned with government, 
with the issuing of orders and with the annoyance about their not being obeyed; 
and finally a third world where everybody else lived happily and free from orders 
and from having to obey. (Letter 25)  
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Hermann was the basis of Kafka’s understanding of absurdity and unconditional 
obedience, and his role as a slaver and lawmaker was the origin of the unseen authority 
that issues absolute mandates.  For Kafka, Hermann represented, on the most personal 
level, the struggle against authority that is found in his work.  Kafka mythologized his 
father as the embodiment of all forms of authority: patriarchal, social, political, and 
theological; Hermann was simultaneously father, employer, ruler, and God.  All these 
relationships imply an authority figure whose authority exists as a matter of course rather 
than merit—the same idea that reoccurs time and time again in Kafka’s writing, an idea 
that Kafka both struggled against and struggled to accept.  Because Hermann was the root 
of Kafka’s subject matter, Letter to His Father can be considered the key to his work.  
Letter to His Father, Kafka’s personal response to the real-world authority that is 
transformed into the authority of his fiction, suggests how he should be read and how he 
might be interpreted.  As he rebelled against his father, Kafka also struggled against the 
larger idea of arbitrary authority.  Kafka describes a third world, the world of freedom, as 
an ideal blocked by the oppressive world represented by Hermann.  In Demian, Hermann 
Hesse makes a similar point: “The bird fights its way out of the egg.  The egg is the world.  
Who must be born must first destroy a world” (112–113).  Likewise, Kafka needed to 
fight past Hermann, needed to find some way to destroy “the world” that was his obstacle, 
to be born into freedom.   
A logical escape from this bondage might have been a break with Hermann and a 
family of his own, a possibility Kafka considered and even pursued at multiple points in 
his life, but he ultimately rejected this path as something belonging too much to Hermann.  
Starting a family would not have freed Kafka from social oppression.  It would only have 
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shifted his position from child to parent, from oppressed to oppressor, and the bond 
would remain, entrapping both parties as prisoners.  Furthermore, family was too 
associated with Hermann.  Marrying and starting a family would have made him 
Hermann’s equal, but also more like Hermann; Hermann would only become a greater, 
more inescapable part of him (Letter 109).  Like the bird of Demian, Kafka needed to 
overcome entirely his bondage to his family to escape the absurd world of society.  
Kafka’s chosen escape route was his writing—the entirety of which can be considered his 
means of escape from the social mandate and family, his attempt to transcend the futility 
of the world.  Writing, Kafka avows, is happiness: “It is really something effervescent 
that fills me completely with a light, pleasant quiver and that persuades me of the 
existence of abilities of whose non-existence I can convince myself with complete 
certainty at any moment, even now” (Diaries 29).  Writing did not eradicate his doubt, 
but Kafka believed that writing brought him closer to fulfilment and, perhaps, 
understanding of the absurd.  Kafka, who would bring his publications to his father’s 
attention, was not disappointed by Hermann’s unfailing neglect.  Hermann’s aversion to 
his writing gave him respite from constant judgment.  On April 27, 1915, Kafka wrote 
that he was “incapable of living with people, of speaking” (Diaries 334).  Interaction and 
speech belonged to Hermann, but writing was a sphere uncontaminated by his father’s 
influence, a domain that belonged to Kafka as the home belonged to Hermann.  Kafka’s 
stories are not just unending nightmares that vent his own hopelessness.  Writing was his 
escape and an intentional, calculated form of rebellion against social subjugation.  
Though Kafka’s last request to Max Brod to burn all his writing seems to indicate his 
sense of failure, his purpose powerfully influenced the message of his fiction.   
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Through the act of writing, of creation, Kafka strove to achieve the same godly 
power that Hermann wielded over him.  In Letter to His Father, Kafka’s purpose is not 
reconciliation with Hermann, but the creation of a new dynamic between them.  Before, 
Kafka had been the victim, and Hermann both culprit and judge.  Kafka could have tried 
to fight the absurdity of their relationship with anger and resentment, but by its very 
absurd nature, their relationship would have rendered this defense ineffectual; Kafka, 
putting forward a case but judged by the very same man who oppressed him, could not 
have prevailed.  Therefore, in true Camusian fashion, Kafka elected not to try to escape 
his absurd situation.  Instead, Kafka embraced his father and the authority that he wielded 
by understanding him.  Kafka had never rejected the idea of authority and higher truth, 
only the incomprehensible form that it seemed to take, and Kafka now embraced the 
absurdity of this relationship.  This acceptance was his solution to the problem of 
absurdity and social bondage.  His struggles with the failings of authority—inscrutability 
and irrationality—are resolved by the understanding that there does exist a transcendental 
truth, the realization that humanity is capable of self-actualization outside the prison of a 
bourgeois world.  Kafka suggests that, to fulfill the potential of one’s humanity, one must 
struggle, one must question authority and seek understanding of the world even if that 
attempt fails, because the struggle has value.  Humanity can thus attain a more fulfilling, 
more human existence free from the conformity of the bourgeois world.  Kafka’s struggle 
against Hermann was the basis of the struggle against authority in his work.  In seeking to 
overcome Hermann through writing, Kafka sought to overcome the social subjugation 
that his father symbolized.  By recognizing absurdity, Kafka weakened Hermann’s hold 
over his autonomy, and by extension, he overcame the greater constraint placed upon him 
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by society.  Hermann was Kafka’s ultimate inspiration.  Thus, Kafka’s work can be 
analyzed in the context of the father-son relationship—the bourgeoisie and the citizen, 
the divine and the devout, the judge and the defendant—to reveal an overarching theme 
of struggle against and submission to an inscrutable, indomitable authority.  Within all 
his work there is, hidden in the absurd, a bit of hope; his characters, trapped by absurdity, 






FATHER FROM ON HIGH: LETTER TO HIS FATHER AS THE KEY TO KAFKA 
 By the time he wrote Letter to His Father in 1919, Kafka had already written 
many of his most famous stories, including “The Judgment,” “In the Penal Colony,” “The 
Metamorphosis,” and The Trial.  Between September 20, 1912, and October 16, 1917, 
Kafka wrote love letters to Felice Bauer, a woman to whom he twice became engaged 
and from whom he twice broke.  Kafka met Bauer, who was a cousin of Max Brod’s 
brother-in-law and worked in Berlin as an executive officer of the Carl Lindstroem 
Corporation, in August, 1912.  Writing letters back and forth, Kafka proposed in May 
1913.  Doubts soon began to set in; Kafka feared that marriage would interfere with his 
writing, and “everything in [him] revolted against it, much as [he] always loved F.” 
(Diaries 262).  Their engagement ended in July, but both continued to write, met several 
times, and became engaged again in July 1917.  Their engagement was broken again in 
December, and they separated for the last time.  In January 1919, Kafka met Julie 
Wohryzkova in Schelesen while recuperating from tuberculosis and deemed her “on the 
whole quite ignorant, more cheerful and sad…yet in her heart she is brave, honest, 
unselfish” (Pawel 379).  They became engaged during the summer, but Kafka once again 
broke the engagement after Hermann brutally expressed his disapproval of the 
relationship: “She probably put on a fancy blouse for your benefit.  Those Prague 
Jewesses are good at that sort of thing.  …Haven’t you ever heard of other possibilities?  
If you’re afraid, I’ll make it my business to take you there myself” (Pawel 381).  
Hermann likely alludes to Kafka’s involvement with prostitutes.  In response, Kafka 
wrote Letter to His Father to address their longstanding conflict. 
Letter to His Father, while revealing Kafka’s purpose as a writer because of its 
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uniquely personal nature, came after many of his works and therefore cannot be 
considered an archetype of Kafka’s fiction or be treated as a template of his work.  But by 
the same logic, Letter to His Father, because it came after so many other works, can be 
considered the culmination of Kafka’s philosophy.  It is the product of a matured Kafka 
who, after the struggle against the absurdity of human life represented by his earlier 
writings, finally reached a conclusion about the dilemma that had haunted him for so long.  
Though the letter comes late in his career, Kafka returns to the same themes in all his 
writing because they are all interrelated facets of an ongoing struggle.  Letter to His 
Father is both a product of earlier works and evidence of the motivation that produced 
those earlier works, because the underlying idea is the same; Kafka, recognizing the 
absurdity of subjugation under Hermann’s patriarchal authority, projects that absurdity 
onto society, politics, and theology.  Freud theorized that children’s play, an expression 
of imagination, segues into adult fantasy, an “attempt to correct some kind of 
dissatisfaction,” and writers use the same material as that which composes fantasies to 
compose their writing (Cavalcanti 229).  Freud would thus interpret Kafka’s writing as an 
attempt to “correct” his dissatisfaction with Hermann.  Letter to His Father differs from 
Kafka’s other work primarily because of its overtly personal nature.  This glimpse into 
Kafka’s real-life situation reveals a tension that illuminates his other works.  The letter is 
therefore a key to Kafka that traces the evolution of his thoughts and clarifies his work as 
a struggle against the absurd.  In all other respects, the letter can be treated as a form of 
literature.  In his discussion of Freudian psychic sources of writing, Jose Cavalcanti 
surmises that Letter to His Father “originally did not have literary aspirations,” but 
because Kafka fantasized about reconciliation, the letter realized his fantasies and 
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metamorphosed into a creative “narrative” of subconscious desires “beyond [Kafka’s] 
memory or comprehension capacity” (230).  Indeed, Letter to His Father is not factually 
accurate.  Though it documents the history of Kafka and Hermann, the letter is a biased 
and abstract narrative.  It mythologizes Hermann beyond strictly irrefutable fact, 
transforming him into a figment that is, in Hanif Kureishi’s words, “one of Franz Kafka’s 
liveliest lies, probably one of his best literary creations or fictions” (11).  It chooses 
points of interest rather than encapsulates the entirety of the father-son history, because it 
does not need to do so; the narrative form is intended to reflect Kafka’s intention, which 
makes it a useful guide to Kafka’s work.  By understanding the relationship Kafka 
perceived between himself and Hermann, one can understand the relationship between 
humanity and authority that Kafka depicts in his fiction. 
 Kafka’s feelings toward his father seem contradictory, not least because the 
purpose of the letter is not reconciliation with Hermann, but recognition of their 
irreconcilability.  Cavalcanti notes the “careful and large handwriting” and “few 
corrections” as evidence that Kafka truly intended Hermann to read the letter (230), but 
Kafka did not write to please him.  Kafka writes that Hermann expects from his children, 
if not gratitude, “some sort of obligingness, some sign of sympathy,” but the letter 
contains neither and makes no attempt to resolve the tension between them (Letter 3).  It 
does not directly indict, but the letter nevertheless probes the relationship to highlight 
flaws and even exaggerate them, which only exacerbates the wounds between father and 
son.  For this reason, perhaps, Julie Kafka never delivered her son’s letter to Hermann.  
Kafka knew how to appease Hermann yet refused to do so, suggesting that the letter was 
not truly written for Hermann.  But if Kafka did not seek reconciliation, he had no need 
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to write it.  If it was self-clarification that he sought, he could have internalized all the 
contents of the letter and arrived at a conclusion for himself and himself alone.  Kafka 
might have even cut off all contact with his father and denied his fatherhood, but instead 
he chose to linger over this deeply troubling relationship.  Writing this novella-length 
letter suggests a deep contradiction in Kafka’s perception of his father—he wanted to 
break away but could not bear to do so.  Reading the letter as a form of literature 
strengthens this interpretation, because the artist must have an inspiration for his work, 
some turmoil that he can translate into art, and Kafka states that his writing is all about 
Hermann (Letter 83).  If he had truly broken with Hermann, he would have lost his 
subject matter, and this letter is evidence of his need.  Kafka and Hermann were “an 
immortal double-act, always co-dependents” (Kureishi 11).  Brod surmises that Hermann 
was a “shining example for Franz’s imagination and creative genius,” and that Kafka’s 
“admiration for his father…had a touch of the heroic in it” (Brod 5).  His notion that 
Kafka admired his father is noteworthy, as a cursory reading of Kafka might suggest 
otherwise; Kafka writes in his diary that it is “unpleasant to listen to Father talk with 
incessant insinuations” (Diaries 154).  Such an accusation might suggest that Kafka 
thought his father petty, but it is no less true that Kafka envisioned his father as the 
supreme authority, a man who “from [his] armchair ruled the world” (Letter 17).  Though 
he protested and rebelled, Kafka never sought to overthrow Hermann.  His 
mythologization of Hermann suggests a deep respect for his authority, but the 
contradiction of this mingled contempt and respect can only be discussed after breaking 
down Hermann’s authority into its constituent parts. 
 Hermann Kafka, the fourth child of Jacob Kafka, a butcher, traveled to Prague 
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from the village of Osek and found work as a traveling sales representative, clawing his 
way out of poverty and establishing himself as an independent retailer of men’s and 
women’s fancy goods and accessories.  Hermann pressured Kafka to take up the family 
business, and Kafka was exposed to commerce from a young age until “the business and 
[Hermann] became one” (Letter 49).  To understand the domestic relationship between 
father and son, Tom McCarthy suggests viewing economics as an extension of the home: 
“Economics is derived from the Greek oikos, which means ‘home’ or ‘hearth’—the idea 
being that the economic realm allows an individual to expand the dominion of his home 
management beyond the bounds of his immediate property” (Letter xii).  In the context of 
business, the family is an economic unit with Hermann as the employer and Kafka as an 
employee.  It was perhaps for this reason that Kafka did not marry, that Hermann was 
displeased with his engagement.  Understanding the economy—and by extension, the 
family—as a zero-sum game, Hermann’s domestic power would be reduced should 
Kafka start his own, independent home.  Thus, Kafka was made to live in his father’s 
shadow, unable to accumulate power of his own.  Kafka instead took to miserliness, 
which he describes as “one of the most reliable signs of profound unhappiness” (Letter 
59).  Miserliness characterizes Kafka’s writing process and writing style, accounting for 
his low output, micromanagement of word choice, and continual self-doubt, to the point 
that he made Brod pledge to burn his work.  In a physical sense, miserliness shows itself 
in Kafka’s bodily concealment.  He avoided the “disgrace of showing [himself] in public” 
in view of his father’s powerful body and overwhelming physical presence (Letter 17).  
Yet it is only as a father that Hermann becomes unbearable.  Kafka states that he “should 
have been happy to have [Hermann] as a friend, as a boss, an uncle, a grand-father, even 
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as a father-in-law” (Letter 7).  Kafka’s insistence that he could have accepted Hermann as 
a boss raises the question as to how the father-son relationship differs from the employer-
employee, and the answer is obligation.  Being Hermann’s child meant that Kafka’s 
employment was founded on an unequal relationship.  An employee offers services and is 
paid for them, an explicit contract that is also breakable, but the child is indebted because 
he can offer no service, and his hypothetical employment is unconditional, unavoidable, 
and unmitigable.  In terms of credit-debt, the employee receives wages, while the child 
receives inheritance.  Wages are part of a contract and received in exchange for work 
proffered, but inheritance is a gift that cannot be repaid, and the gift of life is one that 
Kafka describes as “undeserved” (Letter 33).  Childhood is absurd because it combines 
arbitrariness with inescapability.  Its arbitrary nature distinguishes it from economics, 
giving Hermann authority without reason and without consent, and Kafka’s conflict is the 
result of his struggle to accept this irrational arrangement.     
 Aside from economic authority, Kafka imbues Hermann with political authority 
that anticipates the totalitarian police state.  He recounts the story of Hermann dragging 
him out of bed and onto the pavlatche, the semipublic balcony, and says this of his 
trauma: “Even years afterwards I suffered from the tormenting fancy that the huge man, 
my father, the ultimate authority, would come almost for no reason at all and take me out 
of bed in the night…” (Letter 13).  This scene recalls the opening scene of The Trial, in 
which Joseph K. is dragged out of bed and accused of a crime.  It evokes secret police, 
turning the politics of the domestic sphere into actual politics.  Kafka equates the home 
with the world, and Hermann is the ruler of both.  His political opinions, which “run 
down the Czechs, and then the Germans, and then the Jews,” is described as the 
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“enigmatic quality that all tyrants have” (Letter 17).  Hermann is a dictator because, 
despite all his inconsistencies and arbitrariness, he is never in the wrong.  Kafka further 
describes the conflict between himself and Hermann as a “terrible trial…in which you 
keep on claiming to be the judge” (Letter 65).  As with any dictatorship, the dictator 
cannot stand accused; the dictator is the judge, and should the plaintiff make a case 
against him, he dismisses the case; the dictator can never become the defendant.  
Likewise, Hermann forbade Kafka from pleading or petitioning, disallowing Kafka’s 
potential case against him: “Not a word of contradiction!” (Letter 29).  Though not every 
government is totalitarian, Kafka’s portrayal of Hermann’s political power suggests 
governmental power over citizens.  They must obey laws, must conform to a certain code 
of conduct, without consenting to their submission.  Unable to speak, Kafka was left with 
writing as his only voice of complaint against the arbitrary nature of Hermann’s 
totalitarian control.  Kafka recalls that Hermann was usually playing cards whenever 
Kafka arrived to give him his new books, an image with striking implications (Letter 83).  
Cards are an arbitrary game: players have no control over the hand they are dealt.  
Writing is inherently empowering because the writer fully controls his world.  Hermann 
represents arbitrary political power, while Kafka, writing books, is concerned with 
unraveling the logic of this authority. 
While economic and political authority are strictly human realms of control, 
Kafka also imbued Hermann with theological authority.  Like many others disillusioned 
with the intangibility of religion, Kafka struggled with religious authority.  God is 
distressingly distant and inscrutable, demanding belief without basis; Brod calls this 
divide, which hounded Kafka, the “theology of the crisis—that tendency that sees 
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between God and man…a yawning abyss that can never be bridged” (Brod 170).  Kafka 
was also concerned with the seemingly absurd contradictions of predestination and 
punishment: If God is all-powerful, why does He permit evil?  If He permits evil, why 
does He punish evil?  Kafka, as he explored authority in the social and political spheres, 
sought to understand the nature of God’s supreme authority.  His writing draws on his 
personal life to mythologize Hermann as a god, the “ultimate authority,” a godly figure 
wielding theological power and passing down “heavenly commandments” (Letter 23).  
Kafka writes that Hermann had imbibed Judaism, so that “the faith that ruled [his] 
life…[was] part and parcel of [his] own nature” (Letter 77).  In Kafka’s mind, Hermann 
believed in Judaism because it affirmed him, the Jewish man.  Hermann believed in 
Judaism only to believe in himself, upholding himself as God.  Realizing this self-
affirmation, Kafka mythologized Hermann as the Heavenly Father of Judaism.  To that 
end, Kafka attributed to Hermann all the traits befitting a Kafka, “the Kafka will to life, 
business, and conquest,” while lowering himself as a Lowy, his mother’s family, with “a 
Lowyish spur that impels more secretly, more diffidently, and in another direction, and 
which often fails to work entirely” (7).  Thus, Kafka drew inspiration for his own 
characterization from his mother’s relationship to Hermann.  He depicts Julie Kafka as 
devoted to Hermann, tending to his needs at home, helping with his business, and never 
shielding her son against him.  By calling himself a “Lowy with a certain basis of Kafka” 
(7), Kafka employs a “feminine masochistic identification” (Ritva 319) that leaves him, 
like Julie, forever subservient to their God, Hermann.  Any aggression that Kafka might 
have directed at Hermann would have been ineffectual.  Kafka thus focused on another 
object of his ire: his own body.  Kafka’s “hypochondriacal preoccupations” (Ritva 322) 
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included worries about digestion, hair loss, and spinal curvature, which, “intensifying in 
innumerable gradations, finally ended with a real illness” (Letter 85).  In a diary entry of 
1910, Kafka writes, as though in premonition: “I write this very decidedly out of despair 
over my body and over a future with this body” (Diaries 10).  In August 1917, Kafka was 
diagnosed with tuberculosis.   
Evidently, Hermann, for all his earthly presence, was no more benevolent or 
transparent than the distant Judaic God.  If he could solve the quandary of his absurd 
obligation to Hermann, Kafka might also dispel the mystery of God’s authority and the 
rationale of his own loyalty.  To begin with, Kafka considers Hermann a world unto 
himself, “a world…concerned with government, with the issuing of orders and with the 
annoyance about their not being obeyed” (Letter 25).  Hermann is a political world, but 
also a theological world characterized by hypocritical commandments; Kafka recounts 
that even as Hermann corrected his table manners, he committed the same gaffes (Letter 
23).  Not only are these orders hypocritical, they are arbitrary, as in the story of Hermann 
dragging Kafka out of bed “almost for no reason at all.” Like Hermann, God demands 
obedience, but He demarcates sin arbitrarily and punishes sins whose existence He has 
allowed.  Hermann, telling stories of his youth, denied his children the “opportunity to 
distinguish [themselves] as [he] had done” because that would have involved the sin of 
“violence and revolution…[and] breaking away from home” (Letter 45).  In the same 
way, God tempts believers with sin, first by allowing it to exist, and then by drawing 
attention to its existence through his express forbiddance.  Kafka accuses Hermann of this 
same contradiction: “While on the one hand you tempted me to it by means of example, 
story, and humiliation, on the other hand you forbade it with the utmost severity” (Letter 
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45).  Kafka is convinced that it was Hermann who “pushed [him] down into this filth—
just as though [he] were predestined to it” (Letter 101).  Kafka concludes that divine 
authority can be unjust, which raises the question of his obligation to such an authority.   
 But Kafka’s complaint is not against authority, but against the absurdity of 
authority.  Kafka was “convinced that there were truths which could not be assailed” 
(Brod 173), and one of those truths, as discussed previously, is the third world of freedom 
“where everybody else lived happily and free from orders and from having to obey.” His 
supposition that one might be free from orders and obedience in this world seems to 
suggest that he desires to escape all authority, but Brod theorizes otherwise: 
That brings him back to the Jewish creed, in one sentence of which, “Our God is 
one God,” I see the strongest spell against all attempts to attribute to God ethical 
laws fundamentally different from those of mankind.  God, the world of 
perfection, of the Platonic “highest good,” is under the same laws as we are, our 
morality runs toward this goal, without, it is true, our being able to comprehend 
the goal… (Brod 184) 
Kafka’s original concept of triune worlds proposes that he, the slave, occupies one; 
Hermann, the God, occupies another; and the rest of humanity, the free, occupies the 
third.  These are not three equal worlds, but two, respectively occupied by God and the 
freed persons of humanity, the enlightened portion of humanity, for whom God is not a 
force of subjugation but an example of autonomy that they have attained for themselves.  
Kafka and the rest of humanity, those trapped in the earthly, bourgeois world, are 
confined to their prison.  Their goal, the goal of humanity, is to escape that prison-world 
into a free-world, having reached the full potential of humankind.  To do so, humanity 
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must understand God and the “highest good.” Brod posits that it is impossible for 
humanity to comprehend this goal, but the inability to comprehend precludes neither 
attempt nor success.  Kafka’s writing suggests that, though the goal of perfection is 
inscrutable and perhaps unreachable, one must strive for it anyhow by struggling against 
the absurdity of its inscrutability.  Only by recognizing the prison of the bourgeois world 
can one hope to escape it, and Kafka seems to believe, despite his consciousness of 
human weakness, that man, “with his spark of reason, will, and ethical perception is not 
altogether the plaything of super-mighty powers…which he does not understand and 
never can understand” (Brod 171).  If Kafka believed that humanity is doomed, there 
would have been no point in writing works of hope, perhaps no point in writing at all.  To 
Kafka, freedom is possible, and his aim is to achieve freedom—to reveal, understand, and 
embrace the absurd, and in doing so, be freed. 
Having established Hermann’s supreme authority, Kafka probes the absurdity of 
the relationship between them. While he recognized that reconciliation was impossible, 
having stated in a message to Brod that “the roots of this enmity are ineradicable” (Brod 
170), Kafka pursued understanding nonetheless.  Kafka recalls joking about his father out 
of self-preservation: “Jokes of the kind that are made about gods and kings, jokes that are 
not only compatible with the profoundest respect but are indeed part and parcel of it” 
(Letter 41).  Antagonistic jokes only strengthen the butt of the joke by highlighting the 
joker’s scanty means of attack.  Kafka later abandoned flippancy and discussed his 
relationship with his father in more self-affirming terms: “The child’s exclusive sense of 
guilt has been partly replaced by insight into our helplessness, yours and mine” (Letter 
29).  Note that Kafka recognizes this process as incomplete.  He states that his guilt has 
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been “partly” replaced by insight, because freedom is an ongoing struggle against the 
complacency that threatens to plunge him back into the bourgeois world.  Hermann will 
always exist just as authority will always exist, and Kafka must continue to struggle 
against it with perhaps no end in sight.  But even this endlessness can be transformed into 
a boon, because understanding the limits of one’s ability is another form of the self-
awareness that Kafka advocates.  Furthermore, Kafka notably insists that, like him, 
Hermann is helpless and therefore blameless: “Rather, by virtue of your antagonistic 
nature, you could not help but always and inevitably cause the child such 
disappointments” (Letter 19).  Kafka’s empathy is evidence of his growing understanding, 
but blamelessness does not exonerate Hermann.  Blamelessness strips him of power by 
stripping him of agency.  If Hermann has no actual power beyond that which has been 
afforded to him by his nature, even his most tyrannical acts are not the result of a 
consciously malicious will but something beyond even his control.  Hermann as God is 
likewise subject to the predestination imposed on humanity.  Thus, as Brod theorizes, 
God and humanity are bound by the same laws.  God is no longer so distant and so 
inscrutable if it can be understood that He is constant in inconstancy, that even the 
arbitrary has been preordained.  If the power dynamic between God and humanity is a 
zero-sum game on the economic model, then God’s diminished power is humanity’s 
increased power, placing God on a closer level to humanity—a level that can, perhaps, be 
reached by ascension into the world of freedom.  However, Kafka does not seem to 
believe that God should be, or can be, overthrown.  Kafka lived in “a voluntary and 
therefore triumphant surrender” (Janouch 17).  Kafka accepted Hermann’s authority just 
as he accepted God’s authority, the transcendental authority of the world.  Kafka’s goal 
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was to clarify the relationship between himself and his father so that he could accept 
Hermann’s authority.  Likewise, he aimed to clarify the relationship between himself and 
God so he could better understand and accept God’s authority.   
 Kafka ends Letter to His Father with an answer written from Hermann’s 
perspective. This answer tears apart Kafka’s own rhetoric and accuses him of writing to 
indict Hermann while simultaneously surviving on his blood like a tick—an addendum 
that seems self-sabotaging but serves to humanize the letter by introducing ambiguity.  
Truth tyrannizes over those who do not possess it, and Kafka, by including this response, 
avoids imposing on Hermann as a mode of revenge.  Most importantly, this response 
from Hermann’s perspective completes the narrative.  Kafka states that “with the 
correction made by this rejoinder—a correction I neither can nor will elaborate in 
detail—in my opinion something has been achieved which so closely approximates the 
truth…” (Letter 121).  He calls this a “correction” because up to this point, the narrative 
has been written entirely from his perspective, but an accurate portrayal of the father-son 
relationship must include Hermann as the godly arbitrator who judges Kafka’s 
argument—and who must prove it wrong.  Kafka is not accusing his father, because he 
cannot accuse the judge, the authority figure whom he has mythologized.  Kafka’s 
mythologization of their relationship requires the imaginary reply that silences him.  His 
inability to explain the correction reflects the struggle to understand the absurd: he has an 
idea of what he wants to say, has an idea of freedom, but can only grasp blindly.  Yet he 
must make an attempt.  Returning to the purpose of the letter, Kafka evidently did not 
write this letter in hopes of reconciliation.  His correction shows that Hermann, the judge, 
would have interpreted the letter as further proof of the unbridgeable distance between 
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them.  But Kafka did write the letter, perhaps for his own benefit.  Writing thus becomes 
its own reason—writing for the sake of writing, of thinking and struggling through the 
absurdity of life. 
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FRAGMENTS OF A STRUGGLE: KAFKA’S SHORT STORIES 
 Kafka’s short stories form the bulk of the The Complete Stories, beginning with 
one of his earliest works, “Description of a Struggle,” written in 1904, and appropriately 
ending with his last, “Josephine the Singer,” written in 1924.  At first glance, these stories 
have wildly different concerns.  “Description” depicts the surreal nighttime stroll of an 
ordinary man, while “Josephine” describes a colony of mice and the titular singer’s place 
in society.  Situated within the twenty years between these two stories are nineteen other 
short stories and dozens of fragments, spanning subjects as diverse as a man’s attempt to 
defend a treatise about a giant mole, a doctor’s struggle against his patients to return 
home, a creature’s reflection on its burrow.  The Complete Stories might be read merely 
as a compilation, and indeed, each story could be analyzed separately to great effect.  Yet 
as with all of Kafka’s other work, the underlying themes remain the same: society, 
authority, and, especially, the father-son relationship that characterizes all forms of 
authority.  Accordingly, this chapter will address The Complete Works as a unified work, 
categorizing and analyzing the stories as contributors to particular themes and as 
evidence of the salience and development of those themes throughout Kafka’s career.  To 
this end, the stories will be placed in three subcategories.  First is the bourgeois world and 
its inherent, absurd qualities: humanity’s attempt to conform to society, and society’s 
inability to facilitate humanity’s quest for truth.  Second is the inscrutable authority, the 
force that drives humanity to conform and obey: the nature of this authority and its 
political and theological foundations.  Third is the father-son relationship, viewed 
through Kafka and Hermann’s relationship, culminating in an analysis of The 
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Metamorphosis as an allegory of the struggle between father and son and the larger 
conflict between God and man. 
 
The Entrapping Bourgeois  
In 1904, at the age of twenty, Kafka began “Description of a Struggle.”  Though 
the story convinced Max Brod of his literary genius, modern appraisal has been less kind.  
In the foreword to The Complete Stories, John Updike advises readers to skip 
“Description of a Struggle,” along with “Wedding Preparations in the Colony,” written in 
1907, criticizing them as “not merely opaque but repellent” (Complete Stories xii).  It is 
widely agreed that the two stories are less mature and elegant than Kafka’s later work, 
but to skip them would overlook the temporal development of the Kafkian theme of 
imprisonment in a bourgeois world.  To illustrate this development, the two stories can be 
compared to “A Report to an Academy.” Kafka initially depicts the bourgeois world as 
an obvious threat in the preceding two stories, but by the time of “A Report to an 
Academy,” he has recharacterized the bourgeois into a world of entrapment, into which 
one can be absorbed and blinded to both its own existence and the existence of higher 
truths.  It is precisely this world that Kafka believed himself to have fallen into, as per his 
diary entry of July 19, 1910: “When I think about it, I must say that my education has 
done me great harm in some respects…I can prove at any time that my education tried to 
make another person out of me than the one I became” (Diaries 15-17).  From his 
elementary education in the Deutsche Knabenschule to his study of chemistry and law at 
Charles University in Prague, Kafka despaired of education because it distracted from 
writing.  Education led to his employment as an insurance officer, first at the 
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Assicurazioni Generali in 1907 and later at the Worker’s Accident Insurance Institute for 
the Kingdom of Bohemia in 1908.  In 1911, Karl Hermann, husband of his sister Elli, 
proposed that Kafka collaborate in the operation of an asbestos factory known as Prager 
Asbestwerke Hermann and Co.  In a diary entry of January 19, 1915, Kafka writes: “I 
shall not be able to write so long as I have to go to the factory… Immediate contact with 
the workday world deprives me—though inwardly I am as detached as I can be—of the 
possibility of taking a broad view of matters” (Diaries 326).  Modernism emerged as a 
reaction against the monotony of commercial work and the bourgeois values of the 
Industrial Revolution, and Kafka, likewise, rebelled against the employment that tore him 
away from his artistic calling.  Perhaps for this reason, his earliest works, written during 
this period, are primarily concerned with the bourgeois world.  
The instability of the bourgeois world is one of the most prevalent themes in 
“Description of a Struggle,” the titular struggle being an uncertain attempt to break away 
from the unstable interpersonal relationships of the bourgeoisie.  It begins with the 
narrator sitting alone at the end of a party, surveying a pile of pastries that he has picked 
out and arranged.  The partiers are described thus: “At about midnight a few people rose, 
bowed, shook hands, said it had been a pleasant evening, and then passed through the 
wide doorway into the vestibule, to put on their coats” (9).  Kafka’s preoccupation with 
the details of social niceties—the bowing and the shaking of hands, the spoken 
pleasantries—and his depiction of multiple people following this exact procedure 
demonstrates the impersonality of the bourgeoisie by showcasing its dehumanizing and 
regimenting tendencies.  None of these customs are natural, yet no one is exempt from 
them, not even the slightly drunken man who approaches the narrator with “rather more 
31 
	  
animated conversation” about kissing a girl (10).  This conversation is more animated 
than the party, which follows preset formalities.  By comparison, this non-conformist 
experience breaks the narrator out of his reverie of wine and pastries, a submissive 
trance-like state into which the party—bourgeois society—has lulled him.  He leaves the 
party with the man, but despite his claim that he had “saved an ungrateful young man 
from disgrace,” the truth is that the man had saved him from the stifling atmosphere (11).  
But this new companion is neither friend nor foe, and he continually subverts the 
narrator’s expectations: “No sooner had I given him an encouraging slap on the back than 
I suddenly no longer understood his mood, and withdrew my hand” (11).  There is little 
comfort in this liberation.  If he is the narrator’s key to freedom, the companion is a 
perplexity with which the narrator must struggle.   
Kafka illustrates the lure of conformity by describing the narrator’s difficulty 
understanding his companion and his temptation to give up, forsaking the difficult 
struggle in favor of familiarity.  The narrator describes the possibility of returning to his 
home, where he would feel warm and “spend hours alone between the painted walls and 
the floor which, reflected in the gilt-framed mirror hanging on the rear wall, appears 
slanted” (12).  His description of his home with its warmth and light reminds of the party 
that he has just escaped; the limited space between the walls and the floor suggests the 
claustrophobia of confinement in society; the slanted reflection, shown in a mirror framed 
by false gold, suggests that society provides only the illusion of freedom.  It would be 
easy for the narrator to return home, but instead, he grapples with liberation by 
attempting to understand his companion.  He goes so far as to imagine the other man 
having a conversation about the narrator, speaking from the companion’s perspective just 
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as Kafka took on Hermann’s voice in the last paragraphs of Letter to His Father.  Kafka 
thus suggests that one can never achieve perfect understanding of others, as that 
understanding stems from one’s own perception.  What one knows about others is only a 
product of the mind, an amalgamation of impressions and expectations rather than innate 
truths.  Likewise, it is difficult or even impossible to perceive higher truths apart from the 
bourgeois because any perceptions one might have will be tainted by biases.  Thus, Kafka 
rejects Descartes’ theory of innate ideas, which claims that concepts of truth, gifted by 
God, are naturally present in the mind.  Descartes states: “[God] presents [himself] to my 
mind with so much distinctness and clearness—and from the fact alone that this idea is 
found in me, or that I who possess this idea exist, I conclude so certainly that God exists” 
(Descartes 45).  Kafka would oppose innate ideas on the grounds that humanity is not 
capable of direct communion with God.  Instead, Kafkian literature seems in line with 
Locke’s theory of experience, which claims that ideas come from sensations and 
reflections: “I think it is easy to draw this observation—that the ideas of primary qualities 
of bodies are resemblances of them, and their patterns do really exist in the bodies 
themselves, but the ideas produced in us by these secondary qualities have no 
resemblance of them at all” (Locke II.viii.15).  Locke claims that humans observe 
primary qualities—the highest truths of existence—but humans translate these 
observations into lesser, secondary qualities—subjective sensations.  Thus, humanity can 
never understand higher truths in their purest form and must rely on subjective 
interpretations, which, according to Kafka, constitute the bourgeois world.   
True liberation from conformity may seem impossible, but Kafka suggests 
otherwise.  Initially, the narrator is uncertain and under the power of his companion, but 
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as he embraces the inconstancy of his situation, he gains the power to warp reality at his 
whim—at one point managing to swim-fly through the air—and once he realizes that his 
companion “is indifferent…also harmless,” he eventually rides him like a horse (20).  He 
conquers the uncertainty of this situation in much the same way that he analyzes the 
moon.  At first glowing powerfully and “terrifying,” the moon loses its power when the 
narrator “grew accustomed to it and watched with composure the difficulty it had in 
rising” (22).  Like the bourgeois world, the moon seems an insurmountable obstacle until 
the narrator observes it, quantifies its behavior, and realizes its weakness.  Even if 
breaking away is a difficult, uncomfortable, even unhappy task, Kafka advocates that 
struggle against uncertainty. 
“Wedding Preparations in the Country” gives more insight into interhuman 
relationships and the interference of society.  Its protagonist, Raban, must travel to the 
country to meet his future wife, Betty.  The story is notable for depicting a vast number 
of bystanders: a little girl holding a puppy, two gentlemen exchanging information, a lady 
adorned with ribbons and flowers, people riding in carriages and others walking by with 
umbrellas.  Kafka’s precise description of these bystanders hints that each of them are 
real people with full, complex lives, but like the companion of “Description,” none of 
them can be fully understood.  Two version of the story exist, and in the second version, 
the story momentarily breaks away from Eduard Raban’s perspective to provide the inner 
thoughts of an elderly gentleman: “‘Yes, when one is young—’ the gentleman said, 
meaning nothing in particular by this, merely wanting to indicate how it was raining…” 
(74).  Unlike the conversation that the narrator of “Description” imagines from his 
companion’s perspective, this line in “Wedding Preparations” truly delves into the old 
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man’s mind.  But unlike the reader, Raban cannot read the man’s mind as he wishes.  
Raban misinterprets his words to mean that the old man considers “Raban’s thirty years 
nothing in comparison, and…at the age of thirty he had, of course, been more sensible 
than Raban” (74).  Thus, the old man’s harmless idea about the weather becomes an 
insult.  Raban’s misinterpretation shows that outside lives are exactly that—outside—and 
only surface-level perceptions are possible, precluding the possibility of true communion.   
Perhaps for this reason, society dictates how one must act and think in relation to 
others.  “Wedding Preparations” suggests that being alone is the highest form of freedom, 
while marriage is a social trap that restricts one’s actions.  Raban clearly has no affection 
for his fiancé, whom he has never met, and he has little romantic inclination, though he 
seems to believe that he should.  His statement that “everyone says her eyes are beautiful” 
(58) is contrasted by his admission that “[he has] never found eyes beautiful” (59).  There 
is a conflict between his personal belief and the belief of society, to which he succumbs.  
Nonetheless, Raban recognizes that marriage will restrict him, and he understands that its 
significance is limited: “I don’t even need to go to the country myself, it isn’t necessary.  
I’ll send my clothed body” (55).  His notion that a clothed body will suffice suggests that 
marriage is artificial, that marriage is a construct for which his shell is enough.  His body 
is clothed; the body is separated from his mind, and the clothes are symbolic of day-to-
day interactions, such as employment, which mandates a code of dress.  These things are 
physical, earthly, possessing none of the higher spirituality—sanctity, unity—associated 
with marriage.  Raban’s true being is extrinsic to marriage, and he describes his true 
being as assuming “the shape of a big beetle” (56).  An early hint of The Metamorphosis, 
this strange notion shows the innate incompatibility of higher truth and bourgeois reality.  
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All social obligation is similarly restrictive.  Raban muses that refusing invitations 
may be difficult, and he thinks: “For it is not so easy as I imagine it now when I am still 
alone and can still do everything…for I shall have no one there whom I could pay calls 
on whenever I like, and no one with whom I could make more strenuous expeditions…” 
(62).  Ultimately, Raban knows that solitude enables him to “do anything.”  These things 
that he lists, which are to be done with someone, do not show a lack of opportunity when 
alone, but instead show that choice is eliminated by companionship.  Alone, what he does 
or does not do has yet to be defined; but with an acquaintance, requirements and 
boundaries have already been determined.  Bourgeois society mandates certain modes of 
behavior, restricting personal freedom.  If there is a higher truth to be found, then it will 
not be found solely through others, even if there is value in community.  Instead, Kafka 
suggests that truth is internal and metaphysical, therefore requiring introspection and 
personal development apart from the artificiality and obligations of society. 
Unlike the previous two stories, “A Report to an Academy,” written in 1917, 
depicts a narrator wholly absorbed within bourgeois society.  Red Peter, speaking before 
members of an academy, describes his former life as an ape and how he learned human 
behavior.  The simian/human dichotomy speaks to the conflict between the spirituality of 
the inner self and the earthliness of the external.  Just as Raban’s true nature as a beetle is 
obscured by marriage, Red Peter’s nature as an ape is irreversibly lost during his 
assimilation.  Of this process, he says that returning to life as an ape would have been 
possible “had human beings allowed it, through an archway as wide as the span of heaven 
over the earth” (250).  Kafka’s allusion to heaven suggests that adhering to truth, as 
opposed to conforming to society, is the path of higher spirituality.  Red Peter’s life 
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hinged upon his conformity, and only by abandoning his true identity could he continue 
to live in the external world.  His current existence is a false one, a shell like Raban’s 
clothed body, that denies the essence of his identity.  Despite physical freedom, Red Peter 
has no autonomy, and he recognizes that he has not found freedom but only “a way out” 
(253).  His entire identity is a performance like that of the trapeze artists he describes, 
who can move freely through the air but are little more than “a mockery of holy Mother 
Nature” (253).  Red Peter’s comparison reminds of Kafka’s diary entry about “Japanese 
jugglers, who scramble up a ladder that does not rest on the ground” (Diaries 12).  A 
performer’s identity can change; there is nothing sacred about identity, nothing that 
makes one guise—as a performance artist, banquet attendee, speech-giver, each one 
demanded by Red Peter’s caretakers—truer than another.  Each is a superficial 
performance.  Red Peter describes a half-trained chimpanzee as having “the insane look 
of the bewildered half-broken animal in her eye” (259).  This is exactly his fate as a 
broken creature. 
Malleable identity is not, however, necessarily condemned.  In Kafkian fashion, 
the story contains nothing as straightforward as a moral message.  “Report” highlights 
Kafka’s maturation since writing “Description” and “Wedding Preparations,” with its 
more nuanced theme and his trademark humility, his qualification of what he outwardly 
dislikes—in this case, conformity.  Kafka portrays Red Peter as a sympathetic victim of 
oppression, one who has been locked away, beaten, and burned.  His submission is 
understandable and not quite a defeat.  Maintaining his identity and escaping is an 
impossible dream, but finding “a way out” is not, and at this he succeeds.  Kafka suggests 
that there is nothing heroic in clinging to an unrealistic ideal and forgoing a more 
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manageable goal.  There is nothing glorious in Red Peter’s initial resistance, when he 
“wished to see no one, and to stay in the dark, [his] face turned toward the locker” (252).  
Reality often mandates compromise.  Red Peter’s refusal to view the world outside his 
cage, his desire to stay in the dark and see no one, does not benefit him.  Realizing this, 
he decides that, having no way out, he has to create one: “I made no other demand; even 
should the way out prove to be an illusion; the demand was a small one, the 
disappointment could be no bigger.  To get out somewhere, to get out!  Only not to stay 
motionless with raised arms, crushed against a wooden wall” (254).  Red Peter realizes 
that to “get out” is not true freedom, but this is the only freedom afforded to him, so he 
must seize it.  In many ways, this compromise mirrors Kafka’s personal attitude about 
submission to authority.  Red Peter adjusts his desire from what is most ideal, freedom, to 
something more appropriate to the situation, something smaller and possible—simply 
getting out of his cage, even if he remains enslaved.  His refusal to remain caged is more 
effective than using idealism as an excuse for what would ultimately be mere inactivity 
inside the cage.  Likewise, Kafka responds to the bourgeoisie not with mere distaste and 
desire to escape.  His writing shows its limitations but also the limitations of humanity.  
To break with society, to understand authority and truth, is perhaps unachievable; 
Kafka’s characteristic humility did not allow him to believe that he was capable where 
others were not.  To begin to understand is the more realistic goal, and this Kafka 
attempted to do. 
The Inscrutable Authority 
Within the various bourgeois worlds that he constructs, Kafka continually depicts 
a distant authority possessing both political and theological power over its subjects.  
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Political or theological, this authority possesses several distinctive traits.  First, it is not 
an authority personal to individuals but an all-encompassing, communal authority that 
claims dominion over an entire world.  Even if that world is physically a small region of a 
larger world, i.e., the island of “In the Penal Colony,” Kafka depicts that region 
metaphysically as a claustrophobic, self-enclosed world governed by its own absurd laws.  
Confinement is a recurring theme of this small world.  Disjointed from any other reality, 
it becomes a world unto itself, from which there is no escape.  Second, this authority is 
inscrutable.  Its workings are unknown to those whom it subjugates, and no method can 
reveal those workings.  Kafka’s protagonists and narrators are often travelers who 
stumble into a bizarre world or, as in “The Refusal,” citizens long-accustomed to 
absurdity, but any effort to understand the ruling authority invariably ends in failure.  
Third, this authority possesses absolute power but rarely exercises that power.  Somewhat 
paradoxically, despite wielding absolute power, the authority has little real impact.  For 
instance, the Emperor of “The Great Wall of China” is distant, his voice inaudible across 
the vast territory that he commands.  Authority is so remote from its subjects that its 
power is almost never witnessed and only accepted as vague fact, this remoteness perhaps 
the very thing that renders it inscrutable.  Finally, this authority is arbitrary but absolute.  
Despite failing to exercise power and doing nothing to maintain power, it manages to 
command the almost ubiquitous obedience of its subjects.  These traits render the 
shadowy authority of Kafka’s fiction an omnipresent force.  Kafka shows that authority 




Though Kafka depicts this authority in all his short stories, this section will 
primarily examine three, “In the Penal Colony,” “The Great Wall of China,” and “The 
Refusal,” as the most prominent examples.  These three stories most directly resemble 
political allegories.  Precisely for this reason, they exemplify Kafka’s depiction of 
political authority not only for its own sake but as an allegory of theological authority.  
Many read Kafka as a political activist warning against totalitarianism—The Trial is 
often interpreted as a forewarning of Nazism—but the political scenery of his fiction is 
only a backdrop to authority on a larger scale.  To Kafka, theological authority is a 
political relationship, and political authority can therefore model the former.  Just as 
interhuman politics reflect, on a smaller scale, the theological covenant between human 
and God, Kafka’s depiction of an all-powerful government bears a striking similitude to 
an all-mighty God.  Whenever he depicts political authority, Kafka depicts not only the 
authority of a human government but that of God—Kafka’s concern is not authority 
wielded by humans, but authority that commands humans.  Despite struggling to cope 
with the distance of authority, Kafka ultimately embraces the legitimacy of authority. 
“In the Penal Colony,” written in October 1914 and published in October 1919, 
depicts an unnamed penal colony and describes the final deployment of a torture and 
execution device designed by the Old Commandant, now deceased.  Under this justice 
system, the accused is always found guilty without trial, and this machine, or “apparatus,” 
carves the sentence of the condemned on his skin—a process that kills the prisoner over 
the course of twelve hours.  As the Old Commandant is deceased, the current 
Commandant, finding fault in the injustice of this method and apparently influenced by 
women who “stuff [him] with sugar candy” (152), has discontinued usage of the 
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apparatus.  During this final execution, an officer describes the process to the narrator, an 
explorer, in the attempt to convince him to advocate for the machine.  When the explorer 
is not convinced, the officer realizes that his devotion to the machine is antiquated, and 
he attempts to validate his devotion by martyring himself through self-crucifixion—only 
for the machine to malfunction and kill him instantly, denying him his desired death.   
We must consider how the story moves beyond political narrative before 
analyzing it as an exploration of the nature of authority.  Its investigation of theological 
authority begins with the Old Commandant as a representation of the God of the Old 
Testament.  In Kafkaesque fashion, the penal colony is sequestered on an island away 
from a presumably larger world governed by different authorities.  The narrator is an 
explorer from the West who was “sent out to study criminal procedure in all the countries 
of the world” (156).  Yet the story contains only sparse hints that there is an outside 
world at all, vague details about the explorer being from a different land.  In contrast, the 
penal colony and its political workings dominate the story.  Even while absent, the Old 
Commandant is a much more tangible authority than those of the supposed outside world, 
because the officer and the apparatus extend his influence.  The explorer asks the officer, 
“Did he combine everything in himself, then?  Was he soldier, judge, mechanic, chemist, 
and draughtsman?” to which the officer answers, “Indeed he was,” reflecting the Old 
Commandant’s godlike omniscience (144).  Moreover, he was an all-punishing God.  
Everything in this self-contained world was his creation, and the apparatus delivered his 
judgments.  Defense was impossible against his authority; the condemned did not know 
their sentences, did not know they had been sentenced, and did not have a chance to 
mount a defense, which the officer assumes would simply be lies “backed up with more 
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lies, and so on and so forth” (146).   Having been judged guilty, prisoners are meant to 
experience a religious epiphany in the sixth hour of their torture: “Enlightenment comes 
to the most dull-witted.  It begins around the eyes.  From there it radiates… You have 
seen how difficult it is to decipher the script with one’s eyes; but our man deciphers it 
with his wounds” (150).  Thus, the Old Commandant’s apparatus transforms its victims 
into Christ-like figures, crucified and redeemed by a purgatorial machine.        
But all the same, the Old Commandant’s omniscience is questioned.  Following 
his death, the organization of the penal colony, deemed by the officer “so perfect that his 
successor…would find it impossible to alter anything,” begins to change (141).  When 
the officer attempts to execute himself with the apparatus, the machine malfunctions.  
Though the destruction of the machine might be interpreted as evidence of the failing of 
the Old Commandant and an indictment of his fleeting authority, even in this instance 
Kafka does not depart from his usual depiction of absolute authority.  There is still an 
operative transcendental truth.  One must ask: Why did the machine malfunction?  When 
he sets up the apparatus for his own death, the officer programs the words “Be Just” to be 
fatally engraved on him.  Essentially, the officer asks the machine to punish his injustice, 
the cruelty with which he has treated his fellow citizens, and the machine’s response is 
ambiguous.  Does the machine affirm his actions as just by failing to write “Be Just”?  
But the officer is not granted the vindication that he desires.  His yearning for the 
religious enlightenment that he believes the machine capable of granting is not granted to 
him.  Thus his death becomes an arbitrary act.  Such an absurd death reflects the popular 
Judaic belief that Jesus Christ was one of many false messiahs and that his crucifixion did 
not provide the salvation believed by Christianity.  Likewise, the officer crucifies himself 
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to prove himself right, and the result is an unsatisfying death: “It [the face of the corpse] 
was as it had been in life; no sign was visible of the promised redemption; what the 
others had found in the machine the officer had not found” (166).  The Old 
Commandant’s apparatus, through its destruction, punishes an unjust man with an unjust 
death and therefore proves a point about its authority—that it cannot be manipulated to 
serve the purposes of humanity.  Its nature is inscrutable.  In this way, Kafka satirizes 
religion as incapable of interpreting transcendental truth.  If the Old Commandant is God 
and the apparatus his truth, the officer is a priest who provides only the form of religion, 
the bureaucratic structure and methodology, without the greater substance.  What the 
officer describes as a religious epiphany in the other victims is an individual experience 
that he cannot understand for himself.  When he attempts to force an epiphany, he 
inevitably fails.  In another allusion to Christ, the Old Commandant’s grave is engraved 
with a prophecy that he will “rise again and lead his adherents from this house to recover 
the colony” (167).  In Judaic terms, the Old Commandant is a true messiah, one who, 
unlike Christ, has yet to rise again, and whose justice and authority is uncontaminated by 
the rigid bureaucracy of organized religion.       
The ambiguity of the apparatus raises another question: Does it provide any real 
enlightenment?  It evidently does not in the case of the officer, but whether it has the 
intended effect on the condemned is never confirmed, and indeed, the process is shrouded 
in secrecy.  Not only is the condemned not told his sin, the sin is written in deliberately 
obscure script with “lots and lots of flourishes” (149) so that it is “difficult to decipher the 
script with one’s eyes” (150).  Interestingly, Kafka chooses to depict crimes through 
writing, but perhaps criticizes writing as an inadequate medium—another display of his 
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self-doubt and his qualification that his writing cannot capture the full nature of authority, 
only its inscrutability.  Likewise, criticism of the apparatus has its own difficulties.  
While denouncing the apparatus, the explorer employs a pedantic, bourgeois tone that 
fails to convey the horror the machine deserves.  He notes the “injustice of the procedure 
and the inhumanity of the execution,” but also thinks that it is a “ticklish matter to 
intervene decisively in other people’s affairs” (151).  Like many of Kafka’s characters, 
the explorer detaches himself from the horrific events, noting that there is something 
unsettlingly wrong but doing little to oppose it because to do so would be “ticklish.” 
There is no humane objection.  The prisoner is not a sympathetic victim, not a heroic 
martyr but “a submissive dog…[that] would only need to be whistled for when the 
execution was due to begin” (140).  Objection to the machine is only a protestation 
against the abstract nature of the machine, not against its application; the explorer 
protests the machine because he believes it unjust, but not for the sake of its victim.  As 
an allegory of authority, Kafka’s writing similarly objects to the nature of authority, but 
not to its existence or its claim upon humanity.   
“The Great Wall of China,” written in 1917, explores nation-building, communal 
identity, and the nature of an absolute authority that, unlike the fading authority of “In the 
Penal Colony,” is continuously present but distant.  It unfolds as the reflection of an 
elderly mason from the southern provinces who had once been employed in the 
construction of the Great Wall. Despite being intended as “protection against the peoples 
of the north,” he claims, the Great Wall had been built piecemeal so that not only could it 
“not protect, but what there [was] of it [was] in perpetual danger” (235).  Labor groups 
were tasked with building five hundred yards of the wall over the span of five years, then 
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transferred so that they could see “on their journey finished sections of the wall rising 
here and there…[hear] the rejoicings of new armies of labor streaming past from the 
depths of the land” (237).  These sights would rekindle the laborers’ faith in the project 
and encourage them to continue.  In the second half of the narrative, part of which is 
published as a parable called “A Message from the Emperor,” the narrator focuses on the 
authority of the distant Emperor whose message is not received by his far-off subjects. 
  Just as “In the Penal Colony” uses the political setting in its discussion of 
theological authority, “The Great Wall of China” uses the nation-building process to 
explore human consciousness and how authority maintains its claim over humanity.  Like 
Kafka’s other authority figures, the Emperor is a remote figure whom the citizens can 
only imagine as an abstract force: “We think only about the Emperor.  But not about the 
present one, or rather we would think about the present one if we knew who he was or 
knew anything definite about him” (243).  The citizens do not consider the Emperor to be 
an actual person, and they do not differentiate between different emperors.  The Emperor 
exists as an embodiment of the authority of the Empire: “The Empire is immortal, but the 
Emperor himself totters and falls from his throne…” (243).  Regardless of the identity of 
the individual person acting as emperor, the ultimate authority of the Emperor endures.  
As the mainstay of Kafka’s fiction, the authority figure is never a singular being but an 
omnipresent force.  In this vein, the Emperor is distant and inscrutable, even to the point 
of ineffectuality.  For Kafka, authority is unquestioned, but authority is also so removed 
and so inscrutable that it cannot be obeyed.  In “The Great Wall of China,” the national 
boundaries are so vast that the administrative center of the capital is too far from the 
provinces for any of the Emperor’s messages to be heard.  In the story’s parable, the 
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messenger sets out on his journey but “the multitudes are so vast; their numbers have no 
end…how vainly does he wear out his strength…” (244).  Kafka therefore asks: If this 
authority is so remote, how is it maintained, and what is its value?  The answer is found 
in the mason’s tale about the construction of the Great Wall, which both elucidates how 
authority maintains its power and why Kafka ultimately accepts authority. 
What is the purpose of the Great Wall?  Evidently not its purported purpose of 
defense against the northern invaders, as the mason notes that there are very likely “gaps 
which have never been filled in at all” (235).  Rather, the government ordered the wall to 
be built for the sake of building it.  By enlisting the citizens in a shared goal against a 
shared enemy, the government draws them together and builds a national identity.  Their 
apparent enemy is the North, but the mason states: “Now, I come from the southeast of 
China.  No northern people can menace us there” (241).  Not only has the narrator never 
seen the invaders infiltrate the gaps of the wall, he has never seen them at all.  They, like 
the authority figure, remain a fluid abstraction onto which citizens project their fears.  
Furthermore, the Great Wall is constructed piecemeal because the wall must be partially 
completed to continue motivating the citizens with evidence of progress, but left 
unfinished to maintain their motivation.  Nationality is fostered through a national goal, 
as seen in the mason’s description of the workers’ motivations: “Every fellow 
countryman was a brother for whom one was building a wall of protection, and who 
would return lifelong thanks for it with all he had and did” (238).  If construction of the 
“wall of protection” ceased, the countrymen would cease to be a “brothers,” because the 
act of construction confers solidarity.  Also, note that thanks are “lifelong.” As the 
population grows, these new citizens also need to partake in construction to be inducted 
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into the national identity—the solidarity of the previous generation is built not on any 
inherent quality of humanity but only on “lifelong” thanks.  In conversation, Kafka said 
that while “intellectual labor tears a man out of human society,” labor in the workshop, a 
craft, “leads him towards men” (Janouch 15).  Should the unifying enterprise of craft end, 
the national consciousness would dissolve.   
Government encourages communal identity in its citizens through shared 
subjugation to its authority.  Kafka approvingly depicts the group consciousness of the 
laborers as an example, even if subjugation conflicts with human nature; Kafka writes 
that “human nature, essentially changeable, unstable as the dust, can endure no restraint” 
(239).  Only under subjugation does humanity achieve constancy and become capable of 
greater achievements.  Both in this story and his novels—to be discussed in later 
chapters—Kafka seems fascinated with communal projects and communal ambition.  In 
his narration, the mason relates how a scholar judged the Great Wall as providing “for the 
first time in the history of mankind a secure foundation for a new Tower of Babel,” and 
the mason asks: “Why were there in the book plans…proposals worked out in detail for 
mobilizing the people’s energies for the stupendous new work?” (239)  A recurring 
theme in Kafka is the search for meaning through interpersonal interactions, exemplified 
in the construction of the Great Wall.  Of course, it is wholly impractical to use the Great 
Wall as the foundation for a tower, and the mason says as much: the proposals can be 
meant “only in a spiritual sense” (239).  But Kafka ultimately approves of the subjugation 
that allows this ambition.  Authority is inscrutable, but it forms a bond between people: 
“Unity! Unity!  Shoulder to shoulder, a ring of brothers, a current of blood no longer 
confined within the narrow circulation of one body…” (238).  In the Biblical story of the 
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Tower of Babel, God, witnessing the arrogance of a united and ambitious humanity, 
scattered them and confounded their speech so that they could no longer understand each 
other.  Kafka may be suggesting that, by reconstructing the Tower of Babel, humanity 
might reunite in understanding.  However, the reconstruction cannot be finished, or even 
progress much at all, lest humanity anger God, and reaching God would end the 
subjugation that unites humanity.  Rather than the completion of the Tower of Babel, it is 
the communal effort of building the Tower of Babel that Kafka values.  Perhaps the error 
of the officer in “In the Penal Colony” is not injustice, but his belief that he understands 
more of the higher truth of the Old Commandant than his fellow citizens.   
Kafka may struggle to accept the distance and inscrutability of the authority 
represented by the Emperor, but he criticizes the “feebleness of faith and imaginative 
power on the part of the people that prevents them from raising the empire out of its 
stagnation” (247).  Imperial inscrutability is not the problem—Kafka decries the 
stagnation of citizens who never attempt to understand beyond its inscrutability.  While 
their communal efforts are beneficial, they fail to recognize those benefits.  Kafka accepts 
human inability to understand higher transcendental truth or meaning in the world as a 
“fundamental defect” (247), but the mason, who chooses not to question “the very ground 
on which we live” (248), exemplifies the “feebleness of faith and imaginative power” that 
Kafka describes.  Instead, Kafka accepts authority and its inscrutability as the source of 
unity and of art, because the struggle to understand is a form of piety.     
“The Refusal,” written in the autumn of 1920 and never published in Kafka’s 
lifetime, resembles “The Great Wall of China.” It takes the form of a man’s reflection on 
living in a small town distant from the capital, the inhabitants of which submit to orders 
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issued by the capital despite being refused whenever they appeal for government aid.  
They are led by the tax-collector who also holds the rank of colonel, and the soldiers who 
uphold the law appear inhuman, their most striking traits being “the prominence of their 
teeth which almost overcrowd their mouths, and a certain restless twitching of their small 
narrow eyes” (265).  Again, the authority of this story is distant, and what can be seen of 
that authority is frighteningly strange, but Kafka is surprisingly direct in conveying, if not 
his approval, his submission.   
 The narrator states: “Our little town does not lie on the frontier, nowhere near; 
desolate highlands have to be crossed as well as wide fertile plains.  To imagine even part 
of the road makes one tired, and more than part one just cannot imagine” (263).  But 
Kafka might argue that the road must be imagined.  Understanding the placement of the 
town on the frontier, then the distance between the frontier and the capital, and then the 
location of the capital within the entire nation—Kafka might say that this process of 
understanding is tiring but essential, not necessarily for the sake of the higher truth, but 
for a greater understanding of even the little town.  Kafka modestly accepts the 
absurdities of the world, but seeks to understand a little bit of that dilemma.  “The 
Refusal” demonstrates that humility with its focus on the small town, in which the 
citizens form a delegation to petition the colonel with an unassuming request “for a year’s 
tax exemption, possibly also for timber from the imperial forests at a reduced price” 
(266).  Continuing Kafka’s traditional depiction of bureaucratic impenetrability, the 
citizens’ request is met with a flat refusal, just as, “in all important matters, the citizens 
can always count on a refusal,” yet they continue to make requests (267).  This pattern 
symbolizes Kafka’s struggle with authority.  In his quest to understand authority, Kafka 
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made only small overtures—his writing even doubts its own effectiveness—but 
nonetheless he persisted.  This ritual of perpetual failure raises the question of why Kafka 
continued to write and why the citizens continue to make requests knowing they will be 
rejected.  Indeed, the narrator adds that the citizens receive the refusal with an 
“undeniable sense of relief,” and that “without this refusal one simply cannot get along” 
(267).  Why is refusal welcomed?   
The complying citizens must be contrasted with the discontented.  Kafka ends the 
story with the narrator’s observation that discontent is found in “young people roughly 
between seventeen and twenty,” who are “utterly incapable of foreseeing the 
consequences of even the least significant, far less a revolutionary, idea” (267).  The next 
section of this chapter discusses the recurring motif of a father figure in more detail, but 
these lines begin to raise a poignant question about Kafka’s personal life: Why did he 
choose not to marry and relocate, therefore remaining under Hermann’s influence?  
Unlike many writers seeking the romantic ideal of intellectual freedom—Percy Shelley, 
for instance, who eloped to Scotland at the age of nineteen—Kafka never broke with his 
family.  Assuming the authority depicted in his fiction is based on Hermann, Kafka chose 
to stay because he could foresee the consequences of the “revolutionary idea” of freedom.  
Freedom from Hermann would have deprived Kafka of his theme, and worse, removed 
him from the struggle for submission and comprehension, without which his personal 
growth as an artist and his quest for transcendence would have ended.  Likewise, the 
citizens of “The Refusal” feel relief at the rejection because their attempt is already an 
achievement.  Failure allows them to try again.  Only those blind to the consequences of 
freedom, Kafka says, feel discontent.  Freedom is the path of escapism.  For Kafka, 
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authority was not just a truth of his personal life embodied by Hermann, but a necessity 
through which he could begin to understand the world. 
The Heavenly Father  
 In Letter to His Father, Kafka claims: “My writing was all about you; all I did 
there, after all, was to bemoan what I could not bemoan upon your breast” (Letter 83).  
Everything discussed thus far stems from Kafka’s observation of Hermann.  His portrayal 
of bourgeois society and the conflict between societal obligation and personal freedom 
comes from Hermann’s “shouting, cursing, and raging in the shop…and other sorts of 
tyrannizing” (Letter 51).  His understanding of the inscrutable authority and his 
acceptance of its arbitrariness comes from Hermann’s “self-confidence” in his authority, 
so that Hermann “had no need to be consistent at all and yet never ceased to be in the 
right” (Letter 17).  Kafka transformed his struggle with Hermann into a larger struggle 
with authority.  Inevitably, Kafka’s depiction of authority is frequently paternal.  Though 
often enough there is an actual father, equally often the father figure is a patriarchal 
political authority, such as the Emperor in “The Great Wall of China” or the colonel in 
“The Refusal.” As previously discussed, Kafka contrasts the father figure with the son, or 
the subject, who tends to fall under the power of the father without resistance.  When he 
does question the father’s authority, the son questions the nature of that authority—the 
reason for it, the extent of it—but almost never questions the fact of this authority.  This 
tendency comes from Kafka’s own understanding of Hermann and Kafka’s acceptance of 
the absurdity of their relationship.  Suggesting that the father-son relationship is the crux 
of Kafka’s depiction of authority in all his fiction, this section evaluates “The Judgment,” 
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which depicts an actual father-son relationship, in conjunction with other short stories 
portraying patriarchal dynamics and the psyche of the son as an oppressed figure.   
 “The Judgment” was written in a single sitting on the night of September 22, 1912, 
and in his diary entry of September 23, Kafka writes: “Only in this way can writing be 
done, only with such coherence, with such a complete opening out of the body and the 
soul” (Diaries 213).  It begins with Georg Bendemann sitting in his room and musing 
about his friend in Russia, who had left their hometown years prior to set up a now-
failing business.  Though initially reluctant, Georg had been persuaded by his fiancé, 
Frieda Brandenfeld, to write to Georg about his engagement.  Georg then sees his father 
and informs him of the letter to his friend, to which Georg’s father responds with a litany 
of accusations—that Georg has fabricated this friend, that Georg has deceived him about 
the family business, that Georg wants him dead.  Georg manages only ineffectual 
defenses, before his father finally sentences him to “death by drowning” (87).  Georg 
obeys, running from his home to a bridge, swinging himself over the railing, and 
plunging to his apparent death.  This patriarchal family structure parallels humanity’s 
subservience to God, the father being an absolute, inscrutable authority, and the son being 
his vassal.  There are obvious enough references to Kafka’s personal experiences that the 
story can be immediately understood as a representation of Kafka’s life—Georg’s 
relationship with his father and his engagement to Frieda reproduce Kafka’s relationship 
with Hermann and his engagement to Felice Bauer, whose initials mirror those of Frieda 
Brandenfeld and to whom he dedicated “The Judgment.”  Understanding Georg as a 
stand-in for Kafka, analysis of the father-son dynamic between Georg and his father 
sheds light on the relationship between Kafka and Hermann.   
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Georg’s father resembles Hermann in both physical appearance and demeanor, 
and most importantly, in the way that he is perceived by his son.  When Georg sees his 
father, the first thought in his mind is that “[his] father is still a giant of a man” (81) in the 
same way that Kafka describes Hermann as physically imposing: “There was I, skinny, 
weakly, slight; you strong, tall, broad” (Letter 15).  Yet the father has a strangely 
inconsistent aspect.  His shape and size are protean.  He is described as “giant,” but he is 
still easily lifted and tucked into bed.  Lying in bed, he manages to touch the ceiling.  
Like Hermann and the other authority figures of Kafka’s fiction, Georg’s father possesses 
an intangibility of being that makes his authority impossible to comprehend.  In Hermann, 
this manifests in his “enigmatic quality that all tyrants have, whose rights are based on 
their person and not on reason” (Letter 17), while the fictional characters further 
demonstrate their elusiveness through physical inconsistency.  Their amorphous shape 
prevents them from being “covered up” in the way that Georg would have hidden his 
father in bed to mask his authority (84).  Authority transcends physicality, existing as an 
irrepressible metaphysical force. 
In the first of his accusations, Georg’s father claims that Georg’s friend in Russia 
is not real.  Readers might be inclined to believe the narrator and protagonist, Georg, over 
his belligerent father, but the father’s claim seems less farfetched when considering 
Georg’s inconsistent narration.  Though he tells the reader that his business is succeeding, 
Gregor lives in “one of a long row of small, ramshackle houses” (77).  In Freudian terms, 
Georg’s musings at the beginning of the story, which deal with the social ramifications of 
his economic position and writing to his friend, indicate his conscious ego, while the 
father represents the superego, the punitive authority that judges Georg and sentences 
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him as guilty.  Perhaps for this reason, Georg is highly forgetful.  He forgets his father’s 
size and his resolve to watch his father’s movement in case of attack.  Finally, the 
narration states that Georg “kept on forgetting everything” (86).  His forgetfulness 
indicates his inability to reconcile the irrationality of his situation and his bondage to his 
father.  Georg is condemned as selfish and unfilial by the severe authority of his father, 
just as Kafka, taking on Hermann’s voice at the end of Letter to His Father, condemns 
himself for his unfilial, self-serving letter.  In his second accusation, as the retired owner 
of their family business, Georg’s father reproaches Georg for “strutting through the world, 
finishing off deals that [he] had prepared for him” (86), just as Kafka writes that he can 
“enjoy what [Hermann] gave, but only in humiliation, weariness, weakness, and with a 
sense of guilt” (Letter 49).  Guilt is the question in both Georg and Kafka’s minds, and 
Kafka seems to believe that, as sons, they are inherently guilty of receiving the 
“undeserved gift” of life (Letter 33).  Their superegos, represented by their fathers, 
constantly remind them of this guilt.  Any attempt to escape is futile—the superego is an 
inescapable part of the psyche.   
Kafka became engaged and broke off those engagements largely due to 
Hermann’s disapproval.  Georg’s father likewise condemns his son’s romantic life: 
“Because she lifted her skirts like this, the nasty creature…you have disgraced your 
mother’s memory, betrayed your friend, and stuck your father into bed so that he can’t 
move” (85).  Marriage disgraces the mother’s memory because marriage would rescue 
the son from his feminine masochism, the same sort of bondage that entrapped Kafka.  
Kafka, who associated his identity with that of Julie Kafka, could not have married 
without casting off his mother’s femininity to take on his father’s masculinity.  Escaping 
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femininity represents the ego’s efforts to escape the superego, a motif that Kafka 
recurrently employs in his work.  In “A Little Woman,” the narrator faces a young 
woman whose hostility eerily recalls Kafka’s self-accusation of falsehood in Letter to His 
Father: “So with feminine guile she steers a middle course; she keeps silent but betrays 
all the outward signs of a secret sorrow in order to draw public attention to the matter” 
(318).  Arguably, the woman represents the subconscious superego of the narrator—and 
Kafka—as he considers his public standing and how he can “stay quietly where [he is] 
and not let it affect [his] behavior as far as can be seen” (321).  To truly be free, the 
narrator must escape the woman, but this is impossible, the woman surveys him always.  
Thus, Kafka associates femininity with his own attempt at escape; the conflict between 
ego and superego creates a hostile female figure.   
However, Kafka condemns escape from the superego because, as previously 
discussed in “The Refusal,” escapism precludes comprehension and whatever 
transcendence is possible.  In response to his father’s accusations, Georg initially 
attempts to defuse the situation by making light of his father’s exaggerated attitude, 
calling him a “comedian” (86).  When his father claims, “I’ve established a fine 
connection with your friend and I have your customers here in my pocket,” Georg quips, 
“He has pockets even in his shirt!” (87).  But despite his attempts to ridicule his father, 
Georg empowers him.  It might also be said that Georg empowers his father by his 
attempts to ridicule him.  By mocking his father, Georg reveals his awareness of the 
unequal dynamic between them, thereby acknowledging his father’s power over him.  In 
Letter to His Father, Kafka recalls joking about Hermann out of self-preservation, and he 
calls his jokes “part and parcel” of “profound respect” (41).  Kafka understood that 
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antagonistic jokes do not disempower the subject, but empowers by admitting a need for 
this weak defense.  Though Georg makes fun of his father and seems momentarily to gain 
the upper hand, “in his very mouth the words turned into deadly earnest” (87).  These 
jokes are not jokes but the ineffectual attempt of a man fleeing from his superego.  Kafka, 
understanding the inefficacy of such an attempt to debase Hermann, instead sought 
“insight” into the mutual helplessness between them (Letter 19).  Georg fails to employ 
this self-affirming tactic, remains entirely under his father’s sway, and eventually drowns 
himself at his father’s command. 
Opposition is a recurring theme of Kafka’s depiction of the father-son dynamic.  
In addition to Georg’s antagonistic remarks meant to diminish his father’s authority, 
Kafka depicts the son supplanting the father and the father replacing the son.  Georg’s 
friend becomes a rival for his father’s affection, as the father states that his friend “would 
have been a son after [his] own heart” (85).  In the Oedipal context, Georg’s friend 
models his opposite—being affectionate with the father and less affectionate, even hostile 
to the mother based on his reaction to learning of the mother’s death, his condolence 
“phrased so dryly that the grief caused by such an event, one had to conclude, could not 
be realized in a distant country” (78).  The friend escapes the struggle against authority 
but sacrifices his development and becomes poor and isolated.  But where the friend 
escapes struggle through conformity, Georg also attempts to escape struggle by 
supplanting his father—becoming the father figure to his father—without comprehending 
their relationship.  Georg rebels against his father by imitating him, taking his authority in 
the business, burying his authority by covering him up, and mimicking his marital status 
by himself becoming engaged.  In “The Village Schoolmaster,” Kafka portrays a similar 
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form of father-son rivalry between the narrator and a schoolmaster when the narrator, an 
intellectual, tries to defend the schoolmaster’s honesty about witnessing a giant mole in 
his own essay: “Originally I thought my intervention might be of some use to you, while 
now I cannot but recognize that I have damaged you in every way” (175).  Though he 
seemingly wishes to aid the schoolmaster, the narrator supplants him as his brochure 
steals attention and distracts from his original topic.  Likewise, Georg attempts to steal 
power from his father by reversing their roles, and in a startling reversal of Kafka’s 
memory of Hermann carrying him onto the balcony as punishment, Georg assumes the 
paternal role as he carries his father like an infant and tucks him into bed.  In the father’s 
words, Georg’s mind is split into “an innocent child,” his conscious self that cares for his 
father as a matter of filial piety, and “a devilish human being,” his unconscious self that 
cares for his father only to dominate him (87).  However, Georg cannot escape from his 
superego.  In Freudian consideration of the Oedipus complex, the superego’s authority is 
assigned to the father figure, who lords as the supreme authority over the child.  As 
Georg flounders and stares “at the bogey conjured up by his father,” his father’s stature 
changes, transforming from an infantile figure to a man who can stand on his own (85).  
At the story’s end, the authority of Georg’s superego has been fully transplanted to his 
father, allowing him to command Georg’s death. 
When Georg’s father issues the command, Georg feels himself “urged from the 
room” (87).  Here, Kafka imbues the father with the absolute authority of the Emperor 
and the Old Commandant—and of God.  Georg becomes a Christ-like figure, an allusion 
previously hinted in the story when Georg reminds his father of his friend’s account of 
the Russian Revolution and “a priest on a balcony who cut a broad cross in blood on the 
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palm of his hand and held the hand up and appealed to the mob” (83).  For the mob, the 
priest is the medium of God’s truth.  For the reader, Georg becomes the medium of 
Kafka’s ideal.  When he rushes from the room, Georg runs into a charwoman who cries, 
“Jesus!” and covers her face with her apron (87).  Guilt is again broached, this time with 
the connotation of original sin.  Georg is dying not for the sins of humanity but for his 
own, though his personal sin—being a son to his father—is also inherent in humanity.  
Georg drowns not only in water but also in his father’s irrational accusations.  His father, 
God and superego, does not require a reason to condemn him.  On this reading, the 
Freudian superego is not an abstract construction but a real force capable of violence; 
Kafka acknowledges that the path he advocates, of searching for truth and confronting the 
superego, can be a painful and dangerous one.  But Georg, even while hurtling towards 
his death, does so “as a starving man clutches food” (88).  His acceptance of his father’s 
authority comes as a relief rather than a burden.  Thus, Kafka maintains the inviolability 
of obedience and subordinates humanity to the authority under which it exists.  Georg’s 
death is not in the least melodramatic or sanctimonious.  He waits for “a motor-bus 
coming which would easily cover the noise of his fall,” and at the time he lets himself 
drop, “an unending stream of traffic was just going over the bridge” (88).  His passing 
has no lasting impact.  His fall makes no sound audible over the continued activity of the 
world.  Why did Kafka depict Georg’s death in this way?  The wronged victim who 
hangs himself in anguished innocence and thus defies his accusers is a common literary 
trope, yet Kafka has Georg drown.  Georg’s unassuming death suggests several ideas.  
Drowning makes it difficult for the body to be found, and even if found, the body is often 
unrecognizable; Kafka evidently did not wish to make Georg a heroic figure dying a 
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noble death.  His death cannot be said to be a victory—Georg may be free from his 
obligation to authority, but his life and the very basis of his humanity are also lost.  
Georg’s death results from not only his inability to comprehend his father but his inability 
to try to resist him; Kafka evidently believes that, to the very best of its limited ability, 
humanity should always struggle for comprehension.  When asked by Gustav Janouch 
about the story, Kafka replied: “‘The Judgment’ is the spectre of a night…the verification, 
and so the complete exorcism, of the spectre” (31).  Samuel Ritvo suggests that “The 
Judgment” was a “discharge in fantasy of the conflicted feelings toward his father in an 
effort to exorcise them—murderous impulses as well as tender, caring feelings” (327).  
Through “The Judgment,” Kafka exorcised his escapist impulse, weighing his struggles 
under Hermann against his fears that marrying Bauer would impair his writing ability—
before finally resolving to accept Hermann’s subjugation and strive for understanding.   
The Metamorphosis: The Artistry of Vermin 
 Thus far this chapter has overviewed the themes of Kafkian literature—Kafka’s 
depiction of the bourgeois society dominated by an inscrutable authority, both modeled 
by and exemplified in the father-son relationship.  Naturally these themes coexist in 
Kafka’s fiction, but the previous sections focused on the themes individually for the sake 
of building foundational knowledge.  This section will analyze the themes in unison as 
they converge in The Metamorphosis.  Published in 1915, The Metamorphosis is Kafka’s 
most famous story.  Gregor Samsa, a traveling salesman, wakes up to find himself 
metamorphosed into a monstrous insect, and the novella deals with his attempts to adjust 
to his condition as well as the reactions of his sister and parents, who are repelled.  
Gregor is wounded by his father on multiple occasions.  After a long period of neglect, 
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Gregor finally dies in his bedroom.  Critics have long considered Gregor a stand-in for 
Kafka, and as in the case of Georg of “The Judgment,” the idea has merit; Kafka did 
characterize his writing as a homage to his father. 
 Unlike Georg and most victims in Kafkian literature, Gregor appears to be a 
sympathetic character whose plight is undeserved.  Readers learn that Gregor had taken 
on an exhausting, thankless job to provide for his family and that he had planned to help 
his sister, Grete, fulfill her dream of studying violin at the Conservatorium.  For family 
reasons, Gregor is trapped in a bourgeois routine and caught in a cyclical situation 
metaphorized by his inability to take sick days: “But that would be most unpleasant and 
would look suspicious, since during his five years’ employment he had not been ill once” 
(91).  Because he has never been ill, Gregor cannot be ill in the future.  Likewise, because 
he has started down the path of bourgeois society, he cannot stop himself from falling 
deeper into conformity.  There is no reward for conformity; Gregor can only continue to 
conform or be punished: “What a fate, to be condemned to work for a firm where the 
smallest omission at once gave rise to the gravest suspicion!” (94).  Societal policing of 
his continued conformity mirrors Hermann’s tendency to “reinforce abusiveness with 
threats” (Letter 31).  In this way, family and society become analogous.  As he receives 
no reward from society, Gregor garners no reward from his family, which likewise 
becomes accustomed to his efforts on their behalf: “They had simply got used to it, both 
the family and Gregor; the money was gratefully accepted and gladly given, but there 
was no special uprush of warm feeling” (111).  Despite his altruistic efforts, Gregor is 
still viewed with disgust and scorn when he transforms into an insect.  If Gregor is a 
representation of Kafka, The Metamorphosis seems a more self-exonerating work 
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compared to “The Judgment,” as though Kafka is claiming that he, too, did his utmost to 
meet societal and familial expectations but ultimately suffered alienation.  But as usual, 
Kafka does not fully absolve himself and instead depicts mutual bondage between Gregor 
and his family.  Upon Gregor’s transformation and eventual death, all three members of 
the household discover their own strengths: the father regains his strength and works 
again, the mother takes up sewing, and the sister blooms “into a pretty girl with a good 
figure” (139).  Their previous dependence on Gregor was parasitic and repressed their 
own potential, just as Kafka compares his own existence to that of a tick living on 
Hermann’s blood.  It stands to reason that the family bond impedes both Gregor and his 
family.  When this bond is broken by Gregor’s transformation, his family is freed.  They 
“canvassed their prospects for the future, and it appeared on closer inspection that these 
were not at all bad” (139).  If his family is freed, why should Gregor be condemned to 
death?  To answer this question, one must examine the nature of his metamorphosis. 
 Gregor’s transformation arguably represents Kafka’s own nature—that is, the 
insect represents the artistic soul, Kafka the writer rather than Kafka the member of 
society.  It is a true reflection of his identity, truer than the human caught in the cyclical 
trap of bourgeois society and obligation to his family.  Gregor’s transformation occurs 
overnight while he lies in bed.  Writing is, for Kafka, “a nighttime activity, as are 
dreaming, copulation, and self-abuse” (Johae 215).  Like Gregor, Kafka was lying “in 
bed in [his] misery” when he was seized by the idea for The Metamorphosis, and he 
describes the story’s scenario as “a repulsive scene” that has come “pouring out” (Letters 
to Felice 47, 108).  Gregor’s transformation into the repulsive, too, is a creative act.  In 
the opening paragraphs, Gregor looks around his room and describes a picture he had cut 
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out from a magazine, which shows “a lady, with a fur cap on and a fur stole” (89).  
Society considers this lady, wearing false skin, beautiful.  In contrast, Gregor’s outward 
ugliness reflects the truth of his being, but society rejects that truth and ostracizes him.  
The Metamorphosis is not a story of self-loathing, but of societal alienation.  Gregor’s 
transformation into an insect might seem deprecating, but his metamorphosis is an 
empowering event that could have granted him agency over his life and allowed him to 
break away from family and society.  Though Kafka had reservations about the power of 
his writing and felt obliged to qualify what it could achieve, the fact still stands that he 
devoted himself to literature.  Kafka the writer was removed from society, but there was 
nothing inherently wrong about this removal.  Likewise, Gregor does not immediately 
loathe himself upon discovering that he has become an insect, because there is nothing 
inherently wrong with being an insect.  Gregor enjoys his new life, and “for mere 
recreation” he forms the habit of “crawling crisscross over the walls and ceiling” and 
“hanging suspended from the ceiling,” enjoying the “almost blissful absorption induced 
by this suspension” (115).  There is an artistry to these movements; Gregor defies the 
laws of gravity that would have impeded him as a human, just as artists are expected to 
defy the norm.  To be an insect is to follow his truest nature and to be free.   
Gregor’s transformation is not completed overnight, nor is it an entirely physical 
change.  His voice changes from a “persistent horrible twittering squeak,” which, though 
horrible, at least “left the words in their clear shape” (91) and could be understood by his 
mother, to a voice so unrecognizable that the chief clerk proclaims, “That was no human 
voice” (98).  As he acclimatizes to his new body and comes to terms with his new life, 
Gregor mentally, perhaps subconsciously, abandons humanity.  Only when confronted by 
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his family and employer does he feel himself “drawn once more into the human circle” 
(99).  Drawn though he may be, Gregor clearly thinks of himself as being part of another 
circle, another world.  Following this, Gregor adapts to and enjoys his new life.  
Evidently, being an insect does not inherently repulse Gregor.  Not until Gregor is 
reminded of humanity does it inspire self-loathing.  When Grete rearranges the furniture 
in his room to give him more space to maneuver, Gregor initially “looked forward to 
having his room emptied of furnishing” (116).  At this point, Gregor would have gladly 
cast off his humanity, including the human possessions that tied him to his home, in favor 
of free, open space.  Only when his mother reminds him that this is the equivalent of 
“giving up hope of his ever getting better” (116) does Gregor feel conflicted and self-
loathing: “Gregor was now cut off…he dared not open the door for fear of frightening 
away his sister…and harassed by self-approach and worry he began now to crawl to and 
fro…” (119).  Gregor’s self-loathing stems from being pulled in different directions by 
opposite worlds, one of the past—society and reality—and one of the present—the 
artistic.  Society dictates that humans are to be loved and insects to be shunned.  Gregor’s 
father represents the authority that enforces this ultimatum, “driving Gregor back into his 
room,” brandishing a stick and using violent force without a care for “circumstantial 
preparations” that might avoid injuring his son (104).  His assault, “literally a 
deliverance,” ends with Gregor being pushed through the cramped doorway of his room, 
“bleeding freely” (105).  Like Hermann, Gregor’s father is a divine authority capable of 
cruel punishment.  Gregor is truly free only when he surrenders to his present self and the 
absurdity of his situation. 
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Throughout the story, Gregor’s insectoid body, symbolic of Kafka’s artistry, 
slowly deteriorates under his father’s violence.  His slow death reflects Kafka’s seclusion, 
which stemmed from Hermann’s distance.  In a diary entry of May 4, 1913, Kafka states: 
“Always the image of a pork butcher’s broad knife that quickly and with mechanical 
regularity chops into me from the side and cuts off very thin slices which fly off almost 
like shavings because of the speed of the action” (Diaries 221).  Kafka felt that his father 
and society at large were slowly killing him by eroding his artistic identity.  In The 
Metamorphosis, Gregor’s father shoves him through a doorway, leaving him bleeding 
and bruised, and throws an apple at him, which lodges in his back and begins to rot.  
Gregor’s degradation represents the degradation of Kafka’s artistry, which a conformist 
society condemns.  Kafka suggests that society has contradictory expectations for artists, 
demanding that they serve its leisure while condemning them as different and therefore 
objectionable.  In the short story “A Hunger Artist,” the protagonist, a hunger artist who 
fasts for forty days, experiences the audience’s waning interest and, worse, its 
misunderstanding of his art.  When a spectator tries to console his apparent melancholy, 
the hunger artist grows infuriated, only for his impresario to suggest that his irritation and 
sadness result from his fasting; the hunger artist deems this a “perversion of the truth” in 
a “whole world of non-understanding” (273).  What the hunger artist understands as art is 
not the entertainment that society wants from him.  Society considers him a pariah, a 
spectacle, but for the hunger artist, the art of fasting is as natural as eating is to other 
people: “Because I have to fast, I can’t help it…because I couldn’t find the food I liked” 
(277).  What he desires is the transcendence of art, not the bourgeois conformity that 
society demands.  Written as Kafka was dying, “A Hunger Artist” can be read as his 
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autobiographical depiction of the dying, alienated artist whose vision has been rejected 
by society.  Likewise, The Metamorphosis depicts the seclusion that he felt, the absurdity 
of being an artist seeking acceptance from a hostile world.     
 If Gregor had accepted the absurd, his metamorphosis would have granted him 
freedom and reversed the power dynamics of his household.  Gregor the human had been 
enslaved to his family, but Gregor the insect forces his family to react to him: “If they 
were horrified then the responsibility was no longer his and he could stay quiet.  But if 
they took it calmly, then he had no reason either to be upset…” (98).  In this situation, 
Gregor is the character with the most agency.  What others decide can only be in relation 
to Gregor’s choice to stay or to leave, so that the seemingly weakest member of the 
family “can control, manipulate or mesmerize the rest” (Kureishi 13).  In the father-son 
context, whoever understands and embraces the absurdity of their relationship has greater 
control.  Gregor’s father reacts violently, but his reactions signal his weakness.  He 
cannot adapt to the situation and can only react to Gregor: “Pitilessly Gregor’s father 
drove him back, hissing and crying ‘Shoo!’ like a savage” (104).  Kafka describes the 
father as a savage, and indeed, his reaction is primal, instinctual, and uncontrolled.  
Gregor’s father reacts to the unknown with ignorance and hostility, as he “did not himself 
know what he meant to do” (121).  However, Gregor’s family may also be considered the 
focal characters of the novella.  Unlike Gregor, his family eventually adapts to the 
situation, abandoning its dependence on him and learning self-sufficiency.  At first, their 
despondence prevents them from seizing control: “What really kept them from moving 
into another flat was rather their own complete hopelessness and the belief that they had 
been singled out for a misfortune…” (124).  At the novella’s end, they move past this 
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hopelessness and each family member develops their own sense of identity.  Grete 
undergoes a metamorphosis of her own from girlhood to womanhood: “It struck both Mr. 
and Mrs. Samsa, almost at the same moment, as they became aware of their daughter’s 
increasing vivacity…she had bloomed into a pretty girl with a good figure” (139).  
Grete’s metamorphosis directly contrasts that of Gregor; Gregor becomes ugly, while 
Grete becomes beautiful.  Her change earns societal approval, but Kafka also describes 
that the “sorrow of recent times…[have] made her cheeks pale” (139).  Grete’s bloodless 
visage suggests that Grete metamorphoses into a new vassal of the bourgeois world to 
replace Gregor.         
Gregor dies, thinking of his family with “tenderness and love,” believing that he 
must disappear for his family’s sake (135).  In Kafkian fashion, perhaps what keeps 
Gregor from leaving his family is the innate understanding that he must remain to 
struggle under the authority of his father and society.  Without this struggle to accept the 
absurd, he cannot achieve transcendence.  It is debatable whether Gregor achieved some 
form of enlightenment; Kafka tends to doubt the ability of the artist, as in “Josephine the 
Singer, or the Mouse Folk.” Josephine, the titular singer of a colony of mice, apparently 
cannot sing well at all, and what the narrator refers to as her “piping” comes “a long, long 
way” from her claim to “give [them] new strength and so on and so forth” (370).  Or 
perhaps Josephine truly can sing, and her talent is incomprehensible to the other mice—
though, instinctively recognizing its worth even without understanding, they admire her 
nonetheless.  Regardless, Josephine never realizes that her relationship with the colony 
harms them both; Josephine’s singing attracts predators, while the colony hinders her 
artistic growth.  But in The Metamorphosis, Gregor does seem to realize that the bond 
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between himself and his family causes them both to suffer, and his growing irritation, his 
“rage at the way they were neglecting him,” gives way to tranquility before his death 
(125).  For this reason, Gregor may be the focal character after all, the titular 
metamorphosis referring neither to Grete’s coming of age nor to Gregor’s physical 
transformation, but to his eventual acceptance of his relationship with family and society.  
As he comes to understand his family, he comes to accept their hatred and thereby 
accepts his true nature.  In this same way, Kafka hoped to understand Hermann, 
understand the conflict between them, so that he might come to accept himself and his 
artistry.  Antony Johae supposes that even if he had come to this understanding and 
gained “access to the protected and hidden spaces of his inner being,” Kafka would 
require “rest from his endeavor, a rest which when taken is followed by a protracted loss 
of insight” (217).  On February 11, 1915, Kafka wrote to Bauer of the difficulty in 
balancing creativity and earthliness: “It is very difficult for me to find my way back after 
an interval; it’s as though the door, which only a great effort had forced open, had 
unobtrusively swung shut” (Letters to Felice 444).  Thus, Kafka suggests that 
understanding is fleeting and needs to be “secured and defended against the world outside” 
(Johae 217).  In the short story “The Burrow,” the protagonist, an unspecified mole-like 
creature who constructs and maintains an elaborate system of tunnels, likewise burrows 
to protect itself from the outside world.  However, the protagonist notes the necessity of a 
connection with the outside world even as it protects itself against that world: “Apart 
from this main exit I am also connected with the outer world by quite narrow, tolerably 
safe passages which provide me with good fresh air to breathe” (326).  Neither Gregor 
nor Kafka could simply remove themselves from the world or from their families.  They 
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must remain in a self-imposed imprisonment, a hermetic environment, precisely because 
imprisonment allows the ideal of freedom, “of tranquility, of satisfied desire, of achieved 
ambition” (327).  In a diary entry of June 21, 1913, Kafka writes: “The tremendous world 
I have in my head.  But how [to] free myself and free it without being torn to pieces” 
(Diaries 222).  Kafka hoped to free himself and free Hermann, the “tremendous world.” 




ESCAPISM IN THE FREE WORLD: AMERIKA, OR THE MAN WHO DISAPPEARED 
 While the previous chapter discussed Kafka’s short stories as an overview of the 
themes of absurdity and authority, the following chapters illustrate Kafka’s literary 
maturation by focusing on his novels—the development of his themes and their 
culmination in what would be his resolution of the conflict between rationality and 
authority: acceptance of authority while continuing to seek clarification and 
understanding.  Kafka wrote three novels: Amerika, The Castle, and The Trial.  Amerika, 
his earliest work, begun in 1911, went unfinished.  In 1914, Kafka abandoned work on 
Amerika in favor of The Trial.  Kafka began writing The Castle in 1922 but did not 
manage to finish it before his death in 1924.  It seems that Kafka never returned to 
Amerika despite, according to Max Brod, being so “particularly delighted” by the final, 
incomplete chapter that “he used to read it aloud with great effect” (Amerika 299).  E.L. 
Doctorow notes that Kafka wrote two drafts before abandoning the manuscript, 
suggesting “self-admitted failure” (Amerika x).  Is it contradictory that Kafka found the 
novel both delightful and failed?  Not necessarily; Kafka viewed writing as a duty—an 
extension of his need to understand authority.  Kafka might have considered Amerika a 
failure because it was pleasurable.   
Like all of Kafka’s work, Amerika is claustrophobic.  Its protagonist, sixteen-
year-old German immigrant Karl Rossman, is seduced by a housemaid and exiled to New 
York City by his parents.  In the New World, Karl finds not opportunity and freedom but 
perpetual confinement under various authority figures.  As his ship arrives in the United 
States, Karl befriends a stoker who is about to be dismissed from his job.  Together, they 
plead the stoker’s case to the apathetic Captain.  Karl escapes the situation after being 
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recognized by his uncle, Senator Jacob, who shelters him for a time before abandoning 
him for the minute transgression of visiting Jacob’s friend, Mr. Pollunder.  Karl does not 
defend himself and leaves New York, meeting two drifters, Robinson and Delamarche, 
who travel with him to find work in Butterford.  The scoundrels exploit Karl by selling 
his suit, eating his food, and ransacking his belongings.  Karl breaks from them, finding 
work at the Hotel Occidental and being taken under the wing of its Manageress.  Karl 
works twelve-hour shifts, during which he is “sequestered in an attic with strangers, 
constrained in a porter’s cubicle,” and after losing his job due to Robinson’s reappearance, 
rejoins the pair of scoundrels and is “imprisoned in a bedroom, and trapped on a balcony” 
(Amerika xii).  Setting the novel in America, land of freedom and open space, highlights 
the constraint to which Karl is subjected.   
Max Brod chose the title Amerika when he assembled the incomplete manuscript 
and published it in 1927, retitling it from its original, working title, Der Verschollene, i.e. 
The Man Who Disappeared or The Missing Person.  Kafka’s original title brings its own 
slew of connotations.  Heinz Politzer suggests that the real theme of the novel is “not the 
reality, present or future, of a civilization far away from Kafka’s Prague, but the growth, 
both personal and intellectual, of Karl Rossman” (124).  Likewise, Doctorow argues that 
Karl’s disappearance lies not only in his physical exile, but the loss of his “personality or 
moral integrity” and his “metaphysical ephemera” (Amerika xiii).  Karl is not entirely 
helpless, and on multiple occasions, he attempts to defend himself with either words or 
physical force.  Regardless, the result is the same; Karl fails to adapt and is forever 
estranged by the foreign, hostile New World.  But struggle does not cause disappearance.  
What causes Karl to disappear is not his estrangement, but his avoidance of the 
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conflicts—his case before the captain, his case before Uncle Jacob, his case before 
Delamarche—that would grant him metaphysical presence.  At one point, Karl muses on 
“movement without end, a restlessness transmitted from the restless element to helpless 
human beings and their works” (17).  This same movement would have halted his 
disappearance; the “restlessness” of conflict would have ensured his continued existence.  
However, Ritchie Robertson argues that “America is not just the setting but the theme of 
the novel” and that “the presentation of the world’s most advanced industrial and 
technological society was a major part of Kafka’s project” (45).  Certainly, Kafka was 
imitating Americanism.  In the diary entry of October 8, 1917, Kafka writes that Amerika 
was an imitation of Charles Dickens, but he also states: “It was my intention, as I now see, 
to write a Dickens novel, but enhanced by the sharper lights I should have taken from the 
times and the duller ones I should have got from myself” (Diaries 388).  Kenneth Payne 
describes the conception of Amerika as a “chain of American impressions or images” 
(30), but the setting has no impact on the plot.  Kafka was not critiquing American social 
conditions and institutions, but the ideals of freedom and democracy that America 
represented.  Karl, not America, is the center of the story.  Amerika focuses on Karl’s 
repeated run-ins with authority figures and his repeated escapes. 
Karl repeatedly escapes rather than confronts conflict.  He sometimes puts up an 
ineffectual defense, but he quickly abandons his attempt—abandoning the stoker’s case 
before the captain, failing to defend himself before his uncle, and so on.  Karl moves 
from one authority figure to the next, escaping each one, and thus never faces or explores 
authority; Karl deflects all the conflict in his life.  All the Kafkaesque elements that 
would make for an interesting novel are present—the bourgeois society, the inscrutable 
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authority—but the novel ultimately fails at being Kafkaesque and feels unsatisfying 
because the protagonist never confronts his own strange world.  Every time Karl meets 
the sort of adversity that would make the novel exciting, he flees: from the ship, from his 
uncle, and finally from the hotel.  Every time the novel builds up rising action and is 
about to reach a climax, the tension dissolves with his flight.   
Even Kafka’s trademark claustrophobia dissolves.  In the unfinished concluding 
chapter of the novel, Karl sees an advertisement for the Nature Theatre of Oklahoma.  
Seeing that it promises employment for everyone, Karl applies for a job, is hired despite 
his lack of skills, and departs for Oklahoma by train.  He admires the vastness of the 
valleys and their “broad mountain streams…so near that the breath of coldness rising 
from them chilled the skin of one’s face” (298).  According to Max Brod, Kafka “used to 
hint smilingly, that within this ‘almost limitless’ theatre, his young hero was going to find 
again a profession, a stand-by, his freedom, even his old home and his parents, as if by 
some celestial witchery” (299).  This happy ending is self-indulging and, had it been 
written, would have required a deus ex machina, which Kafka never employed.  Karl, like 
Kafka, is estranged from his father; Kafka, indulging his desire for reconciliation, gives 
Karl the chance of reunion.  Compared to “The Judgment” or The Metamorphosis, which 
are so successful because the protagonist remains bound to authority and subject to the 
absurd, Amerika avoids conflict, provides an escape, and never delivers conflict-
resolution.  Perhaps realizing this failure, Kafka abandoned Amerika, and after writing 
“The Judgment,” Kafka said of his story: “It confirmed my belief that the novel [Amerika] 
is stuck in the disgraceful troughs of literature” (Pawel 271).  Nevertheless, Amerika, 
being his earliest novel, sheds light on Kafka’s development and future works.  Amerika 
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is a prologue to his later novels and initiates motifs that would later be developed.  This 
chapter analyzes Amerika as the foundation for The Castle and The Trial.  Having 
suffered under Hermann’s authority but not yet fully realized the need to face authority, 




The Authoritative Captain 
In the first chapter, “The Stoker,” which was published as a short story in 1913, 
Karl arrives in the United States on an unnamed ship.  Here, the first signs of 
claustrophobia appear as Karl is physically trapped on the ship—though he has little 
intention to leave—by the “swelling throng of porters pushing past him” (3).  When he 
realizes that he has forgotten his umbrella, he descends deeper into the ship through a 
maze of “endlessly recurring stairs, through corridors with countless turnings, through an 
empty room with a deserted writing-table,” and because he must fight through a crowd of 
people, becomes hopelessly lost (4).  Karl’s predicament parallels the confusion of all 
Kafkian protagonists trapped in an absurd world.  For Karl, the maze-like ship is no 
different than the island of “In the Penal Colony.” Governed by strange rules and filled 
with authorities who hinder him, the world is impenetrable despite his best efforts to 
comprehend.  Initially, the stoker traps Karl by seizing “the door handle and pulling the 
door shut with a heavy movement, [sweeping] Karl into the cabin” (4).  Karl is pinned to 
the bunk, but the stoker is not a controlling authority despite the claustrophobia of the 
cabin.  The stoker tells Karl that he is about to be dismissed from his job due to the 
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machinations of the Chief Engineer, Schubal.  Like the workers of “The Great Wall of 
China,” Karl and the stoker are bonded by shared conflict; Karl has been dismissed by his 
father, and the stoker will similarly be dismissed by Schubal.  Kafka portrays the 
communal identity that would recur in his work when the stoker releases Karl, 
demonstrating their solidarity under subjugation.  Together, they plead the stoker’s case 
before the Captain.   
Once again, Kafka depicts a hostile bureaucracy in the form of the gentlemen and 
the Captain.  When they arrive, Karl and the stoker are almost evicted from the room with 
physical force, and during the stoker’s extended speech about the injustice of his 
treatment, there is an obvious “dispersion of interest” (16).  There is no benevolent 
authority.  Even the Captain, who maintains civility, expresses only “resolution to hear 
the stoker this time to the end” (16).  When Schubal appears to defend himself, Karl notes 
that the stoker could “probably split the man’s hated skull with his fists,” but it was 
“beyond his power to take the couple of steps needed to bring Schubal within reach” (21).  
If the Captain is an unsympathetic authority, Schubal is an unreachable one.  Both 
embody aspects of authority that Kafka would later combine into a singular authority 
figure.  The idea that Schubal could be defeated if only he could be reached—but that he 
cannot be reached—reflects Kafka’s perception of authority as an inscrutable force that, 
if only it were within reach and openly exercised its will, might be understood.  This 
scenario foreshadows The Castle, in which the protagonist K. likewise tries to meet 
Klamm, the secretary of the Castle, and understand the inner workings of its world.  The 
ship can be considered a prototype of the Castle, both impenetrable worlds governed by a 
shadowy authority figure, before whom the protagonist must plead his case.  But unlike 
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K., Karl manages an audience with the Captain, and his struggle aboard the ship ends 
when he quickly disembarks—an act of escapism.  In an unlikely coincidence, Karl meets 
his uncle, Senator Jacob, who happens to be meeting with the Captain, and Kafka thereby 
releases Karl from the tension of the conflict between him and Schubal.  Before he leaves, 
Karl asks the stoker, “Why don’t you say something?  Why do you put up with 
everything?” (34).  But the person who says nothing is Karl.  Karl abandons the conflict 
and receives Schubal’s congratulations; Karl leaves under the protection of his uncle; and 
Karl ultimately flees the conflict aboard the ship for the stability of submission to Uncle 
Jacob.   
 
 
The Judgment of Father and Family 
 Uncle Jacob becomes both father figure and authority figure, closely mirroring 
Kafka’s relationship with Hermann.  Uncle Jacob provides Karl with a home and teachers 
so that he “had never to learn by hard experience” (38), a form of the same “undeserved 
gift” that Kafka attributed to Hermann.  Even as he provides for Karl, Uncle Jacob cages 
him in his home and subjects him to irrational law.  Karl is confined to the house and 
unable to glimpse the outside world, having been given the contradictory advice to 
“examine and consider everything” while also being discouraged from standing on the 
balcony “gaping down at the street like lost sheep” (39).  Uncle Jacob never expressly 
forbids anything.  Karl is merely advised against looking from the balcony, and likewise, 
advised not to use the regulator of his writing desk—a mechanism that controls the 
compartments of the desk—though “it would have been quite easy to lock the regulator, 
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and yet Uncle Jacob refrained from doing so” (42).  Uncle Jacob’s vague, inconsistent 
warnings indicate Kafka’s perception of authority.  Kafka’s complaint against authority is 
not the principle of its existence, but its inscrutability, which renders it difficult to obey.  
Kafka also decried how authority enables disobedience; Uncle Jacob provides for Karl 
and purchases the desk for him, thus tempting Karl to use the regulator that Uncle Jacob 
warns against.  In the same way that Hermann told stories of his youth that enflamed the 
imagination with violence and disobedience, the way that God allows the existence of sin 
yet punishes it, Uncle Jacob enables Karl’s offenses.  Uncle Jacob’s vagueness suggests 
to Karl that his displeasure is a mere “pretext” (42), masking the retribution to come. 
Eventually, Karl accepts the invitation to visit one of Uncle Jacob’s friends, Mr. 
Pollunder, after asking his uncle’s leave, which Uncle Jacob grants with “apparent 
pleasure” (50).  But by the next day, Uncle Jacob has changed his mind and attempts to 
dissuade Karl.  Uncle Jacob ultimately acquiesces, but after Karl leaves, he sends a letter 
that repudiates Karl, stating that Karl must “neither visit [him] in person, nor try to get in 
touch with [him] either by writing or through intermediaries” (94).  The punishment 
seems too extreme for the crime; Karl has done little to warrant such an exile, but Uncle 
Jacob, like Karl’s birth father, banishes him with little warning and little preparation.  
Kafka thus suggests the irrationality of authority.  It exists as a self-empowered force that 
demands submission and, perhaps more importantly, piety.  When he receives the letter at 
Mr. Pollunder’s home, Karl obeys Uncle Jacob and departs, but in doing so once again 
indulges in escapism.  Karl escapes the source of his conflict, fleeing “the huge house, the 
endless corridors, the chapel, the empty rooms, the darkness everywhere” (80) that is 
another form of the ship, the absurd world that he should face.  The plot point is not 
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resolved—Karl’s conflict ends, but there is no satisfying conclusion to the debacle with 
Uncle Jacob.  Karl realizes that Mr. Green, the messenger, had intentionally kept him at 
Mr. Pollunder’s to prevent him from returning to Uncle Jacob before the letter was 
delivered, and he even begins to question Mr. Green’s motives, but he ultimately chooses 
to leave.  Perhaps, like Georg’s friend in “The Judgment,” Mr. Green is the usurper of 
Karl’s role as son, the would-be surrogate for Karl, and each “must fight for his own hand 
and…any obligatory social connection between them would be determined in time by the 
victory or destruction of one of them” (66).  But Karl does not struggle.  He disavows his 
obligation to authority by allowing himself to be exiled.  Likewise, Kafka wished to 
escape Hermann—but by the time he wrote Letter to His Father, Kafka had realized that 
Hermann was his inspiration.  Karl’s departure is an escape from his pious task to learn, 
to delve into the reasons for his exile and the authority that commanded it, and it cripples 
his growth. 
Following his “expulsion from his benefactor’s capitalistic Eden” (Payne 36), 
Karl spends the night at a small inn, “merely a last little eating-house for New York car 
and lorry drivers” (99), where he meets Robinson and Delamarche, an Irishman and 
Frenchman respectively, both of whom Karl immediately notes “did not look very 
trustworthy” (99).  Like Karl, they are searching for work, and the trio agree to travel 
together to Butterford, but Robinson and Delamarche exploit Karl by selling his suit, 
spending his money, and dispatching him to obtain food.  Briefly, Karl takes on the 
father-role by providing for them in exchange for information and companionship.  When 
Karl finally breaks with them, Delamarche reassesses their dynamic, himself assuming 
the father-role: “All day you’ve trotted behind me, hanging on to my coat-tails and doing 
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whatever I did and keeping as quiet as a mouse” (127).  Recalling “The Judgment,” Karl 
and Delamarche’s conflict originates in rivalry.  Both are immigrants on the road who 
need to find work.  Each attempts to gain power over the other by making the other 
dependent on himself.  Karl uses money as leverage, while Delamarche uses information, 
but their goal is the same—to become father to the other man.  Though Robinson and 
Delamarche return, Karl momentarily escapes this conflict just as he did Uncle Jacob and 
entirely abandons the father-son dynamic that characterized both conflicts.  He takes 
refuge in the Hotel Occidental as a bellboy under the protection of the Manageress and 
her assistant, Therese, thus entering the most prominent mother-son relationship in 
Kafkian literature.   
Kafka’s depiction of women is less than flattering.  There are few women in his 
short stories, the most prominent being Grete, who eventually neglects Gregor, and 
Gregor’s mother, who seems to sympathize with Gregor but passively takes the father’s 
side.  In The Castle and The Trial, women are typically vampiric creatures whose earthly 
charms distract the protagonist from his quest to comprehend his subjugation.  Amerika 
shares the pattern of seductive, entrapping women, such as Clara, Mr. Pollunder’s 
daughter, who charms Karl with her beauty but bends him to her will, even at one point 
using physical force to restrain him, having “slipped one hand to his throat, on which she 
began to press so strongly that Karl could only gasp for breath” (69).  There is also 
Johanna Brummer, the housemaid who seduced Karl, but she diverges from the beautiful, 
vampiric archetype as a thirty-five-year-old motherly figure.  Like Clara, she chokes Karl, 
but all the while she cares for him as though “she would never give him up to anyone and 
would tend and cherish him to the end of time” (29).  Johanna combines the vampiric and 
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the motherly, though after Amerika, Kafka largely discarded the maternal dynamic.  At 
the Hotel Occidental, Karl finds another mother figure, the Manageress, to replace 
Johanna and the recently lost father figure of Uncle Jacob.  She shelters him and offers 
him work as a bellboy, but she serves also as an escape from the father-son conflict that 
Karl had with Uncle Jacob and Delamarche.  By sheltering Karl, the Manageress robs 
him of the opportunity to struggle and mature.  Kafka may or may not have consciously 
realized this point, but this escapism coddles both himself and Karl.  In Letter to His 
Father, Kafka envisions his relationship with Julie Kafka much as he does Karl’s 
relationship with the Manageress.  Kafka considered his mother “illimitably good” to him, 
but “in no good relation” (Letter 41).  Her kindness, he claims, drove him “back into 
[Hermann’s] orbit, which [he] might perhaps otherwise have broken out of” (Letter 43).  
Evidently, Kafka considered Julie a hindrance to his understanding of Hermann, as 
someone whose kindness placated him and stopped him from reversing the “orbit” into 
which he had fallen.  Kafka wrote this to Hermann about Julie: “She loved you too much 
and was too devoted and loyal to you to have been for long an independent spiritual force 
in the child’s struggle” (Letter 55).  Likewise, Karl loses the Manageress’s support when 
he needs it most; Robinson reappears at the Hotel Occidental, drunk, and when Karl 
offers him asylum, offends the Head Waiter to the extent that he is dismissed, a verdict 
that the Manageress is unable to reverse.  Neither does Karl fight the verdict “determined 
by the first words that happened to fall from the judge’s lips in an impulse of fury” (177).  
Once again, Karl flees, this time from the Hotel Occidental and the clutches of the Head 
Porter who detains him.  Karl then leaves with Robinson to join with Delamarche, falling 
back into the father-son conflict. 
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Delamarche and the Oklahoma Theatre: Submission to Authority 
 In Kafkaesque fashion, Karl has, time and time again, found himself victim of an 
oppressive system ruled by an inscrutable authority—but unlike Kafka’s other characters, 
Karl flees instead of confronting or questioning authority.  Kafka seems unwilling to 
explore the struggle against authority that would become so prominent in his work.  He 
realizes his subject matter is the nature of authority, which explains why Karl meets so 
many authority figures, but Kafka allows Karl to escape without facing them, indulging 
his own escapist urge to flee from Hermann.  Only at its end does Amerika subvert its 
escapist pattern.  This section analyzes the subversion of escapism and the unfinished end 
to Amerika as evidence of Kafka’s maturation as a writer.  Amerika thus becomes a 
prototype for The Castle and The Trial, novels that abandon escapism in pursuit of piety 
and understanding.  
After his exile from the Hotel Occidental, Karl joins Robinson and travels to 
Delamarche’s home, where the final phase of the story, the return to the father-son 
dynamic, unfolds.  Delamarche is staying with a wealthy and obese lady named Brunelda, 
and the two attempt to detain Karl as their servant.  While the power struggle between 
Karl and Delamarche had before been ambiguous, Delamarche is now clearly the father 
figure; Karl seeks protection from him against the police, as Delamarche would be “more 
easily induced than the policeman not to deliver him to the hotel” (217).  The reversal of 
their roles anticipates the relationship in The Castle between K. and his assistants, Arthur 
and Jeremiah, who initially fill the role of K’s sons but become rivals who try to impose 
paternal authority on K.  Delamarche’s insistence that Karl assume the role of servant is 
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an attempt to induct Karl as his son, both replacing the decrepit Robinson and claiming 
power over his old rival, Karl.     
Karl’s conversation with Robinson about his servitude illustrates several points 
about authority and obedience that Kafka would expand in his future novels.  Robinson 
tells Karl that “if you’re always treated like a dog, you begin to think that you’re actually 
one…I don’t care who’s on the balcony with me, so long as there’s somebody” (231).  
Kafka is often treated as a writer of the grotesque, but what he writes is bitterly true; he 
does not indulge in the impractical, romantic ideal of freedom, instead preferring the 
realism of ever-present authority, the struggle to meet obligation, and the difficulty of 
maintaining dignity.  Robinson embodies the struggle for dignity under subjugation when 
he tries to convince Karl to stay.  Robinson craves company in his subjugation.  
Solidarity with Karl would restore a semblance of the self-respect that he has lost while 
being, amid other abuse, “struck across the face several times with the whip” (232).  
Alone, Robinson loses his humanity.  Kafka believed in community, just as he believed 
in authority.  To Kafka, community is a positive response to authority, a way to mitigate 
the unavoidable degradation of submission.  Kafka also depicts the father-son rivalry in 
Robinson and Delamarche’s competition for Brunelda’s attention.  Robinson describes 
how Brunelda “lifted up her skirt and wiped [his] eyes with the hem” (232), and he 
wonders what more she might have done if Delamarche had not called her back.  As 
Delamarche seeks to control Karl, Robinson seeks to take Delamarche’s place and steal 
Brunelda, creating an unending, cyclical process.  Karl tells Robinson, “What applies to 
you needn’t apply to me at all.  Besides, that kind of thing only applies to those who put 
up with it,” to which Robinson replies, “But why shouldn’t it apply to you as well?  Of 
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course it applies to you, too” (233).  This exchange implies the Kafkian premise that 
authority is universal.  Karl’s journey is evidence enough.  No matter where he flees, 
there is always an authority figure waiting for him.  Even if Kafka indulges in escapism, 
Karl’s “escape” can only be temporary before he inevitably falls under the power of a 
new authority.  There is no alternative.  When he looks over the balcony at a political 
campaign rally, Karl is trapped by Delamarche, Robinson, and Brunelda—but the 
democracy below is a mob “flowing backwards and forwards without plan,” and the 
opposition brings a “grand coup,” smashing lights so that everything is swallowed in “the 
illusoriness of darkness” (257).  Romantic freedom is anarchy, and faced with the 
barbarism of the mob, the orderly subjugation on the balcony above seems preferable.  
Notably, this exchange takes place on a balcony—the same place where Hermann 
punished Kafka in his childhood—signaling Kafka’s potential acceptance of what he had 
called tyranny.  Though the balcony exchange is perhaps the most obvious case in point, 
Kafka had previously critiqued the ideal of freedom.  Soon after Karl joins Delamarche 
and Robinson, Kafka writes: “Towards evening they came to a more rustic, fertile 
neighborhood.  All around they could see endless fields stretching across gentle 
hills…and often they heard above them trains thundering over the lofty viaducts” (116).  
Kafka accentuates the idyllic countryside, the freedom and opportunity iconic to the 
Great American West, but the intrusive trains remind that industrialism and an “insistent, 
urban and technological America” is never far (Payne 31).  Despite appearances, there is 
no freedom.   
Repeating his usual response to authority, Karl tries to escape Delamarche; Kafka 
would have allowed him to escape earlier in the novel, but in this case, Delamarche beats 
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Karl and forces him to stay.  When he wakes, Karl moves to the balcony and speaks with 
a student, Joseph Mendel, on the balcony of the adjacent building.  Mendel tells him that 
he should stay.  Karl argues that Delamarche is a “bad man,” and Mendel replies: “If all 
servants were as fastidious in their choice of masters as you are!” (266).  Once again, 
Kafka reiterates that submission is not a matter of choice.  Everyone has obligations, even 
absurd obligations, but must submit nonetheless.  Under questioning, Mendel reveals that 
he works during the day and studies by night, but he also tells Karl: “If I had to give up 
either my studies or my job, of course I’d give up my studies” (268).  His job is the more 
practical choice, just as submission to authority is more practical than the ideal of 
freedom, which, as demonstrated by the political mob, ends in chaos and destruction.  
Interpreting Mendel’s studies as an art form that seeks understanding—just as Kafka’s 
literature is his attempt to scrutinize obligation and, by understanding authority, transcend 
submission and acquire some form of dignity—Kafka declares obedience more important.  
Politzer argues that, at this point, Karl has succumbed to “nihilism” and “the last stages in 
his disillusionment” (155).  However, the text seems to suggest otherwise.  Karl ceases to 
ascribe meaning to freedom, but as Camus says, there is “no necessary common measure” 
between “refusing to grant a meaning to life” and “declaring that [life] is not worth living” 
(Camus 8).  Instead, Kafka depicts Karl, true to his hopes, striving for fulfilment even in 
the face of enslavement and abject reality.   
In the incomplete final chapter pieced together from manuscripts, “The Nature 
Theatre of Oklahoma,” Karl has somehow left Delamarche.  Karl sees a placard 
advertising the Oklahoma Theatre, which promises employment for all: “The great 
Theatre of Oklahoma calls you!  If you think of your future you are one of us!  Everyone 
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is welcome!  Our Theatre can find employment for everyone, a place for everyone!” 
(272).  Like the Hotel Occidental, the Oklahoma Theatre employs Karl, becoming the 
story’s final authority.  Though many people see the placards advertising work, “nobody 
believed in them any longer,” especially not the one belonging to the Theatre, because “it 
did not mention payment” (272).  Kafka criticizes the bourgeois mindset that seeks 
earthly fulfilment over higher truths, metaphorizing society’s movement away from the 
spiritual as disbelief in the Theatre.  However, Karl believes that the Oklahoma Theatre 
will ignore all that he has done, allowing him to “find acceptance” and “find some way of 
at least beginning a decent life” (273).  When he arrives at the racetrack entrance, Karl is 
greeted by a long platform on which young women are “dressed as angels in white robes 
with great wings on their shoulders [and] blowing on long trumpets that glittered like 
gold” (274).  It is an overtly religious vision, and Karl demonstrates a hitherto unseen 
willingness to engage with authority when he is inspired to take up a trumpet and play 
along with them.  Thus, the Oklahoma Theatre becomes a religious symbol of inclusion 
that, discounting the fanciful ending that Kafka envisioned but never wrote, suggests his 
acceptance of authority.  Unlike the small crowd of prospective employees who dither 
below, unwilling to travel deep into the racetrack, Karl notes that, to ask where the 
workers are being interviewed, he must “cross the platform, among all the angels” (276).  
And he does so.  While he had fled from the trials of the ship and the hotel, Karl manages 
to penetrate the racetrack, the final reality to demand his obedience and summon him. 
When he meets the staff manager, he tells him, “I read the placard your company put out 
and I have come here as I was requested,” to which the manager responds, “Quite right.  
Unfortunately, there aren’t many who do the same” (281).  This is Karl’s first success.  
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By promising to “do [his] best and try to carry out all [his] instructions” (290), Karl has 
abandoned escapism and learned piety.  Completing a series of interviews, Karl is moved 
to more and more modest employment within the Theatre, from engineer to technician to 
intermediate pupil—demonstrating the mode of appropriate freedom that Kafka espoused 
in “A Report to An Academy.” Having learned from the student on the balcony the 
appropriateness of meeting obligations before rationalizing them, Karl acquiesces to 
modest work and, faced with the peevishness of the clerk, submits rather than flees.   
However, the Oklahoma Theatre diverges from Kafka’s usual depiction of 
authority.  Contrasting the irrational judgments of the Captain, Uncle Jacob, and the 
Hotel Occidental, the Theatre overlooks Karl’s inexperience and accommodates him.  
Compared to the Castle and the High Court in Kafka’s later novels, the Theatre is 
accessible.  Karl’s willingness to submit to its authority is cheapened by the relative ease 
of doing so; Karl does not struggle with inscrutability or irrationality as K. of The Castle 
and The Trial do.  In this regard, the Oklahoma Theatre is not a true authority.  It 
employs Karl, but it exists for his sake rather than independently, accommodates rather 
than demand obedience.  Its nature as a theatre may indicate falsity, suggesting that it 
performs a mere role.  Though he had begun to abandon escapism, Kafka still afforded 
Karl an easier path than the truly pious submission he would later depict.   
Perhaps realizing the weaknesses of the escapism that pervades the novel, Kafka 
did not finish Amerika.  It is the weakest of his novels, but Amerika provides valuable 
insight into Kafka’s maturation as he outgrows escapism.  By providing the framework 
for The Castle and The Trial, Amerika serves its purpose as a first novel.  Its ending 
clearly demonstrates the lesson that Kafka learned by writing it.  When the Theatre of 
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Oklahoma asks Karl for his name, he answers, “Negro,” signaling his final acceptance of 
submission, even enslavement, to authority, thus leading Kafka down the direction of his 
future literature—darker and more suffocating, with an omnipresent authority from which 
the protagonist never has the option to escape, and which Kafka, likewise, never again 
tries to escape, instead facing the stark horror of this reality. 
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THE CONUNDRUM OF AUTHORITY: THE CASTLE 
 Though Amerika is chronologically followed by The Trial, this chapter focuses on 
The Castle, which reads as the natural sequel to Amerika.  In The Trial, Joseph K. 
encounters the persecution of a strange authority, but he remains in familiar surroundings.  
In Amerika, Karl is denied that luxury and exiled to a foreign land where he must learn 
the lay of the land and the ways of the people; likewise, K., the protagonist of The Castle, 
finds himself in a new world whose laws are unfamiliar to him, and his task as Land-
Surveyor is to map the village ruled by the Castle.  The previous chapter interprets the 
ship and the Hotel Occidental as prototypes of the Castle, symbols of the impenetrable 
authority that Kafka sought to understand.  But while Karl flees from both conflicts, K. 
resolves to stay in the village under the thrall of the Castle: “I can’t go away.  I came here 
to stay.  I’ll stay here” (180).  Most tellingly, K. states that, rather than choosing not to 
leave, he lacks the ability to leave.  By the time he wrote The Castle, Kafka had realized 
the omnipresence of authority, the need to face obligation, and the error of escapism.  
Having established the impossibility of escaping conflict, Kafka knew the value of 
having K., the spiritual successor to Karl, remain under the sway of the Castle.  Where 
Amerika depicts escape from authority, The Castle depicts submission to authority, 
exploring how authority simultaneously demeans and promotes dignity in a collective 
humanity.  The titular Castle is an inscrutable authority whose confusing methods, 
perpetrated by an inefficient bureaucracy, rule over the bourgeois society of the village.  
The Castle is the “essential adventure of a soul in quest of its grace” (Camus 129); K.’s 
quest for meaning enters both the theological and patriarchal spheres as he attempts to 
penetrate the godliness of the Castle by reaching a single official, Klamm, a father figure 
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with whom he competes and whom he seeks to understand; and all the while, K. interacts 
with the villagers, forming relationships and becoming deeply involved in the community, 
an exploration of the social sphere unique to The Castle.  While he seeks the domestic 
stability of a career and home, K. continues his search for meaning, a goal shared by the 
other villagers and dependent upon the Castle.  Communication is the key to 
understanding, depicting both the weakness of language and the dignity of discourse as 
every character shares his or her own, usually conflicting, interpretation of the Castle.  
But Kafka shows that there is meaning to discourse.  Meaning becomes intertwined with 
self and community rather than being an entirely external locus found in the Castle.  In 
the search for meaning, therefore, Kafka advocates communion under authority.  
Purpose of the Castle and Bureaucracy 
 What is the Castle?  Throughout the novel, the Castle, an authority sacred and 
beyond the earthliness of the village, serves as an apparent source of meaning, but it is 
unclear what imbues the Castle with sanctity and meaning: What gives meaning to 
meaning?  Its bureaucratic nature aside, the Castle exhibits inherent meaning that the 
characters of the novel instinctively understand.  In the opening lines, Kafka describes the 
Castle as being present even in its absence: “The Castle hill was hidden, veiled in mist 
and darkness, nor was there even a glimmer of light to show that a castle was there” (3).  
This description suggests the Castle’s secrecy and distance from its subjects, but despite 
the darkness, K. knows to gaze into the “illusory emptiness above him” (3).  Perhaps the 
Castle inhabits an illusion of emptiness, and K. knows its presence regardless, or the 
Castle is part of the emptiness, and its very authority is an illusion.  When he observes the 
Castle in the morning, K. sees “the Castle above him, clearly defined in the glittering air, 
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its outline made still more definite by the thin layer of snow covering everything” (11).  
Despite its modest appearance as “a rambling pile consisting of innumerable small 
buildings closely packed together and of one or two stories,” the Castle momentarily 
“satisfies” K.’s expectations (11).  When he approaches it, K. becomes disappointed at 
the “wretched-looking town, a huddle of village houses, whose sole merit, if any, lay in 
being built of stone” (12).  But despite its appearance, the Castle remains a source of 
power and authority.  Walter Corbella notes that the Castle occupies a central position in 
the village, a “vantage point from which control and authority can be established” and 
that defines “the hierarchical division between the gentlemen and their social inferiors” 
(Corbella 70).  K. compares it to his hometown, the church tower of which is “firm in line, 
soaring unfaltering to its tapering point,” but ultimately an “earthly building” (12).  It lies 
defined in relation to the human community, and because of its earthliness, lacks holiness.  
In comparison, the Castle possesses windows that glitter “with a somewhat maniacal 
glitter” and battlements that are “irregular, broken, fumbling, as if designed by the 
trembling or careless hand of a child…as if a melancholy-mad tenant…had burst through 
the roof and lifted himself up to the gaze of the world” (12).  This “melancholy-mad 
tenant” is the authority lying outside human limits.  It is free and inscrutable, “maniacal” 
in its irrationality and imperceptibility, but due to such traits, authority transcends 
humanity and embodies its sense of meaning.      
From the beginning, the Castle assumes religious connotations through its all-
encompassing nature.  It is omnipresent, simultaneously assimilating its subjects within 
its boundaries and disseminating its sanctity to its subjects.  Schwarzer tells K., “This 
village belongs to the Castle, and whoever lives here or passes the night here does so, in a 
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manner of speaking, in the Castle itself” (4), and likewise, the teacher says, “There is no 
difference between the peasantry and the Castle” (14).  Most obviously, the villagers are 
part of the Castle, but conversely, the Castle must be part of the villagers.  Perhaps what 
imbues the Castle with meaning and authority is the very people over whom it rules, the 
people who trust in the authority of the Castle and therefore give it control.  Kafka 
explores another converse relationship between authority and subject when K. negotiates 
the terms of his employment after the Mayor has requested that the teacher hire K.  
Though the teacher is doing K. a favor by giving him work, K. states that “when one is 
compelled to take someone else on, and this someone else allows himself to be taken on, 
then he is the one who grants the favor” (124).  For the teacher to gain authority over him, 
K. must accept the post.  Similarly, the Castle owes its authority to those who imbue it 
with authority.  Corbella observes that “power does not emanate from a single individual 
or site, but in the multiple interactions between the villagers and the authorities” (78).  
This is not to suggest that the Castle possesses no inherent authority; Kafka, through his 
observation of absolute relationships like that between father and son, certainly believed 
that unconditional authority exists—but not independently of humanity.  Without subjects 
to validate it, authority would be obsolete.  Similarly, Klamm does not need to assert his 
power over K., but he needs K. to have power.  As Ron Smetana observes, the power of 
the Castle is “diffused through the entire village population” (47).  The Castle needs the 
villagers just as the villagers need it.   
Like Kafka, K. firmly believes in the absurd authority of the Castle and the 
“ludicrous bungling that in certain circumstances may decide the life of a human being” 
(82), but the stone-and-mortar Castle cannot be equated with metaphysical meaning.  
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Corbella distinguishes the function of the Castle as a physical and a symbolic structure.  
What is observed as the physical form of the Castle is a construction that denotes the 
efforts of the social enterprise to understand meaning, the invisible authority symbolized 
by the Castle.  When he observes the Castle, K. attempts to capture the Castle’s authority, 
but the Castle’s outward appearance, while indicative of authority, is not the authority.  
Authority cannot be seen, but it is always present.  Even when it disappears from K.’s 
range of vision, the Castle is felt, which “serves as indication of its illusory nature” 
(Corbella 71).  Before his meeting with the Mayor, K. notes that meeting with the 
authorities is not difficult, but that all these authorities do is “guard the distant and 
invisible interests of distant and invisible masters” (74).  When he speaks of authorities 
here, K. means the bureaucracy of the Castle, while the absolute authority that Kafka is 
primarily concerned with is the “distant and invisible master” symbolized by, but 
ultimately lying beyond, the Castle.  K. also states that he fights “not only for himself, but 
clearly for other powers as well which he did not know” (75).  It seems unlikely that K. is 
under the compulsion of some secondary authority in conflict with the Castle.  Instead, K. 
is fulfilling his duty of piety towards authority by questioning and seeking to understand 
it; K’s conflict with authority is a form of submission, in which K. forgoes “an unofficial, 
totally unrecognized, troubled, and alien existence” in favor of vigilance towards 
authority and being “always on his guard” (75).  Kafka did not write to escape or conquer 
authority, but to understand his submission.  Similarly, K. says, “I don’t want any act of 
favor from the Castle, but my rights” (96).  Never does K. desire freedom from the Castle.  
His desire for “rights” suggests willingness to submit, reflecting Kafka’s rejection of 
romantic autonomy.  Kafka’s struggle was for dignity, not liberation; K. muses that 
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“through too great compliance he would only become the teacher’s slave and scapegoat” 
(199), but K. still obeys the teacher as he does the Castle.  Kafka was concerned with 
balancing self and obligation, and to that end, he felt the need to sanction authority.  
Likewise, K. continues his investigation of the Castle and seeks to learn its secrets. 
Even the internal structure of the Castle belies its true authority.  Villagers who 
have visited the Castle include K.’s assistants, Arthur and Jeremiah, who were sent to 
him by the Castle, and Barnabas, the messenger who brings letters from Klamm.  
Barnabas’s account of the Castle indicates that even inside, there are barriers: “Is it really 
Castle service Barnabas is doing, we ask ourselves then; granted, he goes into the offices, 
but are the offices part of the real Castle?” (228).  Because of the barriers put up by the 
“physical” Castle, it is unclear what constitutes the “real” Castle, the absolute authority.  
People create systems that are increasingly refined and self-enclosed until that system no 
longer speaks to reality, and in The Castle, that system, the tool to comprehend the 
meaning of authority, is the form and bureaucracy of the Castle.  As Corbella argues, the 
physicality of the Castle “matters to the villagers insofar as it represents the control 
without bounds that permeates their lives,” but the symbolic power of the Castle “resides 
primarily in their minds” (72).  Contact between the villagers and the Castle is facilitated 
by the bureaucracy—the officials and their servants—but the hierarchy is 
incomprehensible, the bureaucracy seems to do little of worth, and the Castle never 
exercises its supposed power and authority.  Though K. is fixated on Klamm and views 
him as the ultimate authority representing the Castle, Klamm is only a single official.  
Servants of the Castle, who stay at the Herenhoff Inn, are “ruled by their insatiable 
impulses” (285) and described by Frieda, the barmaid and Klamm’s mistress, as 
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“contemptible and objectionable creatures” (51).  The Castle is seemingly incompetent 
and incapable of recognizing its own incompetence.  In explaining the workings of the 
Castle, the Mayor tells K. that his employment as Land-Surveyor was an accident of 
bureaucratic confusion.  When K. decries the error, the Mayor responds: “Errors don’t 
happen, and even when once in a while an error does happen, as in your case, who can 
say finally that it’s an error?” (84).  Errors are only apparent, and affairs are settled 
“justly, yet all the same arbitrarily” (88).  The Castle is made up of unexplainable 
paradoxes, and the officials’ activities seem to serve no purpose. 
But for all its seeming faults and even its tyrannical nature—officials are middle-
aged and brusque, and servants are often sexually promiscuous—the Castle is not 
depicted as something to be overthrown.  Kafka suggests that though authority appears 
irrational and inconsistent, humanity may simply be unable to comprehend an existing 
internal logic.  Barnabas’s sister, Olga, describes the chaotic method of the officials 
traveling between the village and the Castle: “There are several roads to the Castle.  At 
one time one of them is in fashion, and most carriages go by that; then it’s another and 
everything drives pell-mell there.  And what governs this change of fashion has never yet 
been found out” (280).  Olga suggests that, because some unknown law “governs” the 
change, the only impediment to knowing the path of the officials is the obscurity of law.  
Any observed inconsistency stems from ignorance of a system that is beyond humanity.  
Most likely, Kafka did not believe humanity could comprehend the higher truth of 
authority, and it is unclear whether he believed that humanity should do so, even if it 
were capable.  Comprehension might heighten dignity, but it would also negate the 
benefits of submission by mitigating struggle.  If humanity understood its workings, 
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authority would not be a true authority, disproving the existence of higher truth.  K. 
muses: “If an authority is good, why should it not be feared?” (239).  True authority 
ought to be feared, and to be feared, it must remain beyond the ken of its subjects.  
Villagers unconditionally accept the authority of the Castle, never distinguishing between 
the officials and the Castle.  Gardena, the landlady of the Bridge Inn, tells K. that “Herr 
Klamm is a gentleman from the Castle, and that in itself, without considering Klamm’s 
position there at all, means that he is of very high rank” (63).  If his position were 
clarified, Klamm’s stature would be reduced.  His powerful presence stems from K.’s 
ignorance about him.  Inscrutability, Kafka suggests, is what gives authority power. 
Kafka shows the futility of the attempt to define authority, but simultaneously, he 
shows the value of the attempt as the only chance for even a possibility of 
understanding—that there is meaning in pursuing an impossible duty.  K. is no different 
from the villagers in his obsession with and reverence for the Castle, never questioning 
the power of the authorities, but he continues his attempt to penetrate the Castle.  K. 
responds to Gardena that though he does not presume he will be able to “face Klamm 
without a door between [them]” and supposes that he may “run from the room at the very 
sight of him,” he insists on speaking to Klamm, as fear is “no valid reason in [his] eyes 
for refraining from the attempt” (65).  K. starkly contrasts with Karl, who fled from this 
challenge; K. realizes that he is ignorant but never wavers in his quest for understanding, 
being “prepared to put up with [his] ignorance…so long as [his] strength holds out” (73).  
While K. is more aggressive in his attempts, other villagers share his line of thinking.  
Regarding her dismissal from Klamm, Gardena says that she was “entitled to 
inquire…but had no right to be unhappy” (106).  Like K., Gardena had once been 
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inquisitive about the Castle, and nothing suggests that this has changed.  In comparison, 
her more mellow stance implies that failing to meet Klamm is to be expected.  Gardena 
says that if there is no chance of meeting Klamm, K. “won’t alter that fact by means of 
this protocol” (148), but that through the protocols of the Castle, K. possesses “a sort of 
connection perhaps with Klamm” (149).  Even that minimal connection is a meaningful 
victory; K. insists that anything less of a direct meeting is failure, but Kafka’s humility—
even self-deprecation—suggests that his view was more in line with that of Gardena.  
K.’s presumes that failing to meet Klamm is utter failure, disregarding the existence of 
“tiny, vanishing, actually invisible hope” (147).  But his inquisitiveness is not wrong, and, 
as will be discussed, every villager similarly inquires into the Castle.  When K. learns of 
Barnabas’s frustration at his uncertain position in the Castle, K. states that “something is 
there, something which Barnabas has the chance of using, something or other at the very 
least; and that it is Barnabas’s own fault if he can’t get any farther than doubt and anxiety 
and despair” (240).  K.’s disapproval stems from Barnabas’s inaction.  In Amerika, Karl 
is the only prospective employee of the Oklahoma Theatre willing to go deep into the 
racetrack in search of the management; Barnabas, like the dawdling bystanders, allows 
doubt to stop him, something that Kafka deems negligence of duty.  Kafka’s stance was 
that “one must fight to get to the top...one must take advantage of everything that offers 
any hope” (210).  Pursuing any form of hope amid subjugation, as K. does, is the most 
dignified way to live.  What K. must correct is his flawed perception of hope, which the 
following section further explores through the father-son dynamic. 
Father-Son Mimetic Rivalry 
95 
	  
 René Girard, whose work in anthropological philosophy introduced the theory of 
mimetic desire, provides a possible interpretation of the father-son rivalry that pervades 
The Castle.  According to his theory of mimesis, human beings imitate each other’s 
desires, and this imitation gives rise to rivalries and conflicts; the subject desires an 
object because he is provoked by the desire of another person, the model, for the same 
object.  Thus, there is always a triangular relationship of subject, model, and object, 
which can develop into mimetic rivalry between subject and model for the desired object.  
Applied to Kafkian father-son dynamics, the son is the subject who develops a rivalry 
with the father, the model, over some object.  When he steals Frieda away from Klamm, 
K. competes directly with the authoritative father figure, pace the Freudian Oedipal 
complex, for reasons other than sexual desire.  Before learning that Frieda is Klamm’s 
mistress, K. competes with Frieda as fellow subjects of the Castle, and his words are 
meant as “a weapon for bringing down her pride” (48).  As evidenced by Frieda’s 
wording when she asks K. if he wants to “take [her] away from Klamm” (50), K. does not 
want Frieda for her own sake, but only because of her connection to Klamm.  Note that 
other villagers consider sexual affairs with officials to be “respectable,” as Jeremiah calls 
Frieda because she is a “former sweetheart of Klamm’s” (307).  K. differs from the 
villagers in his direct competition with Klamm.  In a deleted passage, Gardena claims that 
Klamm cannot be said to be “sometimes more and sometimes less of an official, for he is 
always an official, to full capacity” (438).  Villagers consider Castle officials beyond 
their reach and therefore beyond competition—Girard calls this phenomenon, in which 
the subject merely imitates the model, external mediation.  However, in internal 
mediation, the subject and model do not belong to different worlds, and the subject comes 
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to resemble the model so that they desire the same things; because they are in the same 
world and reach for the same object, they become rivals.  Internal mediation is modeled 
by K., who evidently believes it possible to reach Klamm and distinguishes him as a 
“private person” able to be spoken to anywhere, “in a house, in the street, wherever [K.] 
happens to meet him” (112).  K.’s attempt to reach Klamm is not purely a quest for 
understanding, but also a competition.  When attempting to win an audience with Klamm, 
K. describes himself as fighting with the authorities “for something vitally near to him, 
for himself, and moreover, at least at the very beginning, on his own initiative, for he was 
the attacker” (75).  Recall Kafka’s admission that he attempted to lessen Hermann’s 
power through jokes and considered breaking with him by marrying—Kafka’s early 
attacks against authority as he competed with Hermann. 
 Another example of mimetic rivalry between father and son is the competition 
between K. and Jeremiah, once again for Frieda.  K.’s assistants, Jeremiah and Arthur are 
childlike, climbing through windows, following K. against his wishes, and being chased 
off with threats.  Though seemingly obedient, they both display mimetic tendencies when 
vying for Frieda’s attention, “jealously” watching her movements with K., trying to sleep 
with Frieda, and trying to ruin K. “so as to be left alone with [Frieda]” (181).  When he 
leaves K., Jeremiah takes Frieda, and he appears to age drastically.  Jeremiah explains 
that when he is alone, “all [his] youthful spirits are gone” (302).  Jeremiah ages because, 
having left K. and being outside his authority, Jeremiah becomes a rival.  Frieda later 
asks K.: “Do you think that Jeremiah, so long as he was in service, would have dared to 
take me away?” (323).  While Jeremiah was his assistant, K. was an external 
mediator/model and therefore not a rival, but once dismissed, Jeremiah becomes part of 
97 
	  
the same world as K.  Now they take part in internal mediation, vying for the object of 
their desires, Frieda.  Perhaps K.’s hatred of Jeremiah and Arthur stems, as Jeremiah 
accuses, from his subconscious fear of displacement, which makes him “afraid of 
assistants” (306).  If so, his hatred harkens to “The Judgment,” in which Georg’s father 
attempts to replace Georg with his friend, a substitute son, to avoid Georg’s displacement 
of himself as the authority.  In that story, also, Georg’s father has a changing appearance 
like Jeremiah, being frail while under Georg’s power but growing stronger and taller 
when asserting his authority over Georg.  Changes in physical appearance in accordance 
to changing metaphysical perception is a hallmark of Kafkian literature, and in The 
Castle, signifies the changing power dynamic between father and son. 
Like that of Jeremiah, Klamm’s appearance also changes.  He appears differently 
to each person, whose descriptions fluctuate “in detail…and yet perhaps not so much as 
Klamm’s real appearance” (230).  His ever-changing appearance leads Gardena to 
conclude neither K. nor herself are “even capable of seeing Klamm as he really is” (64).  
Barnabas, too, doubts that “the official who is referred to as Klamm is really Klamm” 
(229).  What changes may not be Klamm’s appearance, but perceptions of his image.  In 
this way, Klamm’s appearance depends “on the mood of the observer, on the degree of 
his excitement, on the countless gradations of hope or despair which are possible for him 
when he sees Klamm” (231).  K.’s perception of Klamm as a rival offends the villagers 
because it challenges their own perspective.  Perhaps much more offensive than the 
difference between themselves, K. alone defies external mediation in favor of internal 
competition.  Through Klamm’s inconstancy, Kafka shows the conflict of perspective 
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between individuals, suggesting another theme of The Castle: the purpose of 
communication. 
Communication and Language 
 The Castle is a story of communication and, despite the failings of language, the 
value of discourse.  Despite their shared belief in its absolute authority, each of the 
villagers has his or her own interpretation of the Castle.  Aside from their different 
perception of Klamm, villagers share with K. varying, often conflicting information about 
the Castle.  Michael Löwy argues that K. “does not feel called to take up the villagers’ 
cause or initiate collective action,” and thus his attitude is “strictly individual” (54), but 
Löwy neglects the constant discourse between the villagers and K.  Similarly, Corbella 
states that the world of the Castle “affords no room for the development of emotional ties 
in the form of companionship or friendship, especially because they disrupt the 
established order” (75), but the Castle seems instead to facilitate companionship.  
Gardena finds K.’s desire to meet Klamm presumptuous; Olga tells K. that many believe 
Klamm’s secretary Momus to be Klamm himself; Burgel, a secretary to an official, 
Friedrich, tells K. that the Castle tends not to judge at night, because judgments become 
more private.  These discussions are a system of communication that binds the village 
together as a community.  Compared to Clara or Brunelda of Amerika, the women in The 
Castle are typically less antagonistic.  Even Frieda, who beseeches K. to go “to the south 
of France, or to Spain” to keep her with him (180), is only a momentary distraction.  In 
fact, Frieda, like K. and the villagers, searches for meaning: “She was seeking and he was 
seeking…their tossing limbs did not avail to make them forget, but only reminded them 
of what they sought” (60).  Note that in Amerika, lust and other earthly desires draw Karl 
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away from conflict; Frieda and K. instead remind one another of their duty to authority.  
Their physical communion reminds them of their search but is ultimately insufficient; 
their search is for spiritual communion.  K.’s quest for admission to the Castle 
complements his quest for acceptance into the community; K. finds a fiancé in Frieda, 
then work from the teacher, and lodgings with Barnabas.  If Schwarzer is correct that 
whoever stays in the village stays “in the Castle itself” (4), then K.’s two quests are one 
and the same.  By gaining acceptance into the community and shedding the status of 
foreigner that sets him apart, K. also gains acceptance into the Castle.  Klamm writes K. 
to praise him as a Land-Surveyor, claiming that “the surveying work that [he has] carried 
out thus far has been appreciated” (154).  K.’s literal task as Land-Surveyor is to map the 
village.  On a metaphysical level, he explores the village’s customs and beliefs about the 
Castle, thereby fulfilling this task through communication.     
 Before discussing the value of communication, it must be noted that Kafka 
likewise highlights the failings of language.  Communication is difficult; K. and the 
villagers are often at odds because they fail to comprehend one another, particularly 
because of their different perspectives.  Frieda tells K. that Gardena said his “character 
was so different from ours…that even when [he] spoke frankly, it was bound to be 
difficult for [them] to believe [him]” (201).  Paradoxically, communication facilitates 
understanding, but mutual understanding is needed to facilitate communication.   Like all 
worthwhile endeavors in Kafkian literature, communication is confusing and painstaking.  
In the opening of the novel, Schwarzer’s call to the Castle to affirm K.’s identity requires 
that he reach over K. for the telephone that rests almost over his head, so that “he could 
not, even with the best intentions, avoid disturbing K.” (6).  When he himself calls, K. 
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hesitates to give his identity because he is “at the mercy of the telephone…the other 
could shout him down or hang up the receiver, and that might mean the blocking of a not 
unimportant way of access” (27).  When he reveals that calls to the Castle would cause 
all the instruments in the subordinate departments to ring, if only “practically all the 
departments didn’t leave their receivers off” (94), the Mayor emphasizes that the 
inscrutability of authority hinders direct communication.  K. hands the letter from Klamm 
to the Mayor, and the Mayor tells him that rather than the Castle validating his role as 
Land-Surveyor, “the task of proving that [he has been] taken on is laid on[him]” (92).  
Kafka did not believe in convenient answers handed down by providence, choosing 
instead to participate in the more frustrating path of struggling for answers. “To anyone 
who knows how to read official communications, and consequently knows still better 
how to read unofficial letters, all this is only too clear,” says the Mayor.  K. responds, 
“You interpret the letter so well that nothing remains of it but a signature on a blank sheet 
of paper” (92).  Language, Kafka claims, is an insufficient system of communication, the 
subjectivity of language lending itself to misinterpretation and impeding true 
understanding.   
Yet language is the only medium available.  Kafka suggests that 
miscommunication, as another form of endless struggle like submission to authority, has 
its own merits.  K.’s quest largely takes place through discourse with the village 
community, and miscommunication forces them to continue their attempts.  Ongoing 
conversation about the Castle is fruitful whether or not the ambiguity of authority is ever 
clarified.  In fact, conversation is facilitated by inaccessibility; the lack of an easy 
catharsis, the impossibility of an end, perpetuates community.  Before Olga shares the 
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secret of her sister, Amalia, she says that “complete accord” is needed both for K. to help 
them and for them to help K. (243).  It seems impossible ever to reach complete accord, 
but because of this impossibility, Olga must tell K. the story, which, at least minimally, 
enriches his understanding of the village and the Castle.  Communication is how K. seeks 
to integrate himself into the community, and the community provides structure to the 
enterprise of meaning; Kafka, likewise, wrote as a form of communication, and he chose 
not to break with Hermann because family was the structure in which he could begin to 
understand him.  Thus, Kafka stresses the importance of communal identity in the quest 
for meaning, and the role of authority is to foster and enforce community.  When Pepi, 
the chambermaid who temporarily replaces Frieda as barmaid at Herenhoff Inn, must 
return to her original post, she reflects that she is happy to return to the other 
chambermaids: “Why should I get on better than they do?  For that was just what held us 
together, the fact that the future was barred to all three of us in the same way, and now I 
have broken through after all and was separated from them” (406).  As with the masons 
and workers of “The Great Wall of China,” shared blind subjugation to authority 
contributes to the communion between Pepi and her friends.  K., who seeks to displace 
Klamm, approaches authority erroneously.  To K., understanding means rivalry and 
mastery, but to Kafka and the villagers, understanding is deference to the quest; reflection, 
not rivalry, is the proper mode.  During an unsuccessful wait for Klamm outside 
Herenhoff Inn, K. has a moment of seeming enlightenment that removes him from his 
competitive quest.  In his solitude, K. muses: 
It seemed to K. as if at last those people had broken off all relations with him, and 
as if now in reality he were freer than he had ever been…but—this conviction was 
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at least equally strong—as if at the same time there was nothing more senseless, 
nothing more hopeless, than this freedom, this waiting, this inviolability. (139) 
This passage suggests that Kafka, perhaps inspired by Judaism, was drawn to the 
communal enterprise.  Unlike Protestantism, which leans toward individualism in its 
rejection of papal supremacy, Catholicism and Judaism emphasize community.  But 
Catholicism still incorporates a measure of autonomy; church membership itself is a 
matter of choice.  Judaism takes communal identity further.  Jews are born into faith and 
community.  Hannah Arendt interprets The Castle as “the one novel in which Kafka 
discusses the Jewish problem, the only one in which the hero is plainly a Jew” (115).  
Löwy agrees that K. is a Jewish figure, claiming that K. is an “eternal troublemaker who 
is always out of place” (204).  Per this argument, K., ostracized by both the Castle and 
the village, embodies the “modern would-be assimilationist Jew” seeking recognition 
(Arendt 116).   However, though different from the villagers in his confrontational 
mindset, K. is not set so far apart from the village community.  K. truly does become 
assimilated into the village, was perhaps assimilated the very moment he stepped within 
its boundaries.  K. himself recognizes the “relations” he possesses within the village, and 
contrary to Löwy’s claim that K. alone “refuses voluntary servitude” (204), K., like the 
villagers, acknowledges the power of the Castle.  Even when he momentarily achieves 
the freedom that he craves, K. realizes that freedom from authority is meaningless; 
authority is the source of community and meaning. 
Kafka provides an example of an archetypal heroic individual in Amalia, from 
whom Kafka’s opinion about individualism can be inferred.  Like K., Amalia differs from 
the villagers in her perception of the Castle, but while K. remains obedient even while 
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challenging Klamm, Amalia has altogether rejected the Castle.  Though her family used 
to be in good standing, the village has since ostracized them because Amalia refused the 
sexual summons of an official, Sortini.  Amalia’s individualism emerges with her 
changed appearance at the Fire Brigade’s celebration, where she attracted Sortini; Olga 
describes that Amalia’s “somber glance, [which] has kept the same quality since that day, 
was high over [their] heads” (245).  The change is not physical—Olga emphasizes that 
Amalia is not particularly beautiful—but internal, as evidenced by her “somber glance.” 
Earlier, K. had taken notice of her gaze as well, describing it as “cold, clear, and steady,” 
and “not hateful but proud and upright in its reserve” (219).  Amalia has a different 
understanding of the world than others, including K., which allowed her to reject Sortini.  
According to Olga, Castle officials are so attractive that “women can’t help loving the 
officials once they give them any encouragement” (256), and K., analogously, is obsessed 
with Klamm.  Though Olga insists that Amalia must love Sortini, or else she “would be 
too exceptional for plain human understanding” (256), Olga is partial to the Castle in a 
way that Amalia is not.  In another example of miscommunication, Olga projects her own 
viewpoint onto Amalia, and indeed, Olga admits that she herself would have answered 
Sortini’s summons.  Amalia likely feels nothing for Sortini, her understanding of 
authority leading to utter rejection of both the Castle and its officials.  While the villagers 
consider the Castle an external mediator, and K. treats the Castle as an internal mediator, 
Amalia seems to forgo mimesis altogether in favor of autonomy.  Unlike her fellow 
citizens, Amalia does not imitate or compete with a model, the Castle, to distinguish her 
identity.  Instead, she takes the road of the romantic heroine and affirms herself as an 
individual.   
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But Kafka’s depiction of Amalia is unsympathetic.  Löwy praises Amalia as 
“irreducibly [embodying] the refusal to submit, disobedience, in short, human dignity” 
(204), but Amalia’s disobedience does not preserve her dignity.  She becomes a mute 
creature unable to connect with the community and, far more than K., the “out of place 
Jew” that Löwy describes.  If the village represents Jewish community, K. becomes, or 
has always been, part of the community, while Amalia becomes and remains an outsider.  
Her brand of heroism abandons communal identity and appears rooted in stubbornness 
and egoism, as Amalia does nothing to help her family even while her actions ruin them.  
Her freedom is like the momentary release that K. felt—hopeless, senseless, and 
ultimately meaningless.  As Amalia abandons the Castle, the Castle likewise abandons 
Amalia.  No punishment comes, because the Castle no longer recognizes her family.  As 
previously discussed, voluntary submission to authority lends it power and even existence.  
Amalia and the Castle no longer occupy the same metaphysical order.  Before he can be 
forgiven, Amalia’s father “had to prove his guilt” (275), an impossibility so long as 
Amalia does not recognize the Castle.  Amalia’s family is “punished” instead by the 
community.  Olga describes their father’s customers boycotting him and their family 
friends breaking with them: “We weren’t afraid of anything in the future, we were 
suffering under the immediate present, we were actually enduring our punishment” (269).  
To Kafka, individualism threatens meaning by forgoing communal identity, leading to 
the worst possible fate—being set adrift, alone, in a meaningless world.  Like K., Amalia 
does not understand that certain duties are owed to authority, that reverence is owed, and 
that the unbridgeable distance between them, the subjects, and the Castle, the authority, is 
not permission to displace or break with authority.  Camus claims that K.’s interaction 
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with the Barnabas family is his attempt to “recapture God through what negates him, to 
recognize him, not according to our categories of goodness and beauty, but behind the 
empty and hideous aspects of his indifference, of his injustice, and of his hatred” (133).  
Indeed, K. begins to diverge from archetypal moral judgments, but Camus argues that to 
forsake “morality, logic, and intellectual truths” makes K. “a little more exiled” (133).  
However, K.’s abandonment of logic and intellect seems to have the contrary effect of 
bringing him closer to the Castle.  Amalia clings to morality and logic, rejecting the 
Castle’s absurdity by shredding Sortini’s summons.  As he accepts the irrational order of 
the Castle, K. does not become exiled, but integrated. 
 What ultimately empowers the Castle is its ambiguity, which engenders ongoing 
communication between the villagers and gives them purpose and solidarity.  Many 
critics note that Willa and Edwin Muir’s translation of The Castle, the first to be 
published, employs diction with religious connotations.  It seems doubtful that Kafka 
wrote solely with spiritual motives, but as with all Kafkian literature, The Castle 
incorporates religion as part of its exploration of authority.  Considered as a spiritual 
authority, the Castle provides structure to the villagers’ religious enterprise; the 
community has its own form of religion and congregation, one that Kafka advocates as 
opposed to individualism.  Through community, discourse about the Castle becomes 





THE SANCTITY OF LAW: THE TRIAL 
 This final chapter discusses The Trial, the last and most famous of Kafka’s three 
novels.  Written in 1914 and 1915 following Kafka’s abandonment of Amerika, The Trial 
was similarly left unfinished.  Though Max Brod compiled the chapters—the last of 
which seems to bring the story to an end—Kafka, as he describes in a diary entry of 
November 30, 1914, considered the work unfinished: “I can’t write anymore.  I’ve come 
up against the last boundary, before which I shall in all likelihood again sit down for 
years, and then in all likelihood begin another story all over again that will again remain 
unfinished” (Diaries 318).  Kafka correctly predicted that he would later begin The 
Castle and similarly abandon it.  Though The Trial precedes The Castle, there are two 
reasons to leave its discussion last.  First, The Trial reads as a more complete novel than 
either Amerika or The Castle.  Like most Kafkian literature, the plot is straightforward: 
Joseph K., the chief cashier of a bank, is arrested on his thirtieth birthday and accused of 
an unspecified crime by an inscrutable authority.  K. is not imprisoned and continues 
working.  His bourgeois routine as a banker contrasts with the inaccessible and irrational 
court system, which, as the story becomes increasingly absurd and infused with magical 
realism, takes on overt theological elements.  K. attempts to penetrate the High Court, the 
symbol of theological authority, to learn his crime and prove his innocence, but his 
fruitless efforts end with his death when, on the eve of his thirty-first birthday, two men 
execute him by thrusting a knife into his heart.  The Trial differs from the other two 
novels in its ending—though its meaning is likewise ambiguous, the ending is clearly 
climactic and feels like an ending.  According to Brod, Kafka wanted to insert scenes 
before the final chapter describing the workings of the trial but also felt that K.’s trial 
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should never go to the highest level, thus rendering the novel simultaneously unfinishable 
and finished.  Regardless, the ending seems to be the logical terminus, and any unfinished 
elements would have preceded it.  Therefore, The Trial can be discussed as a complete 
novel, partially eliminating the element of speculation involved in discussion of Amerika 
and The Castle.  Second, The Trial parallels the judge-and-defendant relationship 
between Kafka and Hermann detailed in Letter to His Father and consequently 
epitomizes the largest Kafkian theme: the conflict between reason and authority.  Kafka 
consistently refers to his relationship with Hermann as a “prozess,” or trial, using legal 
terms such as “urteil,” judgment or sentence, and “schuld,” guilt.  When he sent the letter 
to Milena Jesenka, Kafka wrote: “And as you read it understand all the lawyer’s tricks: it 
is a lawyer’s letter” (Letters to Milena 65).  In The Trial, K. is similarly beset by an 
inscrutable authority, and he, too, assumes the role of a lawyer in his own defense, 
though to little avail.  Letter to His Father is neither an attempt at reconciliation nor an 
indictment but an allegory of authority.  Likewise, The Trial transcends its outward 
political and theological themes to center on the nature of authority and the human 
response to authority.     
In The Myth of Sisyphus, Albert Camus proposes that The Trial “propounds a 
problem” that The Castle “to a certain degree, solves” (The Myth of Sisyphus 130).  
Certainly, The Trial and The Castle share similar themes and perhaps ask similar 
questions—Kafka was undoubtedly preoccupied with authority—but Camus, who asserts 
that The Trial ends without “treatment” of the absurdity it “diagnoses” (130), undervalues 
The Trial.  Rather than relying on another novel to answer its questions, The Trial is self-
contained and answers the problems shared between itself and The Castle, albeit with a 
108 
	  
different approach.  In The Castle, K. seeks admittance to the Castle, which, while 
spiritually remote, is physically present, with a form like that of the village.  During his 
quest, K. becomes part of the village community, finding meaning in social life and 
communal identity.  In The Trial, Joseph K. is alone.  His quest is solitary.  His goal, the 
High Court, is so far removed that K. never sets foot in it, never sees it, and never meets 
any official belonging to it.  K.’s solitary struggle epitomizes the unreconcilable conflict 
between rationality and absurdity, an internal struggle that must be faced alone.  Where 
The Castle depicts a communal search for meaning, The Trial denies the benefit of 
community and depicts an individual search for meaning.  Believing truth to be 
unreachable, Kafka rejects the romantic ideal of the individual unraveling the absurdity 
of the world.  Before his death, K. realizes his failings and experiences an epiphany, but 
K.’s epiphany is not supernatural, and he does not achieve communion with God.  Instead, 
K. learns a simple truth: that his failing was succumbing to the temptation to arrogantly 
interpret the world.  Like the K. of The Castle, Joseph K. of The Trial commits no crime 
in seeking to understand the unknown authority, but his fault lies in his dogged belief in 
reason.  During his quest, K. moves away from earthly, bourgeois trappings—his work as 
a banker, his lust for women—towards the truth of the High Court, but K. continuously 
seeks systematic explanation; K. wants logic and reasoning that justifies the authority of 
the High Court.  But Kafka believed that humanity is not owed justification.  Law exists 
independently.  Order is maintained, not despite, but simply without need of human 
understanding.  Kafka suggests human understanding has no bearings on the world 
order—and to believe that the world is flawed, because humanity lacks comprehension of 
its law, is arrogant.  Kafka’s response to absurdity is acceptance of absurdity.  Had he 
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accepted what he perceived as the irrationality of the High Court, K. would have been 
freed—and in the moments before his death, as he sees a human figure rather than a god, 




The Nature of the Court  
In discussing the Court, the Lower Court and High Court must be differentiated; 
K. is ultimately accused by the highest levels of the High Court, but all proceedings are 
undertaken by the Lower Court.  As an example of bureaucratic inefficiency, the Lower 
and High Courts seem uncoordinated in their handling of the case.  Officials of the Lower 
Court admit their ignorance of the Law of the High Court, and the lowest officials hardly 
know more than the average citizen.  When they arrest K., the officials Willem and Franz 
are unable to disclose what crime he has committed because they are “humble 
subordinates who can scarcely find [their] way through a legal document” (11).  Like the 
bumbling officials of the Castle, the officials of the Court, while part of the Court and 
therefore invested with authority over K., are still themselves distinct from the Court.  
While the High Court itself is beyond humanity, most officials whom K. meets are, like 
him, flawed in their understanding of the Law—because they, like him, are human.  Thus, 
the Lower Court, comprised of humans, takes on bourgeois characteristics seemingly 
absent in the High Court.  The primary difference between K. and the officials is their 
attitude towards the Law.  While K. combatively seeks to overturn the Law that deems 
him guilty, the officials obey the Law despite their ignorance: “Our officials…as the Law 
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decrees…are drawn towards the guilty and must then send out us warders” (12).  Court 
officials never presume to know why K. is guilty, but their faith in the Law that 
condemns K. confirms K.’s guilt.     
Why does the Court command such obedience?  At K.’s first interrogation, the 
undignified Examining Magistrate shows little aptitude for the Law and makes a fool of 
himself by erroneously referring to K. as a “house-painter” (40), soliciting laughter from 
the crowd.  With his minimal authority, he can only respond by “[springing] up and 
scowling” (41).  K. seems not unjustified when he refers to his bizarre case as 
“contemptible” and “misguided” (41–42).  K. is correct when he lambastes Willem and 
Franz, who, as he accuses, did try “to induce [him] to bribe them…to get [his] clothes 
and underclothes under dishonest pretexts…to eat [his] breakfast under [his] eyes” (43).  
But the perceived failings of the Lower Court do not reflect on the High Court.  At the 
beginning of the novel, K.’s situation, while strange, seems plausible; Kafka may well 
have meant to criticize an unjust judicial system neither transparent nor logical, might 
have intended The Trial as a political allegory.  But Kafka soon introduces an element of 
magical realism when, in a store room of his own bank, K. witnesses Willem and Franz 
being flogged because of the complaints he had made in the Lower Court—and the next 
day, K. returns to witness the very same scene repeating itself: “Everything was still the 
same…the files of old papers and the ink-bottles were still tumbled behind the threshold, 
the Whipper with his rod and the warders with all their clothes on were still standing 
there, the candle was burning on the bookcase” (85).  This surreal interjection signals that 
the world is not as it seems.  Kafka hints, therefore, that the Court is more than just an 
earthly establishment, and that above the bourgeois Lower Court exists the true, 
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overseeing authority, the High Court.  Perhaps realizing this truth, K. flees, “almost 
weeping” (86), and he leaves for home, “tired, his mind quite blank” (86).  At this 
moment, K. begins to see the error of the rationalizing mindset; Kafka oscillates between 
acceptance and rejection of the irrational, but readers, like K., must abandon 
preconceived notions of rationality, which are insufficient to understand the Court.  As 
the novel progresses, logic breaks down, and earthly rationality moves towards 
theological awe of the High Court.  Most strikingly, the flogger-and-warders scene 
suggests that the order is cruel and inscrutable, but that cruelty and inscrutability do not 
mitigate absolute authority.  During his punishment, Willem tells K.: “We are only being 
punished because you accused us; if you hadn’t, nothing would have happened, not even 
if they had discovered what we did” (81).  But the flogger insists that the Court’s 
punishment is “as just as it is inevitable” (81).  In other words, regardless of accusation 
and evidence, the guilty are convicted and punished; the guilty are objectively, 
definitively guilty.  K’s charge is issued and adjudicated, not by humanity, but by the 
High Court.  Rather than a human construct, Law is a divine, self-enacting decree.  To K., 
whose crime is unknown but guilt is pre-established, the High Court is both plaintiff and 
judge.   
Architecture further sheds light on the theological nature of the High Court.  As 
indicated by its name, the High Court exists on a higher, perhaps metaphysical level.  
When summoned to his first interrogation, K. is “given the number of the house where he 
had to go…a house in an outlying suburban street where he had never been before” (33).  
Though it is associated with the Lower Court, this location is removed from the world 
familiar to K.  Immediately, the vagueness of the directions confuses him, and K. is 
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unable to choose between the first staircase that he sees, three other sets of stairs 
elsewhere in the house’s courtyard, and a passage to an altogether different courtyard.  
Finally, K. chooses to climb the first staircase.  He remembers Willem’s previous 
assertion of an attraction between Law and guilt and muses that, were he guilty, “it 
should follow that the Interrogation Chamber must lie in the particular flight of stairs 
which [he] happened to choose” (37).  K.’s choice indeed leads him to the Interrogation 
Chamber, an unlikely coincidence that lends credence to both his guilt and the authority 
of the High Court.  Furthermore, the courthouse is situated in an attic in which people can 
stand only “in a bent posture with their heads and backs knocking against the ceiling” 
(38).  There are two reasons for this forced posture: the crowd of people and the 
architecture of the courthouse.  Kafka suggests that humanity contributes to the 
impenetrability of the Law, perhaps through their misguided attempts to understand it, by 
filling the room with a “crowd of the most variegated people” that is too large for the 
small space (38).  In addition, the low ceiling forces humanity to bow its head, indicating 
that the Law demands obedience.  K. feels that the air is “too thick for him” (38), a 
recurring sensation whenever K. visits locations associated with the Court.  When he later 
revisits the courthouse, K. is taken to a still higher level where the airless offices contain 
“hot roof-beams [that] make the air dull and heavy…[and] hardly breathable” (66).  
When he visits Titorelli, a painter with connections to the Court, K. must climb so many 
stairs that he feels “quite out of breath” because of the “stifling” air (132).  Once he 
arrives, K. finds the heat “almost unbearable” (144) because he has been “desperately cut 
off from fresh air” (145).  These elevated spaces suggest the lofty remoteness of the 
Court.  Titorelli also claims that there are “Law-Court offices in almost every attic” (152), 
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at once suggesting height, because of their height, omnipresence, and perpetual oversight.  
Though he ascends to these higher planes, K. learns nothing insightful about the Court 
and instead feels the oppression of stifling air and heat.  Kafka suggests that no 
enlightenment is to be found—that the High Court, the Law, does not promise comfort or 
even benevolence, but embodies an unyielding, incontestable authority.   
K’s Guilt 
Is K. truly guilty?  Professor Herbert Deinert argues against the presumption of 
guilt, claiming that the reader “certainly knows of no crime K. has committed” (197).  
Indeed, K. seems not to have violated any written, statutory laws, but Deinert’s assertion 
ignores customary laws that deal with standards of community.  K. is certainly not an 
innocent or upstanding man.  He may not be a statutory criminal, but he “puts work 
before all else, browbeats his landlady, sexually harasses a fellow lodger, neglects his 
ailing mother and impressionable niece, and breathes not a second’s hesitation at the 
propriety of his conduct” (Conti 100).  Critics largely agree that K. is an avatar of Kafka, 
but Deinert claims that Kafka’s “critical self-consciousness” and “guilt-consciousness” is 
not transposed to K., and therefore, “Kafka might have considered this kind of 
punishment just, [but] K. is a hapless victim” (198).  Deinert’s suggestion implies that 
guilt is subjective and does not exist outside of human perception—but Kafka evidently 
disagreed.  As discussed, the High Court transcends humanity, and its judgments are 
incontestable.  There is little reason to doubt its verdict and little reason to believe that its 
verdict can be doubted at all.  During his flogging, Willem, who claims that his 
punishment is a result of K.’s accusation, echoes K.  Willem seems to believe that the 
Law is a human construct and that, in the absence of human accusation, there can be no 
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guilt.  Likewise, K. muses: “How can any man be called guilty?  We are all simply men 
here, one as much as the other” (195).  Willem and K. believe that, because the Law is 
created by humanity, guilt is determined by humanity, and K. hypothesizes further that, 
because men are equal, no man can determine guilt—and thus, no man can be guilty.  But 
Kafka contests the premise that Law belongs to humanity.  Instead, the transcendental 
nature of the High Court suggests that Law exists independently of humanity, presides 
over humanity, and needs no justification.   
What is K.’s crime?  The Trial begins thus: “Someone must have been telling lies 
about Joseph K., for without having done anything wrong he was arrested one fine 
morning” (7).  Without knowledge of the crime of which he has been accused, K. 
presumes his innocence, and The Trial details his quest to prove it by unraveling the 
workings of the High Court—but K. only seems to prove and further deepen his guilt.  
Assimilated into the bourgeois world, K. not only misunderstands but debases the higher 
order of the High Court with his misguided, human interpretations.  As Herr Huld the 
Advocate tells K., “What makes [him] so wrong-headed is…the fact that [he has] been 
treated too well, although [he is] an accused man, or rather, more precisely, that [he has] 
been treated with negligence, with apparent negligence” (175).  Because of the 
remoteness of the authority that Kafka, too, struggled to accept, K. succumbs to the 
temptation of interpreting the law as social, neglecting the reality of a higher order.  Upon 
his arrest, K.’s first impulse is to think that he has not “done anything wrong,” but the 
ideas of right and wrong are human concepts inapplicable to the High Court.  K. then 
tries to solicit help in his quest from his Uncle Karl; the Advocate, Herr Huld; the Court 
Painter, Titorelli; and finally, the Priest.  But Kafka’s depiction of community in The 
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Trial differs from that in The Castle.  While K. of The Castle forges meaningful 
relationships that offer varying but meaningful interpretations of the Castle, K. of The 
Trial is only impeded by others, save for the Priest.  K.’s quest is solitary, and it must be 
solitary.  As he removes himself from bourgeois influences and earthly, human 
distractions, K. gains a modicum of insight into the High Court and learns the futility of 
his efforts to interpret it from a human perspective.  Once he understands his guilt, he is 
punished with death.  K. receives his punishment only at the end of his quest because K., 
finally understanding why he must die, finally can die.  To understand this process, this 
section follows K.’s quest and his deepening character, which finally enables his death. 
K. begins the novel as the chief cashier of a bank, having been assimilated into a 
bourgeois lifestyle characterized by routine: “K. had been accustomed to pass his 
evenings in this way: after work whenever possible—he was usually in his office until 
nine—he would take a short walk, alone or with some of his colleagues, and then go to a 
beer hall, where until eleven he sat at a table patronized mostly by elder men” (21).  K. is 
the archetypal bourgeois man of solid social standing and respectability, high-ranking and 
trusted yet petty and paranoid.  His insecurity about his social standing causes him to 
imagine the Deputy Manager scheming against him and “prowling every now and then 
into his office, sitting down at his desk, running through his papers” (183), demonstrating 
the insecurity that Hesse attributes to the bourgeoisie.  However, K. is not entirely 
absorbed into the bourgeoisie and deviates from the norm by partaking in sexual affairs.  
According to Hesse, the bourgeois man preserves his self by moderation and avoidance 
of extremes: “The one path leads to the saint, to the martyrdom of the spirit and surrender 
to God.  The other path leads to the profligate, the martyrdom of the flesh, the surrender 
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to corruption” (52).  K. is unable to find spiritual meaning and resorts to the opposite 
extreme: corruption.  Tempted by lust, K. both preys on and is himself preyed upon by 
hypersexualized women.  These sexual encounters typically have vampiric undertones.  
When he makes advances towards his neighbor, Fraulein Burstner, K. seizes her and 
kisses her first on the lips, then “all over the face, like some thirsty animal lapping 
greedily at a spring of long sought fresh water,” before finally kissing her “on the neck, 
right on the throat,” where he keeps his lips “for a long time” (32).  K. later visits an 
Advocate, Herr Huld, to help him with his case, and he begins an affair with Huld’s 
attendant and possible mistress, Leni.  During this encounter, Leni is described as 
bending over K. to bite and kiss his neck, even “biting into the very hairs on his head” 
(104).  Both incidents involve kissing the neck, the implied vampirism of which indicates 
unwholesome, parasitic relationships.  Though sexuality enables K. momentarily to 
escape the bourgeois world, women also distract him from the transcendental truth of the 
High Court.  In contrast to the sanctity of Law, Kafka depicts sexuality as an earthly 
distraction and a symbol of an inscrutable world.  Sexuality is an ever-present temptation, 
but the more wholesome authority—the High Court or, perhaps, God—is silent and 
distant.  When he considers breaking from Herr Huld to handle his own case, K. thinks it 
fortunate that he “should have no chance of discussing it beforehand with Leni,” not only 
because he considers the matter “beyond her scope,” but because, should they speak, she 
would try “to dissuade him…and he would have continued to be a prey to doubts and 
fears” (159).  K. implies that Leni herself is a source of confusion, suggesting that Kafka 
believed sexuality detrimental to the search for meaning; K., who indulges in sexuality, 
neglects divinity and impedes his quest.   
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Ironically, K.’s prosecution is at the hands of a bourgeois organization, the Lower 
Court.  K. is therefore punished by the same bourgeois world to which he belongs, and 
his attempts at defense are also characteristically bourgeois—creating a cycle of futility.  
Unlike the High Court, the Lower Court cannot determine his guilt, because the Lower 
Court, like K., is human; K. likewise cannot claim innocence, because he, like the Lower 
Court, does not possess the authority of the High Court, yet K. defends himself only by 
repeatedly claiming his innocence.  K. breaks with the bourgeois world when his 
priorities shift from women and the bank to “the thought of his case, [which] never left 
him” (107).  Compare the K. who thought his case a waste of time to the K. who, having 
spent two hours thinking about his case and neglecting his work, thinks that this “long 
stretch of precious time…had not been quite lost,” simply because he had “come to 
decisions which might prove valuable” (121).  But though this prioritizing represents 
progress, K.’s mindset remains mired in human defense: “He had often considered 
whether it would not be better to draw up a written defence and hand it in to the 
Court…he would give a short account of his life, and when he came to an event of any 
important explain for what reasons he had acted as he did” (107).  K.’s acknowledgment 
that he may be guilty represents progress, but he still thinks defense possible.  What K. 
must learn is the futility of human effort, and what he must accept is the presence of 
divinity, of something beyond humanity.  Kafka introduces pseudo-father figures—Uncle 
Karl, Herr Huld, Titorelli—who seem to help K., but these human figures, like the female 
characters, impede the true father-son, authority-subject relationship between the High 
Court and K.  Only by shaking the influence of false fathers does K. manage some form 
of understanding; Kafka deviates from his typically positive portrayal of community by 
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depicting individual effort as a path to understanding.   
K.’s first father-figure is Uncle Karl, who appears at the behest of his daughter 
Erna, K.’s cousin, to “find out the real state of things, and if necessary get some of [his] 
influential friends to intervene” (89).  Note the interference of another female character 
who, though her intentions seem benevolent, ultimately represents another distraction.  
Uncle Karl himself seems less concerned with K. than their family name: “Joseph, my 
dear Joseph, think of yourself, think of your relatives, think of your good name.  You 
have been a credit to us until now, you can’t become a family disgrace” (90).  Uncle 
Karl’s preoccupations signify that he, too, represents the shallow bourgeois, a “petty 
squire” despite being “from the country” (87).  He suggests that K. travel with him to the 
country, where he might flee “the clutches of the Court” (91), but the country does not 
free Uncle Karl from the bourgeois world.  Instead, Uncle Karl, a wealthy landowner 
obsessed with his family name, remains entrenched in earthly considerations.  Compared 
to the hypothetical ending of Amerika, in which Karl—coincidentally possessing the 
same name as Uncle Karl—travels to the countryside of Oklahoma putatively to achieve 
freedom, The Trial depicts the country, like the rest of human society, as part of the 
bourgeois world.  Uncle Karl cannot escape even in the country.  He conversely becomes 
more absorbed into the bourgeois world, because the vastness of the country bolsters his 
wealth, leaving him “harassed by the disastrous idea that…he must get through all the 
programme he had drawn up for himself” (87).  Like K., Uncle Karl’s life is dominated 
by schedule and routine, and though he attempts to fulfill a father-role to K., his obvious 
ineffectuality renders him powerless.  Uncle Karl may reflect Kafka’s disappointment in 
his Uncle Alfred, Julie Kafka’s elder brother who, as the general manager of the Spanish 
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railways of Madrid, was a frequent traveler and inspired in Kafka a longing for “far-off 
lands” and freedom; Kafka reportedly asked if Alfred “couldn’t somehow help [him] to 
get out of all this, and…take [him] somewhere [he] could at last set [his] hand to 
something fresh” (Brod 7).  Alfred disappointed Kafka, leaving him under Hermann’s 
authority, and likewise Uncle Karl cannot protect K. from the High Court.    
Uncle Karl introduces K. to Herr Huld, an Advocate who “has quite a 
considerable reputation as a defending counsel and a poor man’s lawyer” (93).  As K.’s 
lawyer, Huld not only handles his case but shares with K. information about the Court, 
becoming another father figure—but again, an ineffectual one whose work yields few 
results.  Huld does offer useful interpretations of the Court, but his fault, like K.’s, is 
over-interpretation.  For instance, K. learns from Huld that “the Defence was not actually 
countenanced by the Law, but only tolerated, and there were differences of opinion even 
on that point, whether the Law could be interpreted to admit such tolerance at all” (109).  
However, the flaw of this interpretation is its very nature as an interpretation.  It is not an 
objective fact.  Huld evidently believes that the Law tolerates defense, else he could not 
be an Advocate, but as he himself states, the Law does not expressly permit defense.  
Thus, Huld’s personal interpretations deviate from the Law.  Huld symbolizes human 
systems of understanding that perhaps mimic the higher order of the world, the divine—
statutory law and religion, for instance—but that Kafka deems insufficient.  Advocates 
know and can navigate the system, but they are not enlightened, demonstrating the limits 
of human understanding: “For although the pettiest Advocate might be to some extent 
capable of analysing the state of things in the Court, it never occurred to the Advocates 
that they should suggest or insist on any improvements in the system” (114).  Kafka’s 
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complaint about his home was Hermann’s inscrutable authority.  Kafka’s complaint about 
the world was the remoteness and inscrutability of divine order and authority, raising the 
question: Why is the world as it is?  But Kafka agreed with the Advocates insofar as the 
inefficacy of suggesting improvement.  Kafka realized that the absurdity of his 
relationship with Hermann had some basis, and he undertook, in Letter to the Father, not 
to improve their relationship but merely to explore it.  Likewise, Kafka believed that 
humanity cannot comprehend the world on the scale required truly to know that it 
requires improvement or what form these improvements might take.  However, Huld and 
the other Advocates are complacent in their flawed understanding of the Court, which, 
while sufficient for their purposes, ultimately falls short of enlightenment.  Huld tells K. 
that the sensible thing is to “adapt oneself to existing conditions…to understand that this 
great organization [remains], so to speak, in a state of delicate balance” (114).  His first 
claim is true enough—Kafka would agree with piety and adaptation—but Huld is 
mistaken to attribute delicacy to the inexorable High Court.  What remains in “delicate 
balance” is Huld’s complacency.  Huld clings to the idea that he can fully navigate the 
Court, refusing to explore it further and penetrate its secrets, because while he 
acknowledges his flawed understanding, he maintains a tenuous peace.  In this regard, 
K.’s insistence on truth and transparency, while misguided in its combative undertones, 
seems more in line with Kafka’s rejection of complacency and advocacy of struggle.   
Finally, K. is introduced by one of his bank clients to Titorelli, the official Court 
Painter whose position should lend a deep understanding of the judicial process.  While K. 
works as a Bank Assessor, Titorelli appears to transcend the bourgeois world as an artist; 
but while K. seeks the truth of the Court, Titorelli, like Huld, is complacent.  Titorelli 
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tells K.: “Perhaps it strikes you that I talk almost like a jurist?  It’s my long association 
with the gentleman of the Court…but I’m losing a great deal of my élan as an artist” 
(141).  That K. learns of Titorelli from a bank client, someone clearly inducted into 
bourgeois society, foreshadows that Titorelli himself does not escape these trappings.  
Titorelli’s artistry, which might have placed him outside the bourgeois world, turns out to 
be manufactured and unoriginal.  Titorelli paints according to conventions and rules, 
having inherited the post as Court Painter from his father and learned the “complicated 
and various and above all secret rules laid down for the painting of the different grades of 
functionaries” (141).  In Titorelli, Kafka depicts the misguided artist satisfied by 
scratching the surface of art—art that satisfies convention and does not challenge the 
norm—because Titorelli, having a minor understanding of the outward form of the Court, 
misses the deeper truth of the Court.  When he outlines methods of escaping trial, 
Titorelli tells K.: “There are three possibilities, that is, definite acquittal, ostensible 
acquittal, and indefinite postponement” (142).  Definite acquittal, Titorelli says, is 
impossible, but only because Titorelli does not know enough about it.  Titorelli suggests 
ostensible acquittal, which means obtaining a provisional verdict of innocence from 
judges of the Lower Court, which can be overturned at any time by the High Court.  As 
Titorelli states, “the charge is lifted from your shoulders for the time being, but it 
continues to hover above you and can, as soon as an order comes from on high, be laid 
upon you again” (147).  The Lower Court cannot absolve guilt, as that is a power 
exclusive to the inaccessible High Court, but it can rescind charges.  This may allude to 
Christian confession, in which the sacrament of penance allows believers to confess sins 
and be absolved by a priest—but Kafka suggests this process is flawed.  Having a human 
122 
	  
component, the Lower Court has limited power to determine and absolve guilt.  Likewise, 
Kafka suggests that religion and other earthly attempts at divine communion can imitate 
the form of the divine, but that the form is not enough, and to believe it sufficient 
disrespects the piety owed to authority.  Seeing K.’s hesitance, Titorelli suggests 
indefinite postponement, which means currying favor with the judges to keep the process 
from progressing.  This will allow K. to “assume with fair certainty that the case will 
never pass beyond its first stages” (149), but like ostensible acquittal, is only a delusion.  
Both methods reinforce submission to authority, but the subject lives in complacency, 
imprisoned under illusory rhetoric.  As K.’s foil, Titorelli seems, despite his knowledge, 
more misguided; K. has the impulse to search for truth, an impulse that Kafka commends. 
The Parable, and K.’s Lesson 
The penultimate and perhaps key chapter of The Trial, “In the Cathedral,” 
introduces the titular Cathedral and its priest, both of which are part of the High Court 
and therefore invest the Court with theological authority.  K., requested by the Bank 
Manager to accompany an Italian client, must meet him at the Cathedral.  When the client 
does not appear, K. explores the Cathedral alone.  Because of the rain outside, the 
Cathedral is dark and visibility is poor, forcing K. to use a pocket-torch.  As he waves it 
“over the rest of the altar-piece” that draws his attention, K. sees that the piece is a 
“portrayal of Christ being laid in the tomb” (190).  If The Castle is a Jewish novel as 
Hannah Arendt proposes, The Trial can be characterized as a Christian novel.  Wayne 
Stables suggests that K. is “ever in medias res, in the midst of a field of guilt whose 
originating transition has already occurred” (571).  His guilt is predetermined because, 
perhaps, like all of humanity, he is cursed by the original sin of Adam and Eve in the 
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“field of guilt” that is the Garden of Eden.  In the Cathedral, the altar-piece of Christ 
reintroduces the theme of sacrifice, briefly mentioned during the earlier flogger-and-
warders scene, when K. had been “really very anxious to get the warders off; since he had 
set himself to fight the whole corrupt administration of this Court” (84).  When Franz 
began to shriek under his flogging, K. had fled, thinking that he “could not afford to let 
the dispatch clerks and possibly all sorts of other people arrive,” and he concluded: “No 
one could really demand that sacrifice from him” (84).  At the Cathedral, K. learns that 
sacrifice is truer than the justice he has long sought.  Justice is the epitome of rationality, 
but sacrifice, though it may be undeserved, is the piety that he must demonstrate.  K. 
must become a Christ-figure.  If the High Court demands sacrifice, then K. must accept 
sacrifice.   
As he ventures deeper into the Cathedral, K. feels the weight of its solemnity: “K. 
felt a little forlorn as he advanced, a solitary figure between the rows of empty seats…and 
the size of the Cathedral struck him as bordering on the limit of what human beings could 
bear” (193).  It is not merely physical size that affects K., but the scope of what the 
Cathedral symbolizes—the omnipresent, omnipotent authority of the High Court.  Like 
Kafka, K. is stricken by the magnitude of the power that governs him and the world.  
Unable to understand it, he can hardly bear its weight.  K. is on the verge of leaving when 
a priest calls out his name.  Unable to resist the summons, K. approaches, and the priest 
tells him, “I had you summoned here, to have a talk with you,” to which K. replies, “I 
didn’t know that.  I came here to show an Italian round the Cathedral” (194).  K.’s answer 
supports Titorelli’s previous claim that “everything belongs to the Court” (140).  K. had 
thought Titorelli’s claim nonsensical, but the priest’s summons suggests that all events, 
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including the Italian client asking to be shown the Cathedral, are under the control of the 
High Court.  Interestingly, the bourgeois Bank leads K. to the Cathedral.  Though he 
seems to criticize the baseness of bourgeois life and the rigidity of organized religion, 
Kafka qualifies his criticism by showing both as mechanisms through which higher 
authority might operate.  In other words, though they are flawed, human systems have 
merit as an attempt at understanding and, given that their flaws are not ignored or 
forgotten, might prove useful.  K., led by the Bank to the Cathedral, speaks with the 
priest and learns his final lesson. 
Immediately, the priest criticizes K.’s methods: “You cast about too much for 
outside help, especially from women.  Don’t you see that it isn’t the right kind of help?” 
(195).  As discussed above, The Trial, unlike The Castle, depicts a solitary quest, in 
which external intervention only impedes the protagonist.  Ironically, K. realizes his 
mistake of relying on help through, once again, help, which perhaps explains why this 
conversation does not enlighten K. so much as it shows him why his efforts have been, 
and are doomed to be, futile.  Kafka uses the setting to elucidate K.’s incomprehension: 
“In the prevailing darkness the priest certainly could not make out K.’s features, while K. 
saw him distinctly by the light of the small lamp” (196).  While the priest stands in the 
light, K. is hidden in darkness.  Even now, K. is preoccupied with finding “a mode of 
living completely outside the jurisdiction of the Court” (196).  The priest claims that K. is 
“deluded” (197) before reciting the parable “Before the Law,” to demonstrates K.’s 
delusion about the High Court.   
 Superficially understood, the parable is simple.  “Before the Law stands a 
doorkeeper on guard,” and an unnamed man tries in vain to gain entrance to the Law, 
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thinking it should “be accessible to every man and at all times,” but he spends the rest of 
his life waiting for permission that is never granted.  Before his death, he asks the 
doorkeeper: “Everyone strives to attain the Law.  How does it come about, then, that in 
all these years no one has come seeking admittance but me?” (197–198).  The doorkeeper 
replies: “No one but you could gain admittance through this door, since this door was 
intended only for you.  I am now going to shut it” (198).  Deceptively simple, the parable 
lends itself to a range of interpretations, which the priest gradually explains, but none of 
these interpretations are meant as truths.  K.’s immediate reaction is to rely on concepts 
of right and wrong, latching on to the idea that the doorkeeper has deluded the man.  At 
this, the priest chides K.: “You have not enough respect for the written word and you are 
altering the story” (199).  As it is written, the parable does not include the word delusion; 
therefore, it is wrong to speak of delusion.  When the priest suggests that the doorkeeper 
is benevolent—being humble of his position and respectful to his superiors, refusing to be 
bribed and attending the man—K. is almost convinced, but the priest offers another 
interpretation, that the doorkeeper is the one deluded.  Though he seems to hold power 
over the man, the doorkeeper is actually subordinate because he must remain to guard the 
door intended for the man, and though he is in the service of the Law, the doorkeeper 
only guards its door but has never penetrated the Law.  Interpreting the doorkeeper as 
deluded suggests that religion has lost meaning; Kafka may once again be noting that 
religion, like the doorkeeper, preserves the form and social structure of authority but, 
because of its subordination, lacks purpose.  Religion is a social construction and holds 
no power over independent, metaphysical truth.  Therefore, the door in the parable does 
not matter, religion does not matter, and the man who seeks truth, regardless of the form 
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this quest takes, is already on the right path.  But the priest reminds K. that he is only 
reporting one of many of the “various opinions concerning that point” (201).  Though his 
arguments are logically sound and the “individual steps of the argument seem flawless, 
the discussion as a whole has reached no conclusion whatsoever” (Deinert 194).  These 
interpretations fail because they depend on logic.  As the priest insists, these 
interpretations are irrelevant, because “the scriptures are unalterable” and the 
interpretations “often enough merely express the commentator’s bewilderment” (201).  
What can be learned from the parable?     
 K. remains unwilling to abandon the idea that the man is a victim of delusion, 
because the doorkeeper’s delusion must also delude the man.  In response, the priest says: 
“Whatever he may seem to us, he is yet a servant of the Law…he belongs to the Law and 
as such is set beyond human judgement” (203).  This is the prelude to the final lesson of 
piety that K. must learn.  Nowhere does the text give the right to judge, to pass judgment 
on the doorkeeper, who exists above the reach of humanity because of his connection to 
the Law.  Doubting him would be “to doubt the Law itself” (203), and the Law cannot be 
doubted.  K. cannot agree, because to do so would mean accepting as truth all that the 
doorkeeper says, but as the priest has proven, the text does not explicitly validate the 
doorkeeper’s statements and thus they cannot be interpreted.  Solving this paradox, the 
priest says simply: “It is not necessary to accept everything as true; one must only accept 
it as necessary” (204).  Kafka is less romantic than existential.  Here, he makes his most 
forthright argument that necessity precedes truth.  Regardless of interpretation, authority 
will exist, order will exist, and therefore, interpretations attempting to capture its essence 
are not only futile but ultimately meaningless.  Attempting to free oneself from authority 
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is “based on the delusion that this is possible” (Deinert 195).  Discussion of the parable 
leads to no conclusion, and the implications escape comprehension, because the parable 
is meant to demonstrate the impossibility of interpretation.  K. defends the man seeking 
admission to the Law because he, too, seeks admission to the High Court, but his 
obsession with right and wrong, innocence and guilt, blinds him to the significance of the 
narrative—that meaning is found not in grand, sweeping truths, but in the individual steps 
toward understanding.  K. is unable to understand the parable because he interprets it and 
tries to establish a correct interpretation.  In doing so, he imposes himself on the narrative.  
As the priest states, the text is unchangeable.  What can be interpreted from it without 
introducing personal elements?  K. should struggle to explore and understand, but his 
failure is believing that he can interpret the world and judge the Law, when the Law is 
instead owed his submission and piety.  K. must make a sacrifice—abandon rationality 
and fully embrace the absurdity of Law. 
 K. does not recognize the significance of the parable, and Deinert argues that, 
even if he had, K. would not have benefited: “Whoever his accusers are, they reside 
somewhere in sublime unconcern…. His fate is irreconcilable and will be the same” 
(197).  Deinert is correct about K.’s fate being unchangeable, but to suggest that K.’s 
quest is ultimately futile implies that personal growth is impossible.  Regardless of his 
fate, understanding the parable would have, at the very least, given him peace of mind.  
K.’s actions may be unnoticed by the High Court, but acknowledgment by higher 
authority is unnecessary.  If it were, then Letter to His Father would have been utterly 
meaningless.  Like the parable, the letter made little difference.  Even if he had read it, 
Hermann would not have acknowledged it.  Kafka likely realized the futility of 
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reconciliation, but Letter to His Father remains meaningful despite being an inadequate 
bridge between father and son.  For Kafka, the letter clarified the absurdity of their 
relationship and perhaps allowed him to accept it.  Likewise, the parable would have 
allowed K. to accept his fate, unalterable as it is, and the ending of the novel might not 
have been steeped in hopelessness. 
On the evening before K.’s thirty-first birthday, two men arrive to take K.  Now 
realizing the “futility of resistance,” knowing that there “would be nothing heroic in it 
were he to resist,” K. leads the men to a quarry, where they lay his head against a boulder 
(208).  Preparing to execute him, they draw a “long, thin, double-edged butcher’s knife” 
(210).  It suggests an animalistic death, as though K. were less than human—because K. 
has not lived up to his humanity.  Even now, after learning something of his guilt, K. has 
not realized his potential. Recall K. at the beginning of the novel.  He considered taking 
his life “such a senseless act that, even if he wished, he could not bring himself to do it 
because of its very senselessness” (13).  Now, at the end of his quest, K. perceives 
“clearly that he [is] supposed to seize the knife himself…and plunge it into his own 
breast” (210).  Senselessness no longer inhibits K., signifying his maturation beyond 
bourgeois logic and acceptance of irrationality.  However, K. still fails in two important 
regards.  First, despite recognizing that he should, K. fails to take the knife.  K. realizes 
that because he “could not relieve the officials of all their tasks, the responsibility for this 
last failure of his lay with him” (210).  During his quest, K. should have learned not to 
rely on others, but he still needs the officials to mediate between him and the Court.  
They must interpret K.’s guilt and punishment for him, enacting something that K. should 
himself do.  Thus, K. fails to achieve personal communion with or even personal 
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acceptance of the Court.  Finally, K. looks up at a house above the quarry moments 
before his death, and he experiences an epiphany:  
With a flicker as of a light going up, the casements of a window there suddenly 
flew open; a human figure, faint and insubstantial at that distance and that height, 
leaned abruptly far forward and stretched both arms still farther.  Who was 
it? …A good man?  …Where was the Judge whom he had never seen?  Where 
was the High Court, to which he had never penetrated?  He raised his fingers and 
spread out all his fingers. (210) 
All the signs point to this experience as a religious epiphany—occurring before death, the 
flicker of light, the figure gesturing seemingly in welcome—but Kafka specifies that K. 
sees a human figure, not a godly one.  As an epiphany, this experience must incorporate 
some form of revelation.  At the risk of angering the priest, interpretations must be 
suggested here, but unlike K.’s interpretation of the High Court, these aim to interpret 
something human and are thus hopefully permissible.  There is nothing supernatural 
about the figure, which metaphorizes the divine in human terms; Kafka may be saying 
that redemption is human, that redemption, the definite acquittal of guilt that Titorelli 
deemed impossible, may be possible after all.  Why does K. raise his hands?  K. may 
ward off the light, unable to bear its severity just as he was unable to bear the size of the 
Cathedral, but spread fingers may also be a sign of worship, demonstrating K.’s 
acceptance of his judgment and death.  Ambiguity persists to the final line, which reads: 
“‘Like a dog!’ K. said: it was as if he meant the shame of it to outlive him” (211).  
Nothing explains this shame.  Nothing specifies that the shame belongs to K.  Perhaps the 
shame belongs to K., that he should die like an animal, or perhaps the shame belongs to 
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the Court, that it was unable to teach K.  It is entirely possible that Kafka himself did not 
know, that his writing “transcends [him] and makes him say in reality more than he is 
aware of expressing” (Camus 124), but the passage and the novel are no less meaningful 
for their ambiguity.  Likewise, authority does not need to be immanent to have meaning, 
because its existence is enough.  Christopher Conti argues that K. is Kafka’s “bête noire, 
the model for the diabolical agencies of self-observation that Kafka alternately solicited 
and shunned in his diaries” (101).  On December 9, 1913, Kafka wrote: “Hatred of active 
introspection…. To put up with oneself calmly, without being precipitate, to live as one 
must, not to chase one’s tail like a dog” (Diaries 244–245).  K. dies like a dog because, 
relying on introspection and logic and refusing to accept an inscrutable but unalterable 
truth, he has “lived in pursuit of his tail” (Conti 101).  All of this recalls the priest’s point, 





 Prominent writers often become adjectives, their visions so distinct and so 
powerful that their names become synonymous with aspects of experience: the Orwellian, 
the Chekhovian, the Kafkaesque.  Kafka’s name connotes horror and surrealism, but 
popular usage of “Kafkaesque” often misrepresents his vision.  Though he indeed 
depicted desperate, futile struggles against inscrutable bureaucracies, Kafka transcended 
this depiction, straddling fantasy and reality to explore truths of humanity and ultimate 
meaning.  Within the world of anxiety and paranoia that he creates, Kafka possesses a 
strange, haunting elegance.  Kafkian literature is characterized by contradiction: 
terrifying yet beautiful, hopeless yet full of hope; there are “perpetual oscillations 
between the natural and the extraordinary, the individual and the universal, the tragic and 
the everyday, the absurd and the logical” (Camus 126).  Written in the second-person 
perspective, parables are perhaps best suited to Kafka’s message.  In “An Imperial 
Message,” the Emperor sends a message to you, “the humble subject, the insignificant 
shadow cowering in the remotest distance before the imperial sun” (The Complete Stories 
4).  Despite your insignificance, the message is meant for you and you alone.  It speaks to 
the human desire for communion with a higher being, for meaning and importance 
behind everyday existence.  Perhaps the message is the key to understanding, the answer 
to all uncertainties and questions.  But Kafka emphasizes the impossibility of that 
message ever arriving.  Because “the multitudes are so vast,” the messenger must fight 
through “the chambers of the innermost palace.” Even should he succeed, he can never 
travel through the imperial capital, “the center of the world, crammed to bursting with its 
own sediment” (5).  This haunting parable ends in futility.  Some message of great 
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importance is meant for you, but you will never hear it.  All you can do is “sit at your 
window when evening falls and dream it to yourself” (5).  Kafka combines yearning and 
intense hope with futility and hopelessness, but for all its bleakness, futility is not so 
terrible.  Though the message never arrives, you still have your dreams.  Kafka depicts 
conflicting emotions that are somehow compatible—reflecting his own intense struggle 
to reconcile rationality and a reality with no apparent meaning or logic. 
Amidst this discussion of bureaucracy and authority and meaning, one might 
accidentally mythologize Kafka as a perfect author who unwaveringly adhered to his 
transcendental vision.  But like anyone else, Kafka was flawed.  Kafka, too, indulged in 
escapism.  Recall that Hermann was the root of Kafka’s theme, the basis of Kafka’s 
understanding of authority, and that Kafka, in the service of his writing, never broke from 
Hermann by starting a family of his own.  Though he never married, Kafka did, near the 
end of his life, leave Prague and Hermann.  In the summer of 1923, Kafka met Dora 
Dymant at the Berlin Jewish People’s Home.  Like Kafka, Dymant rebelled against the 
constraint of her father and left Poland for Germany, as Brod describes: “For all the 
respect she bore her father whom she loved, she couldn’t stand the constraint, the 
narrowness of the tradition” (97).  Perhaps their shared discontent bred kinship between 
Kafka and Dymant.  Kafka soon decided to follow Dymant’s example and, “after offering 
successful resistance to all his family’s objections” (197), left with her for Berlin.  
Though he considered this time a period of happiness and salvation for Kafka, Brod also 
notes that, after leaving with Dymant, Kafka suffered through a particularly frightful 
winter that aggravated his tuberculosis: “It is that which really killed Franz, so I think” 
(201).  Coincidental though it must be, the timing is bizarrely appropriate.  After leaving 
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Hermann, the catalyst of his creative genius, Kafka began to die.  Just as his characters 
could not escape their subjugation, needed their subjugation, Kafka could not escape and 
needed Hermann.  On March 17, 1924, Kafka returned to Prague and his parents, which 
he felt “as the shipwreck of all his plans for being independent, as a defeat” (Brod 203).  
There had never been a chance for independence.     
During his last days, tortured by tuberculosis, Kafka consoled himself with 
literature—though he could not read it.  Kafka wrote to Brod, “It isn’t that I am really 
reading; I’m too tired for that.  Being closed is my eyes’ natural state, but playing with 
books and magazines makes me happy” (Letters to Friends, Family, and Editors 414).  
On May 20, 1924, two weeks before his death, Kafka thanked Brod for a recently 
received book but focused on its appearance: “So now the book is here too, just the look 
of it magnificent, glaring yellow and red with a touch of black, and very tempting” (415).  
Kafka could no longer muster the energy to read but his obsession with literature 
remained—an obsession that comforted him in his dying days, an obsession that 
ironically ended in his abandonment of content in favor of form.  Perhaps Kafka, had he 
been fully lucid, would have decried his own reliance on the physical form of the novel.  
It does remind of the Lower Court and the bureaucracy of the Castle, imitations 
possessing the form of higher truth yet nothing more than imitations.  Regardless, 
literature again became Kafka’s escape, this time from earthly pain, pain that nearly 
drove him mad.  Kafka demanded morphine from Doctor Robert Klopstock, the “friend 
become father, judge, and God” (Pawel 446).  Dependent on Klopstock’s care and liable 
to die at any moment, Kafka raged: “Kill me, or else you are a murderer” (Pawel 446).  
Illness murdered any pride or independence Kafka might have possessed.  Klopstock, 
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Kafka’s sole caretaker, held such power over him that Kafka doubtlessly believed 
Klopstock the murderer of his dignity.  Once again, Kafka was subjugated, having 
suffered his entire life from anxiety, insecurity, alienation, and depression.  Death might 
not have been worse.  As Socrates argues in “Apology,” death is an unknown, but “men 
fear it as if they knew that it is the greatest of evils” (29b).  What should be feared in 
death?  Socrates denounces baseless knowledge as “blameworthy ignorance” (29b), an 
opinion Kafka likely shared.  All his writing points to distrust in humanity, which is 
entangled in bourgeois society but blind to its entanglement.  Nor did Kafka trust his own 
ability to achieve enlightenment, and he headed to his death accepting failure.   
On May 19, 1924, in what may be his final letter to his parents, Kafka reminisces 
about the time they had spent together in Franzensbad, the times Kafka and Hermann 
“used to have beer together quite often…when [Hermann] would take [Kafka] along to 
the Civilian Swimming Pool” (Letters to Friends, Family, and Editors 414).  But this is 
not mere wistfulness.  Even lying on his deathbed, Kafka remembered Hermann not 
merely as his father but as the supreme authority, choosing to recount a memory of 
himself, “a little skeleton,” shying away from but also admiring Hermann, “strong, tall, 
broad” (Letter to His Father 15).  Kafka urged his parents to stay away, perhaps yielding, 
one final time, to escapism.  Kafka may not have wanted to see his parents, because he 
could not “show the visitors major, undeniable progress” in his illness (Letter to Friends 
415), and because he no longer wanted to fight.  Kafka and Hermann could not have 
reconciled.  Reconciliation lay outside their nature.  Hermann, the root of Kafka’s every 
internal conflict, anxiety, and frustration, could not have offered comfort.  Kafka died 
without Hermann ever reading Letter to His Father, and he asks his parents: “I think we 
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should rather let it be.  So shall we not let it ride for the present, dear parents?” (415).  
Kafka had accepted his turbulent relationship with Hermann, accepted his irrational 
subordination to a distant, inscrutable authority.  In his diary entry of January 9, 1920, 
Kafka writes: 
Through a heaven of vice a hell of virtue is reached…. It is no disproof of one’s 
presentiment of an ultimate liberation if the next day one’s imprisonment 
continues on unchanged, or is even made straiter, or if it is even expressly stated 
that it will never end.  All this can rather be the necessary preliminary to an 
ultimate liberation. (Diaries 391) 
Though he never escaped Hermann, Kafka had nevertheless been liberated by his 
acceptance of his fate.  On June 12, 1923, Kafka unifies in his final diary entry the three 
overarching aspects of his life: his relationship with Hermann, his writing, and his desired 
freedom.  Kafka and Hermann existed in discordant harmony, combative to the very end, 
their every word a “spear turned against the speaker” and their conflict irresoluble, but 
they needed each other, so much so, Kafka writes, that “it happens whether you like or no, 
and what you like is of infinitesimally little help.”  More consolation: “You too have 
weapons” (Diaries 423).  In the end, Kafka was not defenseless.  Writing was his weapon 
and his freedom.  Kafka had already learned everything to be learned from Hermann, 
written everything to be written about Hermann—and thus had no need to see him.   
Kafka died at noon on Tuesday, June 3, 1924.  Milena Jesenka’s farewell, which 
was published in the conservative Národní Listy of June 5, 1924, says of Kafka:  
Few knew him, for he was a loner, a recluse wise in the ways of the world and 
frightened by it.  For years he had been suffering from a lung disease, which he 
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cherished and fostered…. He wrote the most significant works of modern German 
literature; their stark truth makes them seem naturalistic even where they speak in 
symbols.  They reflect the irony and prophetic vision of a man condemned to see 
the world with such blinding clarity that he found it unbearable and went to his 
death. (Pawel 447)  
Jesenka spoke truly of Kafka.  Kafka was a solitary visionary who scrutinized the world, 
peeled back layers and layers of falsity to expose truths that he himself could not fully 
comprehend, and wrote words of brutal beauty.  Though Jesenka’s farewell praises Kafka, 
his life, beset by mental and physical pain, concluded without fanfare.  The German-
language press ran obituaries and five hundred people attended Kafka’s memorial service 
at Prague’s German Chamber Theater on June 19, including, presumably, readers of the 
few short stories he had published.  But the world had not yet noticed Kafka.  Beyond 
Prague, Kafka was largely unknown.  Three Czech papers published obituaries, but one 
misspelled Kafka’s name.  Kafka would have preferred anonymity, but Brod, who 
preserved his work, brought Kafka public renown.  Kafka distinguishes himself as an 
author who refused escapism, refused individualism, refused romanticism, for the painful, 
piercing truth—the truth of a world governed by a higher authority, the truth of a 
humanity destined to fail, but the truth, also, of hope.  The Kafkaesque is not 
hopelessness, but instead the hope of a man who had much for the world but none for 
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